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ERRATA 
P. 7, the last paragraph should read as follows: 
Two related criticisms follow. The pure encounter 
theologian speaks of I-Thou encounters as self-authen- 
ticating; yet, he uses language in some instances which 
makes this-contention questionable. On the one hand, 
an I-Thou encounter is described as the awareness of 
"numinous awful presence". This term qualifies as 
being appropriate to describe a self-authenticating 
experience. It is difficult to take exception to such 
non-specific, non-descriptive terminology; names for 
the Godhead are not suggested. The experience may be 
as the theologian claims. But other terms are also 
used to describe encounter and they present immediate 
questions. Terms such as "Father of Jesus Christ", 
"Creator", and others are used to describe the I-Thou 
encounter. They add -- 
P. 66, line twelve - delete the word "vocational". 
P. 133, the ninth and tenth lines should read: per- 
ceptual synthesis is incomplete because transcendency 
is never absent. 
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The motivation for this study comes from the author's 
acquaintance with Martin Buber, a strong appreciation of 
his 
thought, and a long held assumption that theology today 
is 
justly indebted to his phenomenology of interpersonal rela- 
tions. 
The purpose of the investigation is, generally 
speaking, to ascertain the validity of my long-held assumption. 
More specifically, I seek to analyze the I-Thou typology 
critically. The phenomenology of personal encounter is 
cast in two categories, the I-It and I-Thou forms. What 
these forms specify about human interaction is of special 
interest. Secondly, his phenomenology is connected to a 
specific ontology and theology; I seek to analyze and evaluate 
those connections in order to understand viable relationships 
among phenomenology, ontology and theology. Specifically, I 
concentrate on how a phenomenology of the interhuman bears 
upon the issue of transcendence. What is its proper function, 
and how can theological study "make use" of such a phenomen- 
ology? 
The study is a philosophical investigation; it seeks 
to clarify the proper use of phenomenology, and specifically 
how it relates to belief in God. The challenge in such an 
investigation is to remain sensitive to the insights offered 
in a phenomenology of interpersonal encounter, while retaining 
a critical approach to it and its connections with ontology 
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and theology. This complex of tasks suggests a particular 
procedure. 
The first task is to ascertain which issues need to 
be isolated. This calls for a critical study of Buber 
before we begin the constructive effort. To ask questions 
about his phenomenology is, perhaps, as important as building 
a case for how a phenomenology should function in opening 
the issue of transcendence. I study Buber by dealing with 
the questions of a noted critic, Ronald Hepburn. 
Following this I describe and analyze the phenomen- 
ology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a distinguished phenomen- 
ologist of the interpersonal; reasons are given for selection 
of this thinker at the appropriate place. This is the 
beginning of the constructive effort, although the first 
priority is to describe the concepts germane to his phenomen- 
ology of intersubjectivity. I learn from him that a phen- 
omenology of the interhuman can do justice to the insights 
of Buber while at the same time forming more viable connections 
between phenomenology, ontology, and theology. Alternatives 
are found at many points, which are more credible than those 
Buber allows. 
There is also good reason for comparative studies 
which concentrate on two issues. The first is that of 
refining a method which will be proper for the construction 
of a phenomenology of interpersonal encounter. We investigate 
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the thought of Edmund Husserl and its relation to the thought 
of Merleau-Ponty to develop a method which will serve our 
overall objective. I also analyze the phenomenological- 
ontology of Martin Heidegger to sharpen the relationship 
between a phenomenology of intersubjectivity and ontology. 
Finally, I undertake the constructive effort to bring 
together the findings of the analytical and comparative seg- 
ments, and to suggest a relation between a phenomenology of 
the interhuman and faith which conforms to those findings. 
The study is critical and constructive; though it 
is certainly not exhaustive of all the issues, it is hoped 
that it can be of use in the theolological community. 
CHAPTER I 
MARTIN BUBER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY--MEETIN G- 
It is our purpose in this first chapter to describe 
and interpret Martin Buber's I-Thou philosophy, paying 
special attention to his concept of interpersonal meetings. 
We single out this aspect of his thought in the beginning 
because it plays a central role in the rest of his work; 
his notion of the interpersonal gives us access to his 
ontological explications and clarifies his religious'con- 
victions. These will be discussed in Chapter II. 
As for procedure, we shall follow a simple model, 
i. e. letting our reading of Buber be a response to crit- 
icisms, specifically those of Ronald Hepburn. The reason 
is twofölds too often we read theologians heavily indebted 
to Buber, both Christian and Jewish, who in applying his 
thought court a misunderstanding of the original. 1 The 
first task is to understand what Buber intends to say about 
meeting; we readily admit that it is our interpretation of 
what he says, and his intentions, but there is strong evi- 
dence to support our case. Second, we shall concentrate on 
responding to Hepburn's criticisms because this procedure 
1This is true in Buber's mind to be sure. See his, "Replies to My Critics", especially his criticisms of Wheel- 
wright and Rotenstreich, Schlipp, Paul and Friedman, Maurice, (eds. ) The Philosophy of Martin Buber, LaSalle, Ill., Open Court 
Publ. Co., 1967, pp. 689 ff. 
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should highlight the central tenets of Buber's philosophy 
rather than focusing upon details. Our objective is to 
uncover the structures of his phenomenology of meeting 
and to organize epistemological issues; response to ob- 
jections should help. us to see- the_ major'difficulties in 
his thought and the unique contributions. 
Ronald Hepburn's book, Christianity and Paradox, 
contains serious criticism of many theological viewpoints, 
but his two chapters on "Encounters" have, to my mind, the 
most thorough and challenging objections to the I-Thou phil- 
osophy of any work read. 1 He cannot be considered an "enemy" 
to whom counter-attack is due; his questions strike at the 
heart of the I-Thou concept of meeting. He is a thoughtful 
and at times sympathetic critic. Understandably we will be 
asking if Hepburn has criticized Buber correctly but this 
is not meant to imply that his questions are irrelevant; 
rather we do so to rethink the I-Thou concepts of meeting 
and to reread Buber in light of thoughtful criticisms. What 
follows is an enumeration of the assumptions and objections 
Hepburn makes. 
To begin, we cite Hepburn's primary assumption: 
it is that encounter theologians maintain that an ostensive 
definition of God is obtainable within their philosophy of 
1Hepburn, Ronald, Christianity and Paradox, London, 
C. A. Watts and Co., 1958. 
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meeting. 
' In Hepburn's words, the theologians say: 
God cannot be pointed out, brought forward for 
identification, or indeed made perceptible to any 
of the senses. But He may be encountered as the 
Thou of my prayer. 2 
This statement points out that encounter theologians 
do seek to demonstrate the existence of God, not through 
reason, or empirically verifiable tests,.. but through the 
"gesture" of encountering Otherness as the supreme Thou. 
Prayer, as we shall see, is for Buber a gesture which grows 
out of meeting another person as a Thou. We emphasize now 
the assumption which leads Hepburn to his severest critique-- 
the fact that Buber and others seek to demonstrate through a 
philosophy of meeting, that God exists. In Hepburn's por- 
trayal of this objective, he specifies the way it is supposed 
to be carried out. Their procedure: 
. if God is no object, if instead He is a person 
. another approach is demanded .... The one 
appropriate procedure is to entrust ourselves in prayer 
to the being who is properly only talked to not theorized 
about ... Instead of depending on uncertain chains of 
reasoning, we should depend on a self-authenticating 
direct awareness of God; a knowledge by acquaintance 
from which all fallible inference-steps are absent. 
ZHepburn does not address himself exclusively to 
Martin Buber; he includes those who, like H. H. Farmer, 
and Emil Brunner, are indebted to Buber. We shall record those places where he has someone else in mind; otherwise it can be assumed that Buber would be an object of his 
criticism. 
2Hepburn, R., op. cit., p. 18. 
31bid. 
L. 
This procedure leads the theologian to use inter- 
personal I-Thou meetings as the central analogy to demon- 
strate God's existence. We meet others as particular 
thou's; we meet God as absolute Person. The important 
thing is the theologian's objective: as far as Hepburn 
is concerned, the theologian seeks to demonstrate the 
existence of God by this means. This assumption is central 
for Hepburn's critique; the effectiveness of a theology of 
encounter rests upon its ability to establish God's exis- 
tence. It fails if it cannot produce such a result. 
Later, in response to this assumption we shall ask 
if Buber pursues such an objective, either overtly or 
covertly. Does he believe that such an objective is proper? 
If not, what is the significance of I-Thou encounters? 
Specifically, what is Buber's conception of the linkage 
between interhuman encounters and divine-human meeting? 
We shall discuss this. in Chapter II, but Buber's objectives 
should be made clear, if possible, in the present chapter. 
To fail to bring clarity here would be to court wrong 
assumptions about Buber's efforts. By establishing his 
objectives, the phenomenology of meeting will be put into 
perspective. 
Hepburn's criticisms commence under the general 
heading of "possibilities for error and illusion". 1 His 
llbid., p. 30. 
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first concern is that the theologians being considered 
provide no checking-procedures in their assumption that 
interpersonal relations demonstrate the existence and 
nature of divine-human encounters. 1 When the encounter 
theologian argues that because such and such is the case 
in human relations, we can justifiably believe in God's 
existence, he says something which can be checked with 
regard to human relationships. But what he says about 
the interpersonal does not necessarily support his conclusion 
that God exists. The theologian makes a crucial transition; 
checking procedures, Hepburn says, apply to the premise but 
not to the conclusion. The latter sphere, the theologian 
contends, is beyond all "fallible inference steps"; that 
is, no checking procedures are admissible. 
2 Hepburn 
responds, "Can we accept the sharp division--either argu- 
ments for God or personal relations, nothing in between? "3 
In extreme cases (and Buber is an extreme in Hepburn's 
estimation) no checking-procedures are admissible in the 
sphere of interpersonal relations. Hepburn deals with 
Buber as a "pure encounter theologian". Buber, he says, 
makes no connection between the spheres of It and Thou; 
1The term "checking-procedures" refers to the phen- 
omenon's being open to both empirical and logical verifi- 
cation. It must be available. for the weighing of-evidence. 
2Hepburn, op. cit., p. 18 
31bid., p. 30. 
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that is, checking-procedures apply only to the world where 
an interpersonal encounter is excluded, the I-It world. 
In the I-Thou sphere,. checking is irrelevant. 
To Buber, the two 'primary words' I-Thou and I-It, 
describe two fundamentally different, mutually exclusive 
forms of our relation to our world. 
In connection with this objection,. Hepburn defines 
two terms he uses frequently in his argument, "knowledge 
about" and "direct awareness". The first term pertains to 
checking-procedures. We can have knowledge about another 
if we can look at behavioral patterns, physical character- 
istics, or evaluate discourse between two people. Knowledge 
about is the key in describing what kind of a relationship 
exists. Direct awareness is synonomous with Buber's I-Thou 
notion; it is the form of meeting or encounter. Hepburn 
argues that Buber separates such knowledge about another 
from the sphere of encounter by placing it completely in 
the I-It category. Direct awareness in the I-Thou sphere, 
is immune to checking procedures and knowledge about the 
other. This includes all forms of empirical or logical 
evidence. The two spheres in Buber's thought are mutually 
exclusive; this is fundamental to Hepburn's objection. 
It leads us to ask if Buber does, indeed, make the 
I-It, I-Thou forms mutually exclusive? Does he argue that 
the sphere of knowledge about objects and persons is totally 
lIbid., p. 26 (underlining mine). 
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divorced from the sphere of meeting? Is our experience of 
another person in the I-Thou form, something we can know 
anything about? 
We anticipate our reading of Buber in saying that 
there will be no argument with Hepburn about the differences 
between I-It and I-Thou forms. But Hepburn perceives more 
than differences; he claims there are no connections between 
the two forms of, relation. They are mutually exclusive; 
this is the argument that concerns us. If they are truly 
separate and totally divorced, Hepburn has found a telling 
criticism to the I-Thou phenomenology. The total absence 
of knowledge about another would seem to make I-Thou 
encounters a highly problematic form, unavailable for 
logical interpretation and divorced from the concrete 
world of experience. If Buber does not intend exclusiveness, 
, 'that are the points of connection between the two forms? 
Two related criticisms follow. First, the pure 
encounter theologian speaks of I-Thou encounters as 
"self-authenticating"; yet, he uses language which makes 
such a contention questionable. In addition to portraying 
I-Thou encounter as an awareness of a "numinous awful 
presence", the terms "Creator, " "Father of Jesus Christ, " 
and others, are employed. Whereas "numinous awful presence" 
is non-descriptive and therefore appropriate for describing 
a direct awareness, the latter terms are not. They add 
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descriptive interpretations to the experience; they describe 
the "Thou, " and this leads Hepburn to observe that a "pure" 
twareness or directness cannot be claimed for an encounter 
if such terms are employed. The cherished beliefs of a 
religious community very likely influence the theologian's 
description. This is the first difficulty with the claim 
to direct awareness. 
The second difficulty is the theologian's use of 
psychological terminology to demonstrate the existence of 
I-Thou encounters. 
We shall also have to consider the objection that 
such certainty as the Christian claims for his encounter 
with God can only be had by 'subjective' or 'psych- 
ological' statements: statements not to the effect 
that such and such exists or is the case, but that I 
have such and such sensations and no more . 
l. 
When this criticism is associated with the assumption 
credited to the encounter theologians i. e. that I-Thou events 
demonstrate God's existence, we can see the seriousness of 
Hepburn's objections. Pure encounter theologians, he 
implies, use a kind of "double-think" in their explication 
of an event; they claim God's existence an acceptable 
"conclusion" and they employ language which exposes reliance 
upon sensations and feelings. Understandably, Hepburn finds 
this to be contradictory. 
llbid., 
p. 31. We take note of the fact that Hepburn 
directs his criticism towards "Christians", and Buber was a 
Hasidic Jew. Still, the criticism can apply if Buber uses 
psychological statements appropriate to his tradition. 
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Concerning the use of both descriptive and psych- 
ological terminology, we are obligated to see whether 
Buber consciously employs them and if so with what objectives 
in mind. Does Buber use these two forms of language in his 
I-Thou catagory? Can a psychological rootage be uncovered 
in Buber's descriptions of the I-Thou form? Another consid- 
eration: if Buber denies that I-Thou encounters demonstrate 
God's existence, must we conclude that I-Thou encounters 
have only a psychological reference? We ask as does Hepburn: 
is there any middle ground between a case for God's existence 
and "sensations and no more"? 
Hepburn's final, and most extensively described 
objection, concerns the method that theologians employ in 
relating the sphere of the interpersonal to divine-human 
encounter. 
If the vital analogy here is that between meeting 
people and meeting God, have the theologians esta- 
blished this analogy firmly enough to bear the weighty 
super-structure they have reared upon it? 
Encounters between people are supposed to serve as 
an analogy for the pure unfettered meeting between God and 
man. The way the theologians construct the analogy concerns 
Hepburn; it is in their interpretation of interpersonal 
relations that the theologian errs. They have not only 




misjudged philosophically what can be said about human 
encounters. Certainly, if Hepburn is correct about the 
theologian's misjudgment of the interpersonal, it will be 
a telling criticism of teachings resting upon it. 
Hepburn says that the encounter theologians construct 
a "scale of relative purity" to make the connection. 1 By 
this he means that a model is constructed; the lowest points 
on the scale indicate "impure" relationships, i. e. situ- 
ations in which people use one another or treat the opposite 
party as an "object". There is reliance, at this point on 
the scale, on the other's behavioral characterisitics, and 
on physical appearance; the predominant form of the relation 
is "knowledge about". At a higher point on the scale, 
perhaps, when the parties are well acquainted, the theo- 
logian claims there is a decrease in utilitarian aspects 
and, more important, a decrease in the function of "know- 
ledge about" the other. The emergence of trust and concern 
begins to replace the "impure" characteristics. Persons 
observe one another not as objects, but observe "in order 
to enter into living relation. "2 At the highest point on 
the scale it is conceivable that the parties do not rely at 
1Ibid., 
p. 32. Hepburn singles out Emil Brunner here; 
but as we shall see the objection. also applies to Martin 
Buber's I-Thou phenomenology. 
2Ibid. 
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all upon behavioral checks, upon knowledge about. Cer- 
tainly they say, there is no treatment of the other as an 
object. Both are "subjects", interacting; the impurities 
are absent; an I-Thou encounter exists. 
The encounter theologian then extends the application 
of the model from description of the interpersonal to 
description of divine-human encounter. Purified of all 
utilitarian purposes or actions and of all "knowledge 
about", the interpersonal becomes an effective analogy for 
encounter with a Holy God. 
Hepburn summarizes the position: 
We can move in thought away from the imperfections 
of our human-encounter examples towards an idea of the 
perfection of meeting with God. This we do by thinking 
away all that remains of I-It, all vacillating between 
experiencing the other as personal and as an object, 
until there remains nothing at all of object-knowledge, 
only pure encounter with a Thou. 
Hepburn's objection is not difficult to perceive; 
if the analogy is to effectively illustrate man's meeting 
with God, it is imperative that there be a decrease in one's 
treatment of the other as an object, and also a decrease of 
1Tbid., p. 31-32. We cannot see how Hepburn's first 
objection to encounter theology (the mutual exclusiveness 
of I-It and I-Thou forms) can be reconciled with this one-- the "scale of relative purity". If the two forms have no 
relation, there could hardly be a scale which leads progress- ively from It to Thou, from the interpersonal to divine 
encounter. The notion of a "scale" is incompatiblp. with the former objection; one or the other can apply but not both, and perhaps neither. 
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dependence upon behavioral checks or knowledge about. If 
both requirements cannot be met the interpersonal analogy 
will lead nowhere; it will be "like a car that stalls at 
the very start of the race". 1 
Concerning the issue of decrease in the participant's 
treatments of the other as an "object", Hepburn registers no 
objection. His examples make it clear that he believes with 
Buber that there are human exchanges in which the parties 
relate as "subject to subject", i. e. in trust and intimacy. 
His criticism focuses on the second aspect of the argument; 
it is whether 
... the physical-events (hands, eyes, voice in move- 
ment and sound) have become less essential, or have 
they remained quite essential in each case, although 
approached, used, attended to, in different ways, or 
checked up on less and less frequently because of the 
increasing intimacy of the people concerned? 2 
His answer is obvious: he argues that knowledge 
about the other is still quite essential in trustful rela- 
tions. Behavioral checks may be less frequent, but when 
so, it is because one is confident that the person 
trusted is someone who behaves in a familiar way. Moreover, 
1lbid., p. 39. 
2Ibid., p. 35. 
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On the occasions when I sit opposite a friend and observe 
his gestures and expression, I am neither looking at 
these as so many objects, nor in the belief that his 
entire being consists in such overt actions (behaviour- 
ism), nor am I looking 'through' these to a hidden per- 
sonality, as I might look through a glass of a window, 
concerned only with the view beyond ... I admit that his inner life, like mine, is more than gestures, speech, 
smiles; but I doubt if we know what we are saying when 
we declare that personality and knowledge of personality 
are possible without these: I doubt if anything recog- 
nizably personal can be left over once we have stripped 
all such behaviour away. 
Because he believes that knowledge about remains 
integral to the most intimate relations, Hepburn concludes 
that the theologian's construction of a scale of relative 
purity is faulty. The pure encounter theologian has misjudged 
the nature of the interpersonal; his phenomenology of meeting 
is misconceived. Hence it is inappropriate to use it as an 
analogy for encounter with God. The inter-human analogy 
as the theologian constructs it, indeed, leads nowhere. "In 
face of these reflections, the theologian might well decide 
that the analogy between meeting human beings and meeting 
God is too weak to carry any apologetic weight. "2 
We have spent some time with this objection because 
it is important for reading Buber. Does he employ a scale 
of relative purity, or can one be perceived lurking behind 
1Ibid., p. 36. 
2Ibid., p. 37. 
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his two-fold construction, I-It and I-Thou? If not, what 
part does knowledge about play in encounter situations? 
We anticipate somewhat by saying that Hepburn's 
objection aids us in uncovering an often unnoticed aspect 
of Buber's phenomenology of the inter-personal--the positive 
connections he intended between I-It and I-Thou relations. 
His criticism will also point out a major difficulty in 
Buber's phenomenology. He never bothered to write an 
adequate philosophical explanation of the role that know- 
ledge about actually plays in the interpersonal. We shall 
address ourselves to these points later. 
Hepburn's objections are far from casual. Their 
general import is to challenge the theologian to use empir- 
ical and logical evidence in his descriptions and theories 
of meeting. We turn now to Buber to ascertain how Hepburn's 
objections apply. 
Concerning Hepburn's first assumption, does Martin 
Buber court the notion that an ostensive definition of God 
can be obtained via his philosophy of meeting? Does he 
believe that his descriptions of the interhuman answer man's 
questions about the existence of God? This area of inves- 
tigation is most important; we need to uncover, as best we 
can, the objectives or intentions he entertained. 
Answers about intentions certainly do not cover the 
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issue. As with many philosophers, immediate intentions 
and later interpretations, do not always fall into logical 
order. We may find that Buber's stated objectives conflict 
with the actual structures of his work. Specifically, he 
may entertain no objective of demonstrating God's existence, 
but unless we assume it, Buber's position could be non- 
sensical. 
The material we cite lends itself to this possibility. 
Note the following passage. 
Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the 
eternal Thou ... The Thou that by 
its nature cannot 
become It ... What does all this mistaken talk about God's being and works (though there has been and can 
be, no other talk about these) matter in comparison 
with the one truth that all men who have addressed 
God had God himself in mind? 1 
Buber wants, first of all, to make it clear that 
talk about God or descriptions of his being and activity 
are "mistakes". The term he uses, notably "talk about" 
is closely allied to Hepburn's phrase "knowledge about". 
He says, in effect, there can be no apologia for God's 
existence. If we take him at his word, descriptions of 
the inter-human will not lead to the conclusive proposition 
that God exists. He wants to avoid the classical argumen- 
tative characteristic in philosophic discourse. 
1Buber, Martin, I and Thou, New York, Chas. Scribners 
Sons, New York, 1958, pp. 75--71-6-. 
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What does he intend? The following passage attempts 
to clarify this issue. 
Of the relational event we know with the knowledge of 
the life lived, our going out to relation, our part of 
the way. The other part only comes upon us, we do not 
know it; it comes upon us in the meeting. But we strain 
ourselves on it if we speak of it as though it were 
something beyond the meeting. 
A person can make claim to have experienced meeting. 
The key to this is the form of address. Though we cannot 
pretend to know something about the one who is met we can 
claim to "go out to relation". No claims about the Other 
have currency but claims do count when we say we are met in 
relation. The form of address constitutes the "relational' 
event". 
The "relational event" is known to occur simply by 
living it. It cannot prove the existence of God, but when 
we ask what it does demonstrate, we begin to catch the 
ambiguity of Buber's position. 
On the one hand, he says that the relational mode 
of address occurs and is the basis of one's total life 
experience. 
I proceed from a simple real situation: two men are 
engrossed in a genuine dialogue. I want to appraise 
the facts of this situation. It turns out that the 
customary categories do not suffice for it. I mark: first the "physical" phenomena of the two speaking and 
gesturing men, second the 'psychic' phenomena of it, 
lIbid. 
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what goes on 'in them'. But the meaningful dialogue 
itself that proceeds between the two men and into 
which the acoustical and optical events fit, the dia- 
logue that arises out of the souls and is reflected 
in them, this remains unregistered. 1 
The significance of dialogue or meeting is his chosen 
issue. It is to be the focus for his entire philosophy; 
meeting, the "relational event", the "between", constitute 
ways of reordering of philosophical debate. He seeks to 
describe one unique event, and this precludes the necessity 
of describing the Holy God. Hepburn, he would say, wrongly 
identifies him as an apologist. He views his work as descrip- 
tive. If we were to choose an appropriate term for these 
objectives, it would be "phenomenology". Specifically, 
Buber should be called a phenomenologist of intersubjectivity 
when speaking of his declared objectives. 
But can we take him at his word? When he speaks of 
the relational event does he exclude the presence of God? 
Certainly not. Divine presence is the apex of the event's 
meaning. We cannot be assured that apologia is absent when 
this is considered. The "eternal Thou that by its nature 
cannot become It", is integral to interhuman dialogue. 
Though description of God is eschewed, divine presence 
is assumed, and this alters our view of his claims to 
1Schlipp, P. and Friedman, M. , op. cit. , p. 
698. 
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describe an interpersonal event. 
Manifestly, the "relational event" is also a meeting 
between man and God, because the parties are, so to speak, 
identified. He never strays from the assumption that the 
interhuman puts man into relation with God. If we agree 
with him that there is no "apology" in this, i. e., if 
apologetic maneuvers are denied, that would contradict his "" 
own identification of meeting as a "glimpse" of the eternal 
Thou. Buber's work would make no sense apart 
from the divine-human context of meeting. Such an appraisal 
is necessary if we are to read him accurately. 
Admittedly, no effort is made to force the conclusion 
that God exists. Buber assumes that God is present in the 
experience of meeting; perhaps, that is why he makes the 
disclaimer about doing apologetics. From his comment about 
mistaken talk, it is reasonable to assume he thinks argu- 
ment is inappropriate. But to disclaim apologetics because 
he does not argue for the existence of God is to take a 
narrow view of the apologetic enterprise. And to assume 
God's existence is to short-circuit a very important element 
in philosophical discourse, that of making assumptions 
public. 
There can be little doubt that this conflict between 
declared objectives and implicit assumptions does create 
difficulties in appraising his work; the relation between 
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theology and philosophy as distinct disciplines is clouded 
rather than clarified. We can never be sure whether he 
speaks as a philosopher who believes and is giving reasons 
for belief, whether he is a theologian who is developing 
a "complimentary" philosophy of religion, or whether he 
is a philosopher of religion who borrows from both disci- 
plines to create a way of standing between pure philosophy 
and apologetic theology. Regretfully, we cannot deal with 
these broader questions here if we are to complete an analysis 
of his phenomenology of meeting. We shall deal with this 
in our concluding chapters. 
We turn to Hepburn's objection that Buber's I-It, 
I-Thou categories are mutually exclusive. The connection 
between them, or lack of one, is an important matter in 
analyzing Buber's work. If there is none, it would be 
increasingly difficult to see the connection between mun- 
dane experience and the intimate experience of living 
relation. Moreover, it would become improbable, if not 
impossible, to see the connection between interpersonal 
encounter and divine-human meeting. Again, Buber's inten- 
tions, are of utmost importance. We must know whether or 
not he intended to relate the two forms, and we must also 
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know what evidence he provides to support his case. 1 
We begin by asking, what if any are the positive 
functions of Buber's I-It form of relation? This question 
should give us access to the main issue. 
Buber says that man's life is lived in both I-It 
and I-Thou forms; "to man the world is twofold in accordance 
with his twofold attitude". 2 Man, being who he is, is a 
creature of the I-It relation; it is the dominant form 
of his existence. 3 It is the "exalted mel. ancholy of our 
fate". 4. In the I-It mode man*is bound to act in two ways; 
he objectifies and analyses the objects of his world, and 
he treats things and people as instrumental objects. (As 
Hepburn so well said, the I-It relation is a composite of 
'We 
meet two difficulties in this endeavor. Buber's 
thought is disguised in poetic language. The little book 
I and Thou is a poetic product; systematizing the relation 
will not be easy for this reason. Secondly, Buber admits in 
a later work that readers are left with a negative impression 
of.. the I-it relation. Speaking about I and Thou Buber says, 
It. .. Indeed 
it does not do justice to it; because I am born 
in the midst of this situation of man and see what I see and 
must point out what I have seen. In another hour it would 
perhaps have been granted to me to sound the praises of the 
It; today not: because without a turning of man to his Thou 
no turn in his destiny can come. " From Schlipp, P., and 
Friedman, M., eds., The Philosophy of Martin Buber, op., it., 
p. 704. We repeat our earlier stipulation about this issue; 
we are asking whether the two relational forms are mutually 
exclusive or not. We do not contest that they are different. 
2Buber, M., I and Thou, p. 3. 
3Ibid., pp. Q, 14,17,33. 
Labia., r.: 16., 
:r 
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"knowledge about; " as well as the activity of looking upon 
others as objects). When it comes to treating people as 
objects, Buber's answer is obvious; he emphasizes that it 
is a negative relationship. But what about man's effort 
to know his world? Is it also a negative form? 
Buber speaks of the act of knowing as a rhythmic 
passage from I-Thou to I-It, and finally to I-Thou again. 
Take knowledge: being is diclosed to the man engaged 
in knowing, as he looks over what is over against him. 
He will, indeed, have to grasp as an object that which 
he-has seen with the force of presence, he will have 
to compare it with objects, establish it in its order 
among classes of objects, describe and analyze it 
objectively. Only as It can it enter the structure 
of knowledge. 1 
We are led to believe that the I-Thou form of direct 
encounter is supposed to be followed by the act of getting 
to "know about" what has been encountered. The I-It form 
becomes the inevitable successor to the I-Thou form. Buber 
goes on: 
Now the incident is included in the It of knowledge 
which is composed of ideas. He who frees it from that, 
and looks on it again in the present moment, fulfills 
the nature of the act 2f knowledge to be real and 
effective between men. 
"Knowledge about" is fulfilled by its return to the 
I-Thou form where it becomes "effective between men". 
llbid., p. 40. 
2Ibid., p. 41. 
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Buber's language of fulfillment stipulates that the I-It 
function is necessary. He says, in effect, that the initial 
sense of "presence" is not enough; the act of knowing matures 
as objectification and evaluation occur. Man's relation to 
his world is enhanced because he has analyzed and scrutinized 
things and people around him. As the fulfillment of this 
procedure, the object is attended to again, as presence, as 
a "thou". 
Buber clarifies the importance of the I-It relation 
somewhat with the following: 
It is not as though scientific and aesthetic under- 
standing were not necessary; but they are necessary 
to man that he may do his work with precision and 
plunge it in the truth of relation, which is above 
the understanding and gathers itself up in it. 1 
The I-It form in this example is far from being 
inconsequential and negative; it is both necessary, and is 
beneficial depending on its fulfillment in the I-Thou form. 
He goes on to say that only in its unfulfilled state is the 
act of knowing negative. That is, the purpose of objecti- 
fying and "knowing about" is not to conquer the world of 
others but to enter into relation with it. 2 
Given the foregoing examples, Hepburn's position 
1lbid., pp. 41-42. 
2Ibid. 
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courts a misunderstanding of Buber. Though the two forms 
are different, Buber states that they are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, in the light of I-Thou encounter, the 
I-It form of relation is necessary, even complimentary to 
the I-Thou form. 
Buber also speaks of the relation between the two 
forms in other ways. The I-It form is subordinate to the 
I-Thou: the other is not a "thing among things" in the 
I-Thou form; this does not mean "that nothing else exists 
except himself. But all else lives in his light. 111 The 
I-It sphere is, not deprecated, but is subordinate to the 
I-Thou form. Because the I-Thou relation is an act of 
total self-offering of one person to the other, there is 
a "suspension of all partial actions and consequently of 
all sensations of actions grounded only in their particular 
limitation. "2 In this reference, the I-It relation is 
again subordinate; only in complete separation from the 
I-Thou encounter does it operate negatively. If meeting 
is to be understood as the primary mode of personal exis- 
tence, the I-It form can be regarded as complimentary. 
The subordinate but complimentary relation he writes 




9 p. 31. 
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No system of ideas or foreknowledge intervenes ... 
memory itself is transformed ... No aim, no lust, 
and no anticipation intervene between I and Thou. 
Desire itself is transformed ... Only when every 
means has collapsed does the meeting come about. 1 
His poetic language does not conceal the conceptual 
implication: I-It characteristics are meant to be trans- 
formed, "taken into" the vitality of encounter. He is 
speaking of affective states but the model again applies. 
The I-It form is a subordinate form, but it is a necessary 
compliment to the form of living relation. 
Almost in passing, he mentions that the character- 
istics of individual perception are not excluded in the 
experience of presence. Of a tree, the subject may say, 
... it is not necessary for me to give up any of the ways in which I consider the tree ... Rather is 
everything, picture and movement, species and type, 
law and number, indivisibly united in this event. 2 
Once more knowledge about is related directly to 
the I-Thou encounter. With regard to persons, 
Good people and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and 
ugly, become successively real to him: that is, free, 
they step forth in their singleness and confront him 
as Thou. 
That Buber intends no total separation is abundantly 
clear in the preceding quotations. The two forms are 
distinct; the I-Thou form is primary; the I-It form is 
1lbid., pp. 11-12. 
2Ibid., 
p. 7. 
31bid., p. 15. 
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"demonic" only when divorced from its subordinate role. 
This much we can ascertain from Buber's early piece, .j 
and 
Thou. But the language is poetic and there is no evidence 
which helps us to be more specific about the intended 
relation. Buber fails to explain systematically how the 
relationship between the two forms is to be conceived. 
In his later works, where he undertakes explanation 
of the two orders and their application to specific issues, 
there is likewise no specific relation expounded. We have 
already noted that he did not count it his responsibility 
to "sound the praises of It". The absence of such "praise" 
helps explain why there is no specific relation expounded, 
but because there is no more specific information available 
on the positive structures of the I-It form, one can easily 
assume that no relation to the I-Thou form exists. This, it 
seems to me, constitutes a major difficulty in Buber's 
thought and explains why Hepburn offered his criticism. 
It is not that Buber intends a negative estimation of the 
acts of knowing about or perceiving; it is that he fails to 
describe them with the same rigour that he does the act of 
meeting. Hepburn is mistaken about Buber's intentions, but 
he is correct in seeing the consequences of Buber's failure 
to describe the structures of perception and ratiocination. 
Without an explicit phenomenology of perception and reflection 
it is difficult to maintain that I-It and I-Thou modalities 
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have a complimentary relation. That the two forms exist 
in unhappy tension is an understandable conclusion given 
the absence of systematic evidence to the contrary. In our 
concluding remarks we shall discuss why Buber did not arti- 
culate a phenomenology of perception, a phenomenology of 
"knowledge about". 
Related to the above criticism we ask, is Hepburn's 
contention valid, that the I-Thou form is questionable as 
a "self-authenticating experience"? Hepburn cites the 
use of descriptive terms when Buber describes a pure 
encounter situation, terms describing the Other which 
indicate prior education and are attributable to the cher- 
ished beliefs of a community. 
In order to understand Buber's response to this 
criticism, we cite two factors in his portrayal of meeting. 
The first is readily observed: Buber, of all writers in 
the encounter tradition, is most careful in his choice of 
language concerning an experience of the other. Strictly 
speaking, the terms he employs are not descriptive; they 
are indicative of the living relation he says exists 
"between". With regard to interpersonal encounters, the 
term is always "thou"; hardly a descriptive term. With 
regard to divine-human meeting, it is "Thou", "Presence", 
or "Word". These terms tell us nothing about the party 
in question; they do not give us information nor do they 
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determine the personal or super-personal characteristics 
of the one over-against the "I". Rather they indicate the 
relationship between the "I" and the Other. Buber, unlike 
those who are influenced by him, avoids terms which could 
be construed as descriptive of the Other. On this he is 
consistent; he is not an open target for Hepburn's objection. 
Desdribing meeting does not ential description of the Other. 
Object language is inappropriate in the description of 
meeting; such could be inferred when we recall Buber's 
objectives. It must be said of the interpersonal as well 
as of his notion of divine-human encounters. Buber concen- 
trates on describing "meeting", not the one met. 
There is a concept in Buber's poetry which should 
clarify this position somewhat. It concerns his use of 
the word "modification", a term which has a very different 
meaning for him than for the language analyst. 
In I and Thou this notion is given poetic expression. 
With regard to divine-human encounter he says, 
The revelation does not pour itself into a funnel, 
it comes to him and seizes his whole elemental being 
in all its particular nature and fuses with it. The 
man, too, who is the 'mouth' of revelation, is indeed 
this, not a speaking-tube and any kind of instrument, 
but an organ which sounds acc9rding to its own laws: 
and to sound means to modify. 
1Buber, M., I and Thou, p. 117. (underlining mine). 
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From this we can at least see the direction of his 
thought. In terms of the classic problem of the relation 
between subject and object, we might say that Buber's 
emphasis is upon subjectivity. In experiencing the I-Thou 
relation, the subject always injects himself into the exper- 
ience. Living relation terminology is open to language 
about the subject's position, gesture, viewpoint, or 
involvement. This holds for the interpersonal as well as 
the experience of relation with God; 
l Buber's notion of 
modification expresses his attempt to recognize human 
subjectivity. Obviously, the concept is not supposed to 
rule out experience of a genuine relationship. That is, 
his recognition of subjectivity in no way implies "invention" 
on the part of the subject. Buber says of the religious 
experience: "I possess no security against the necessity 
to live in fear and trembling; I have nothing but the 
certainty that we share in the revelation. "2 
Buber's conviction about being bound up in relation, 
is the nub of his philosophical apologetic. One cannot 
demonstrate the object qua object--that would yield neither 
the real person nor the holy God. He must live in fear 





and trembling, and he must reserve judgment about the object. 
But in so doing a person can still know he is bound up in 
meeting, and meeting is not a subjective creation. Buber's 
notion of modification is supposed to represent the subject's 
deep involvement in the experience of encounter. 
Does this answer Hepburn's objection? Taken cumula- 
tively, does Buber's hesitancy to employ descriptive terms 
for the object and his notion of modification, take Hepburn's 
target away? 
Buber's "reply" can be summarized; one cannot demon- 
strate the existence of the object, only the experience of 
relation; in that context the subject's involvement and the 
existence of relation are inextricably mixed.. "Knowledge 
about" the relation or description, is always partial and 
secondary to the lived relation itself; we are supposed to 
acknowledge the relation before we describe or demonstrate 
it. Experience of relation is the irreducible. Again, he 
seeks to be a phenomenologist whose primary datum is an 
event called "meeting". 
Hepburn would be understandably dissatisfied with 
such a reply; description of the object is the only way to 
achieve reliable knowledge about a relationship and Buber's 
refusal to describe "the object" is an evasion of the issue 
rather than a clarification. We are at a point where it is 
difficult to pass off Hepburri's objections. We are not 
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given an argument to counteract Hepburn's claim to the 
questionableness of a self-authenticating encounter. Buber 
refuses to claim the existence of God in an explicit manner; 
he refuses to identify any "object" of experience. Yet, 
he willingly admits to the operation of human subjectivity. 
We have not seen what he means by human subjectivity and 
without a stipulation of that term, it would seem that we 
are on very unstable ground if we accept his affirmation 
of the self-validating character of experience. 
Hepburn's questions about self-authentification 
pursue next, the use of psychological referents, i. e. the 
"I sense", "I feel" sort of language. From the above 
discussion of modification it follows that Buber acknowledges 
a psychological dimension in his descriptions of meeting. 
"Modification", I assume, includes expressions that indicate 
one's mental condition. But does his notion lead us to 
believe that meeting depends solely upon a subject's feelings 
and sensations? Buber's disclaimer is most emphatic. 
I perceive something. I am sensible of something. I 
imagine something. I will something. I think something. 
The life of human beings does not consist of all this 
and the like alone. This and the like together esta- blish the realm of It. 
But the realm of Thou has a different basis. 1 
Buber is saying that psychological or subjective referents do 
1Buber, M., I and Thou, p. L. 
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not get at the heart of the experience of encounter; they 
are not dependable descriptive terms for that event. What 
is his alternative? 
To clarify his limitation on the use of psycholog- 
ical terms we must go deeper into Buber's notion of subjec- 
tivity, what he calls "genuine subjectivity". He contrasts 
genuine subjectivity with the term "individuality". 
The I of the primary word I-It makes its appearance 
as individuality and becomes conscioys of itself as 
subject (of experiencing and using). 
Individuality occurs when the I-It form is the 
dominant mode in a person's life. Clearly, individuality 
is a negative term, signifying differentiation of self 
from others, self-appropriation, and detachment. 2 Individ- 
uality is a kind of Pre-Copernican orientation to the world 
where the self is "concerned with My--my kind, my race, 
my creation, my genius. "3 Everything revolves about the 
subject in this aspect of the I-It form. As Buber sees it, 
individuality centers on selfish motives and emotions. 
Individuality would then be a form of thinking and acting, 
as well as feeling. Anything which indicates alienation 
. 





or complete dependence on the I applies. Subjectivism, 
if we were to use it in the sense that Buber uses individ- 
uality, would be a completely negative term. It would not 
answer to Hepburn's objection in that it stipulates one 
modus operandi in the I-It sphere. It does not even take 
up the question of human perception in Hepburn's terms. 
Genuine subjectivity stands in sharp contrast to 
individuality. - "The I of the primary word I-Thou makes 
its appearance as person and becomes conscious of itself 
as a genuine subjectivity (without a dependent genitive). "i 
The authentic person enters into relation with others; the 
primary gesture is out to relation rather than inward to- 
wards self. Genuine subjectivity represents an orientation 
towards relations; the person is a participant, cognitively 
and emotionally. Again, Buber describes a personal mode 
of existence and in so doing has given the term subjectivity 
a different meaning. 
Where do psychological references fit here? They 
have a place, for Buber never counsels the loss of sense 
or feeling in encounter; they are meant to be part of a 
given relation. Buber gives us one example; it stresses 
the difference between expressions such as "I feel", and 
lIbid., p. 62. 
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"I love" or "I trust". 1 Here, the "I feel" is wholly within 
the context of an "I" centered world, i. e. individuality; 
the latter two expressions illustrate the existence of a 
living relation and genuine subjectivity. Emotions and 
sensations (the "I feel"), can express a living relation 
if the other marks of genuine subjectivity are predominant. 
This is Buber's main way of responding to Hepburn. Within 
the I-Thou event, emotional life has its place, but not as 
its primary aspect. The relation is primary; emotions 
and sensations are expressions of relations but not exhaustive 
ones. 
As before, Buber does not give a direct answer to 
Hepburn; he will not subject the event of meeting to My 
explanation, psychological or otherwise. He shifts the 
reader's attention to a peculiar type of phenomenology; 
the question "how do I know" is simply not as important as 
1The example: "Feelings dwell in man but man dwells 
in love. Love does not cling to the I in such a way as 
to have the Thou only for its 'contents' its object; but 
love is between the I and the Thou. " Buber, I and Thou, 
pp. 14-15. As was true in our discussion of relations between the I-It and I-Thou forms, there is a relation between individuality and genuine subjectivity; they are 
not mutually exclusive. Again, this is expressed poetically. "The I that steps out of the relational event into separation 
and consciousness of separation, does not lose its reality. Its sharing is preserved in it in a living way. In other 
words, as it is said of the supreme relation and may be 
used of all, ` the seed remains in it. ' This is the province of subjectivity in which the I is aware with a single 
awareness of its solidarity of connexion and of its separation. Genuine subjectivity can only be dynamically understood as the swinging of the I in its lonely truth. " Ibid., p. 63. 
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the question, "What does meeting mean? " His apologetic 
effort focuses upon one kind of intersubjective event 
called meeting. We have already cited a major difficulty 
in this; he will not utilize any method which explains 
the nature of meeting in terms of perceptual activity. 
Now we find him again refusing to explain how the psych- 
ological dimensions are subordinate. His catagories 
"individuality" and "genuine subjectivity" are suggestive 
of a different approach to an analysis of the intersubjective 
event, but they do not clarify the question pressed by 
Hepburn. 
We shall not receive a satisfying answer if we press 
Buber on the question of a covert psychological foundation 
for his phenomenology. As we have said, such an affirmation 
could not satisfy Hepburn; there is no reliance upon 
empirically testable data. Buber's refusal to restrict 
intersubjectivity by submitting it to any means of veri- 
fication has the unavoidable effect of leaving the reader 
without any means of refuting Hepburn's pointed questions 
and criticisms. Buber invites our acceptance of the unique 
I-Thou mode of relationship but he does not provide us 
with any means of understanding it in terms of traditional 
philosophical interrogation. 
It becomes clear, even at this early stage, that 
philosophical activity is conceived quite differently by 
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the two thinkers. Buber is the apologist for meeting, 
Hepburn the critic. Buber measures all else by the inter- 
subjective sphere. Human perception, judgment, and existence 
in general, is looked at through the relational event. 
Hepburn demands that we assess the value of the inter- 
subjective by other means, namely, individual perception 
and judgment. We must know about these before we can 
accept the affirmations about the interhuman or the "between". 
The two start from different vantage points; it is under- 
standable that their conclusions differ. 
We come now to Hepburn's final objection, the theo- 
logian's use of a scale of relative purity as an analogy 
for divine-human encounter. While it is abundantly clear 
that Buber's relational event is rooted in and descriptive 
of a "religious event', this needs clarification. 1 
We have already said that Buber does not seek to 
demonstrate God's existence, but assumes it when expounding 
upon the significance of meeting. This means that Buber's 
descriptions of the interpersonal sphere invite the accept- 
ance of a religious encounter or meeting in which faith 
is born. Undeniably, Buber's work rests upon this conviction. 
What then of a scale? Is there one which "peaks out" in 
1vide. Buber, M. 
_I and 
Thou, pp. 75 ff., and Schlipp, Paul, and Friedman, M. , eds. 2. cit. pp. 741 if. 
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this supreme event. 
We would mistake Buber's phenomenology if we saw it 
as a progressive analogical scale leading the skeptic to 
accept divine meeting. Two reasons bear this out. First, 
the interpersonal events he interprets are not like divine- 
human encounter; they are not conceived of as encounters 
which need purification in order to fulfill their proper 
function. The I-Thou form is expressive of an authentic 
relationship in the intersubjective sphere. If we take 
this point seriously, i. e. that there is nothing to be 
added to I-Thou encounters, we see that no scale of relative 
purity is needed, implied, or expounded. I-Thou encounters 
between people are not analogies for something else; they 
are authentic modes of man's existence. 
Another way is needed to express the religious aspect 
of the interhuman. Buber's way to express this connection 
between the interhuman and the divine-human is to say that 
the holy God is glimpsed in the experience of others. 1 
Man experiences the holy in the context of the common. 
This may not seem too different from a "scale", but it is. 
Buber's refusal to talk about God in other-worldly terms 
is one clue. There is no experience of God apart from a 
1Schlipp, 
p., and Friedman, M., eds.; op. cit. p. 710. 
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mundane world. We shall go into what this means in the 
succeeding chapter. But now it should be emphasized that 
Buber's concept of divine Presence is always expressed in 
existential, historical, and interpersonal terms. Divine- 
human encounter is expressed in terms of talk about inter- 
personal encounter; to explicate the full measure of this 
is Buber's philosophical vocation. 
We should also remind ourselves of the potentially 
positive role of I-It relations. When considered in light 
of an I-Thou encounter, what Hepburn calls "impurities" 
are always present even if they are subordinate. The act 
of knowing about can be beneficial and complimentary to 
living relation. We find it hard to discern any scale of 
purification in this; the I-It form can work for the deep- 
ening of man's sense of encounter and Presence. There is 
no need to "think away" one's perceptions, analyses, etc. 
Rather they can be taken into relation where they are 
"effective between men". There is no scale in this. 
Lastly we cite Buber's concept of "duration"; it 
is his alternative to any suggestion of a scale. It helps 
specify the sort of religious heritage he employs in his 
phenomenology of meeting. 
He says that the I-Thou event is "lived in a 
'duration' whose purely intensive dimension is defineable 
only in terms of itself, and not as part of a continuous 
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and ordered sequence. "1 Such poetic language is highly 
suggestive of a distinction made by many theologians in 
their expositions of biblical theology. They specify a 
difference between chronos, and Kairos. Chronos is clock- 
time, duration in the sense of measured moments, Buber's 
"continuous and ordered sequence". Kairos refers to the 
impact of the event, its meaning in the lives and history 
of the participants. The affinity of this distinction with 
that of I-It and I-Thou is readily discernible. I-It is 
kin to chronos, I-Thou to Kairos. We can also see that 
history if conceived this way, has no progressive pattern, 
no necessary transition from chronos to the intensive 
dimension. Buber thinks of encounter moments in terms of 
Kairos which breaks in upon the everyday. The form is 
"meeting", and in it, no scale of relative purity is 
implied. 
Once again it is evident that Hepburn and Buber 
speak different languages and employ diverse conceptual 
tools. Hepburn has not properly criticized Buber at this 
point, but as we shall see, Buber's response will not 
explain how the divine-human experience is related to the 
inter-personal or the mundane. We save further explanation 
of his theory for the next chapter as it is of central 
importance in our study. 
1Buber, M., I and Thou, p. 30. 
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OBSERVATIONS 
Charles Hartshorne in describing Buber's metaphysics 
made the comment, "Buber has no metaphysics; Buber is one 
of the greatest of metaphysicians. . . "1 To me this state- 
ment suggests an appropriate appraisal of Buber concerning 
phenomenology. "He has no phenomenology and he is one of 
the greatest of phenomenologists. " Buber, in I and Thou, 
has written one of the classics on intersubjectivity. In 
contrast to the empirical--logical fixations which try to 
"arrive at" a concept of intersubjectivity through knowledge 
about the other, Buber begins with intersubjectivity. He 
shifts the ground of concern to an interrogation of what 
meeting means. In this he is original and suggestive. 
As a phenomenologist of intersubjective experience he shifts 
the philosophical burden from its concentration upon the 
logical-empirical criteria for demonstrating the existence 
of intersubjective interchange, to a descriptive-interpretive 
explication of that interchange. His goal is not to demon- 
strate "meeting" but to interpret its significance. In 
this sense his work is constructive or apologetic. He 
speaks primarily to the reader who affirms the occurrence 
of encounter. Buber's insistence upon this as the pivotal 
phenomenon in human existence carries impressive weight; for 
humanists and religious alike, Buber has selected the critical 
1Schlipp, P., and Friedman, M., eds.; op. cit. p. 49. 
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event which gives life meaning, the intersubjective encounter. 
At every point we have seen Buber redirect the criticisms, 
searching not for a proof but for a meaningful exposition 
of the irreducible phenomenon, meeting. He is a most signi- 
ficant phenomenologist of intersubjectivity. 
Buber also brings home the suggestion that inter- 
subjectivity plays a central role in a conception of God 
or transcendence. There is no question in my mind that 
Martin Buber has done more to focus philosophical explica- 
tion upon intersubjectivity as it applies to the issue of 
transcendence than anyone before or since. One reads and 
rereads Buber because of this focus; it is his major contri- 
bution and is a major contribution to any investigation of 
"religious experience". 
But just at the point of Buber's redirection of 
phenomenological concern, questions arise. The reserva- 
tions come not at the level of acknowledging intersubjective 
encounter as central; they arise when we ask how it is to 
be understood or conceptualized as central. 
There is little leverage one has for the claim that 
encounter is the irreducible foundation upon which phen- 
omenology must rest. Buber affirms but does not give 
evidence that his work is non-apologetic. He says he does 
not seek to demonstrate God's existence but he assumes 
it, affirms it, and describes relationship with God. 
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How can we accept the "purely descriptive" objectives he 
claims to espouse? 
Buber also intends no complete separation between 
the mundane I-It mode and the all important I-Thou mode. 
But he gives us preciously little evidence to understand 
how they relate. We are told to accept "differences" 
but we are not given the opportunity to distinguish differ- 
ences from exclusivity. No patient investigation of the 
I-It mode is conducted to help provide the necessary links. 
Psychological language is limited but since perception 
and affective states are dealt with so hurriedly it sounds 
vacuous to affirm a "self-authenticated, relational event". 
No scale of relative purity is expounded, but the 
concepts of chronos and kairos hardly aid us in relating 
the interpersonal to divine encounters in any systematic 
way. 
The most serious vacancy, however, is Buber's general 
lack of interest in relating human perceptual modalities 
to the interpersonal sphere. Without systematic investi- 
gation of this, we are left with the tempting invitation 
to accept meeting as the irreducible central phenomenon of 
human existence. In short, we are left with Buber's objectives 
and intentions, no more. We appreciate them but can we over- 
come the obstacles he leaves in our way? 
Failure to take on the task of describing the rela- 
tion between perception and the interpersonal must qualify 
I_ 
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our estimation of Buber as a phenomenologist. There is no 
real "debate" between Buber and Hepburn. Buber's "invi- 
tations" to acknowledge the irreducibility of encounter, 
really avoid philosophical exposition or debate. In the 
context of any philosophical discipline, one can hardly 
accept his alternatives unless they are demonstrated as 
being better ones. By refusing to debate, he is hardly 
a phenomenologist as he declares. 
One final observation: we said we would ask why 
Buber did not count it his responsibility to write a phen- 
omenology of "knowledge about" which would compliment his 
concept of encounter. We make one suggestion based on our 
work here and will enlarge upon it in the following chapter. 
It seems an ironic one in light of our concern. 
Buber's thought springs from the intensity of reli- 
gious experience; he is closely related to the traditions of 
Kierkegaard, Hamman and Rosenzweig as well as being a most 
noted interpreter of Hasidic tradition. We have said, with 
his full consent, that the I-Thou phenomenology is an expli- 
cation of the experience of faith. Religious faith plays 
a major part in his phenomenology, but what is its specific 
function? The clue to its specific function is found in 
Buber's discussion of faith and reason. His remarks on 
the subject of gnosis are revealing. 
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In so far as it (gnosis) originates in genuine personal 
ecstasies, it betrays its origin in which it has to do 
with no object at all, with nothing that could be legit- 
imately made into the object of an assertion. Thereby 
it not only offends the transcendent but also human 
existence because it constructs a structure of know- 
ledge which passes from now on as complete, which 
claims the absolute legitimacy of the transmutation 
in an allegedly finally valid appeal to the 'known' 
mysterium. That the being into which this structure 
is here transmuted ultimately signifies the annihila- 
tion of creation, is conclusive. 
Obviously he is speaking of the misuse of reason, 
gnosis, but it is fair to say he thinks such an excess 
is fostered when one adheres to the modalities of reason. 
Buber's distaste for objectification leads him to eschew 
all arguments concerning the credibility of his views. 
Misunderstandings might follow, or the primacy of the 
encounter event would be eclipsed. He was a radical on 
this; encounter phenomenology stands or falls on the basis 
of its power to invite our acceptance and acknowledgement. 2 
I must say it once again. I have no teaching. I only 
point to something. I point to reality, I point to 
something in reality that had not or had too little 
been seen. I take him who listens to me by the hand 
and lead him to the window. I open the window and point 
to what is outside. 
I have no teaching, but I carry on a conversation. 3 
1lbid., p. 743. 
2That I view this position as lamentable should be 
clear. In the following study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, it 
will be discovered that a phenomenology of perception and 
rational activity need not be either religiously based, or a 
closed system, in order to retain the central importance of intersubjective encounter. 
3Schlipp, P., and Friedman, M., eds. op. cit. p. 693. 
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Buber chose the way of the biblical prophet; showing 
the positive role of reason was an empty endeavor. 
The irony is that Buber's religious convictions 
encouraged his reluctance to explain how a phenomenology 
of 
of intersubjectivity bears upon the affirmation,, transcen- 
dence. He seems to be saying that one must remain silent 
about the relationship between faith and reason in order to 
appreciate it. There has never been a more suggestive 
and imaginative exposition of the full potential of inter- 
subjective encounter. But if we are expected to see the 
relation between intersubjectivity and transcendence, why 
are we left without conceptual exposition? Must faith, 
to be vigorous, remain silent about this most important 




MARTIN BUBER'S ONTOLOGY AND 
CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENCE 
From our previous investigation it is clear that 
Martin Buber's phenomenology of intersubjectivity sought 
to interpret phenomena much more significant than isolated 
or bizarre occurences. Though he bases his interpretation 
on the conviction that meeting is a concrete event, it 
cannot be understood that meeting is inconsequential, 
however rare its occurence. Meeting is central to man's 
existence and the key to his being. The purpose of the 
present discussion is to get at Buber's explication of 
meeting in terms of its ontological rootage and its central 
place in his theology. More specifically we aim to uncover 
the ontological significance of the relational event and 
to see the doctrine of transcendence which both shapes it 
and emerges from it. 
The effect should be twofold: we will be able to 
see his phenomenology in proper perspective and we will 
approach the central question of this study. Namely, can 
a concept of transcendence be introduced because of its 
solid connections with a phenomenology of intersubjectivity? 
The first task in approaching the question will be to 
ascertain how Buber deals with the connections. We put 
the issue in general terms here, anticipating that the 
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following discussion will sharpen it considerably. 
Buber, all agree, did not work out such questions 
systematically, but it is appropriate to take up the onto- 
logical question after having analyzed the phenomenology. 
I and Thou speaks entirely in poetic terms of the inter- 
subjective experience; Buber's later works attempt to 
interpret his phenomenology and to apply it to many areas 
of concern; two important areas are ontology and theology. 
If we are to understand the ontological and theological 
dimensions of meeting, we must turn to his later writings., 
Two important articles address the question of 
the ontological significance of meeting, "Distance and 
Relation" and "Elements of the Interhuman. "l The first 
essay explicates the significance of the I-Thou phenomen- 
ology in terms of "the principle of human life, that is, 
its beginning". 2 Buber thinks not of a temporal point in 
time at which man emerges as man, but of a principle which 
grounds and characterizes all human life. The principle 
1Vide., Friedman, Maurice, ed. The Knowledge of Man, 
Harper and Row, New York, 1965. "Distance and. Relation" 
was originally published in the Hibbert Journal, Vol. XLIX, 
1951; "Elements of the Interhuman" appeared first in 
Psychiatry, Vol. XX, 1957. 
2Ibid., p. 59. 
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is man's "special way of being" and as such, is a special 
"category of being". 1 
. the principle of human life is not simple but twofold, being built up in a twofold movement which 
is of such a kind that the one movement is the presup- 
position of the other. I propose to call the first 
movement 'the primal setting at a distance' and the 
second 'entering into relation'. That the first move- 
ment is the presupposition of the other is plain from 
the fact that one can enter into relation only with a 
being which has been set at a distance, more precisely, 
has=-become an_. independent opposite. And it Is only 
for man that an independent opposite exists. 
Distancing signifies a movement peculiar to man; 
it is his unique capacity to set apart a world, (Welt as 
distinguished from the animal's limited capacity to live 
only in the immediacy of its environment (Umwelt). Man 
acknowledges the life-ways and existence of the "other". 
Otherness, spoken of generally, is the world over against 
man. In its most inclusive terms, otherness is a totality 
larger than immediately perceivable things. "With soaring 
power he (man) reaches out beyond what is given him, flies 
beyond the horizon and the familiar stars, and grasps a 
totality--3 
Two characteristics emerge from these statements: 
the mark of being human is to recognize that things have 
1Ibid., p. 60. 
2lbid. 
31bid., p. 61. 
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independent existence; second, the world we set apart is 
not an "unsteady conglomeration", but a unity or whole. 
This is Buber's meaning when he describes distancing as 
a movement, the peculiar way distancing is accomplished 
reveals him who accomplishes it. Distancing reveals the 
human; it is the principle of all human existence. 
Along with this, he says that distancing cannot be 
acknowledged as the principle of human life unless we also 
acknowledge the contact man has with the world. In order 
to see the distancing principle, it is necessary that we 
assume a primal, relation. He puts it this way: 
Only the view of what is over against me in the world 
in its full presence, with which I have set myself, 
present in my whole person, in relation--only this 
view gives me the world truly as whole and one. 1 
What Buber seems to be getting at is that man is 
inextricably bound to his world as a perceiving, thinking, 
and imagining being; his way of being in contact is to 
set apart things and others. 2 If this is a correct inter- 
pretation, the distancing-relationship connection is clear: 
they are equally necessary and of equal importance in 
describing human existence. One cannot be had without 
the other; distancing and relation are two fundamental 
characteristics of human activity. 
llbid., p. 63. 
2For the present we should not read his term 
"relation" as indicating the I-Thou form. It is a more 
general term and refers to either the I-It or the I-Thou 
form. 
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But some confusion occurs with the additional term- 
inology he uses in describing distance. In addition to 
its being a "movement", it is termed a category. 
... the great phenomena on the side of the acts of dis- tance are preponderantly universal, and those on the side 
of the acts of relation preponderantly personal, as in- 
deed corresponds to their connection with one another. 
The facts of the movement of distance yield the essential 
answer to the question, How is man possible; the facts of 
the movement of relation yield the answer to the question, 
How is human life realized. The first question is 
strictly one about category; the second is one of cate- 
gory and history. 
Distance answers the question, how is man possible? 
It is not entirely clear how we are to take this specification. 
Conceived of as a human action, distancing would be compat- 
ible with the rest of his phenomenology; in its emphasis upon 
concrete experience, distancing serves well as a general label 
for the activities of hearing, seeing, i. e., for perception. 
Distancing describes one characteristic of the Lebenswelt. 2 
If he intends something else by calling distance 
a category, some confusion is generated. He could con- 
sider distance a kind of categorical imperative, a principle 
which attempts to explain how human experience is possible. 
This perspective would indicate a much different rela- 
tionship between distance and relation. The terminology should 
lIbid., p. 64. 
2The term Lebenswelt, often used by Husserl and Mer- leau-Ponty is appropriate here. It specifies that categories 
are always drawn from the experiential world and are not 
purely mental contrivances. 
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be sorted. Once we clarify the confusion it will be easier 
to see how his ontology relates to the phenomenology of 
meeting. 
Buber illustrates with two examples. Man uses ob- 
jects as tools, and tools are created for specific tasks. 
Objects fashioned for a particular task, however, may also 
be set aside to perform different tasks. A knife can be 
used to kill or to-carve. Two aspects of the concept emerge 
In the first sense the tool, as "distanced", has an identity 
of its own. But at the same time it is always used "in 
relation"; i. e, it is an object which expresses man's 
relation to his world, a tool which serves human purposes, 
such as killing or carving. 
Concerning humans, Buber says, "Man as man, sets man 
at a distance and makes him independent; he lets the life 
of men like himself go on round about him, and so he, and 
he alone, is able to enter into relation, in his own, 
individual status, with those like himself. "1 As a signi- 
ficant other, an individual, man is capable of relating 
to others. He imagines the other as an "other", and this 
can be the beginning of what Buber calls "personal making 
present. "2 Making the other present is associated with 
1Friedman, M., ed. op. cit., p. 67. 
2lbid., p. 78 if. 
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the occurrence of an I-Thou encounter. Distancing is the 
universal fact of mutual existence; men are individual and 
social beings; "making present" is the personal fulfillment 
of the two fold principle. 
In both illustrations, the implication is that 
distancing is a movement characteristic of all human beings. 
We must turn to Buber's last published work, if we 
are to receive further clarification. There, distancing 
is primarily a "movement". Taken cumulatively with the 
above, it gives us reason to think that his ontology is 
based upon an existential-historical perception of existence 
rather than upon some a priori principle which provides 
truths about man. 
Man, as I have indicated, is the only living being that 
by its nature perceives what surrounds it not as some- 
thing connected with it, as it were, with its vital 
acts, but as something detached, existing for itself. 
This 'first movement', which once constituted man as 
such, is in no way a 'reflective attitude'; it is the 
primal act, the primal attitude of man that makes him 
man. It is also the presupposition for man's entering 
into relation. ... I cannot bring this primal con- 
stitution of man, without which there would be neither 
speech nor tools, into connection with a reflective 
attitude. Man, I say, 'is the creature through whose 
being the existing being is set at a distance from 
him. ' Not through reflections but through human being. 1 
:.; Distancing is primarily a movement of existential 
character, established as a principle because it is the way 
man relates to his world. Comparison with other phenomen- 
1Schlipp, P., and Friedman, M., eds. off. Lit., p. 695. 
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ologists will help us further stipulate the meaning of 
distancing. 
Buber has written little of the influence-of Husserl, 
but one of Husserl's concepts applies. Eidetic intuition 
Husserl advises, is that capacity of man to see the essence 
of his existential activity. By reflecting upon the 
phenomenon (in this case, relations) the thinker sees the 
ongoing themes operative in various activities. The con- 
cept of distance, in this sense, is the essence of living 
experience. It can be called the form or eidos of all 
human experience. 
Martin Heidegger's notion of phenomenology is also 
appropriate in getting at Buber's conception. Heidegger 
expressly counsels reflection upon man's pre-reflective 
activities (modes of existence) to gain access to ontolog- 
ical truth. The ontological dimension is deeply embedded 
in the existential actualities and can be uncovered, as it 
were, through critical reflection upon the themes which 
emerge in man's history. Buber, to my knowledge, never 
mentions the Heideggerian conception of phenomenology but 
there is a parallel; the distance-relation concept functions 
as the ontological dimension of an existential modality. 
Again, it is the essence of experience. 
This may serve to clarify Buber's conviction that 
ontological truth is discovered in the phenomenal sphere. 
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Man's actual living is indicative of his being; we are not 
suggesting further similarities between Buber, Husserl and 
Heidegger. Buber's concept of human activity has led him 
to postulate the "principle of human life". 1 Perhaps, this 
clears the fuzziness of his terminology a bit. 
To complete what Buber says about distance and rela- 
tion, it should be said that the realization or fulfillment 
of the distance-relation principle returns us to the I-Thou 
phenomenDlogy. The other who is distanced and who shares a 
common existence can become a "self for me". The beginning 
of a relation "is ontologically complete only when the other 
knows that he is made present by me, and when this knowledge 
induces the process of his inmost self-becoming. "2 Man truly 
becomes himself only in acceptance and confirmation of the 
other. The distacne-relation principle is meant to be 
actualized in an I-Thou relationship. 
Buber's conception of the relationship between 
phenomenology and ontology is "circular". His apologetic 
begins with and culminates with the affirmation of meeting; 
a brief restatement shows this clearly. Man's contact with 
the world is assumed in his discussion of distancing. 
Buber did not stipulate that a living relation was necessary 
1Friedman, M., ed., op. cit., p. 69. 
2lbid. 
9 p. 71. 
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in noting the distance principle, but we cannot conclude 
that it is unimportant. Distance would make no sense if it 
were separated from the two-fold form of man's relation to 
the world. The I-Thou encounter is pivotal in that phen- 
omenology. The ontological theme, distance-relationship, 
rests upon the truth that meeting occurs. And as Buber 
openly affirms, the distance-relation theme is complete 
only when a living relation is its capstone. It becomes 
increasingly evident that the truth about man's being has 
one specific "home"; ontology arises out of the phenomen- 
ology's religious orientation and reaffirms that conviction 
in its fulfillment. 
When Buber's ontology is brought into focus in this 
manner, our appreciation for it is heightened. Our questions 
about it are also intensified. We can appreciate the fact 
that his ontology is an outgrowth of his pehnomenology. 
Ontology does not seem to dictate what he believes occurs 
in the phenomenal world. He does not care so much for 
metaphysical principles of human existence as he does for 
the "movements" which characterize human existence. The 
occurrence of interpersonal meeting dictates the phenomen- 
ology and eventuates in an ontological doctrine. This is 
as it should be; we shall argue below, that an adequate 
phenomenology is the only viable resource for ontological 
reflection and exposition. 
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Our appreciation of this pattern is qualified, however. 
For the truth about meeting is primarily religious as we 
have inferred above and will discuss below. Our questions 
about his phenomenology (and now ontology) take us back to 
the influence of theology. The pattern just described 
seems to rest ultimately upon a theological conviction. 
If so, it seems rather unimportant that the ontology grows 
out of a phenomenology. The whole structure stands upon 
the credibility of a religious affirmation. Despite his 
protestations, we have encountered nothing to mollify this 
growing suspicion. We turn now to his doctrine of the 
interhuman. 
Buber singles out for special exposition the term, 
Zwischenmenschlich. 1 His exposition helps explain how the 
entire ontology is formulated in the context of the I-Thou 
relationship. It emphasizes the importance of meeting as 
being the key for man's capacity to be truly human. 
The interhuman, Buber says, has to do with a "separate 
category of our existence, even a separate dimension, to 
use a mathematical term, and one with which we are so 
familiar that its peculiarity has hitherto almost escaped 
"'So far as I know, Buber's use of the word 'Zwischenmenschlich' which I have translated as 'interhuman' is the first recorded usage. " Smith, R. G., "Martin Buber's View of the Interhuman", The Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. VIII, No. I, June 1966, p. 74. The article Smith refers to is "Elements of the Interhuman". 
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us. "1 Zwischenmenschlich, is the sphere of the "between"; 
it is dialogue which stands apart as an ontologically 
relevant sphere and indicates what is truly human about 
men. 
"Being" man is contrasted with "seeming" man. The 
two modes of existence have to do with the question of 
authentic ways of relating. A glance can be manufactured 
or it can be spontaneous and genuine. The man who 'makes' 
his look is dominated by the mode of semblance; the spon- 
taneous glance indicates that man is "being himself". In 
the being mode,, men communicate the truth about themselves. 
I-Thou encounter, Begegnung, occurs if the being mode 
dominates the lives of those who come into contact. 2 
There is no one way to bring about this mode of human 
interaction; one party may incite the other to be himself; 
one may struggle to regain self authenticity in order to 
communicate. However realized, the "being" mode is what 
is true about individuals as well as the authentic mode 
of interaction. This is Buber's first way of describing 
the ontological dimensions of meeting. 
1Friedman, M., ed. off. cit., p. 71. 
2"Because genuine dialogue is an ontological sphere 
which is constituted by the authenticity of Bein every invasion of semblance must' damage it.. ' Ibid. p. ý.,; 
E 
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Buber's next contrast distinguishes between "inad- 
equate perception" and "personal making present", two 
forms of man's awareness of the other. Inadequate perception 
is an awareness of the other in reductionist terms; e. g. 
we assert the other can be known fully in terms of his 
behavior, economic background, or parental influences. 
Personal making present on the other hand, is Buber's term 
for perceiving another's wholeness. More specifically it 
means to "perceive his wholeness as a person determined by 
the spirit; it means to perceive the dynamic centre which 
stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude with the 
recognizable sign of uniqueness. "1 Unity, uniqueness, and 
wholeness are the marks of personal making present. 2 The 
mode of personal making present is a key factor in realizing 
the truth about man and his capacity for interhuman exchange. 
Lastly, he contrasts the mode of "imposition" with 
that of "unfolding". Imposition is the logical extension 
of inadequate perception; it is man's way of manipulating 
another. Buber's example is the propogandist. Such a man 
views the other as an object to be swayed; he seeks to bring 
the other into his way of thinking, his club, his sphere of 
1Ibid., p. 80. 
2In connection with these contrasting modes, Buber 
makes special mention, as quoted, of the spirit; we shall return to this below, as it is an excellent illustration 
of the specific meaning which pertains to the interhuman. 
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influence. Contrasted with this are the actions of the 
educator; he goes out to the other in order that the other 
may become more himself. He seeks to encourage the other's 
potential. As in the former examples, 'the unfolding mode 
makes meeting possible; with imposition, meeting is of 
course, frustrated. 
These three conceptual pairs specify how man fulfills 
what the distance-relationship pattern described as man's 
potential. They make clear Buber's contention that the 
interhuman is freighted with ontological status. They 
complete the apologetic circle. In this "realization" 
of the distance-relation principle the events of meeting 
are given proper ontological description in that they now 
pertain to a fully human way of being in the world. This 
is Buber's way of holding the connection between phenomenology 
and ontology. Put simply, man's acts indicate most deeply 
who he is; the I-Thou relation indicates man's humanity, 
and consequently, it animates the ontology. 
We turn now to a discussion of Buber's notion, 
spirit. It will specify the place his doctrine of transcen- 
dence occupies in the phenomenology and ontology. We choose 
to analyze his use of the term spirit, for it easily illus- 
trates the elements which make up Buber's peculiar notion 
of transcendence. 
Buber gives us reason to organize two fairly distinct 
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notions of spirit. The first notion is shown in the 
article just discussed, "Elements of the'Interhuman"; he 
is brief but the idea is significant. 
A man cannot really be grasped except on the basis of 
the gift of the spirit which belongs to man alone among 
all things, the spirit as sharing decisively in the 
personal life of the living man, that is, the spirit 
which determines the person. To be aware of a man, 
therefore, means in particular to perceive his whole- 
ness as a person determined by the spirit; it means 
to perceive the dynamic centre which stamps his every 
utterance, action, ? nd attitude with the recognizable 
sign of uniqueness. 
As above, personal making present is an authentic 
human mode of awareness, and this mention of spirit is to 
be identified with that kind of human awareness. To make 
another present is to utilize one's own uniqueness to see 
others; it is to perceive the center of the other's person- 
ality. Spirit in this context, is the stirring within a 
man to enter into relation. This does not mean that some- 
thing in man drives him to relate, as a chemical would 
stimulate a given reaction. It means that man aua man 
is inclined to interact, and that inclination makes possible 
the rare I-Thou event. Spirit signifies the human capacity 
to "go out" to others; man can be aware of his going out 
as was noted in I and Thou. 
2 Secondly, man who is aware 
this way consciously receives the other as a significant 
1Friedman, M., ed. op. cit., p. 80. 
2Vide, Buber, M., I and Thou, p, 76. 
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other; there is acceptance of the other's peculiarities 
and differences. 1 The essentials of the movement are open- 
ness and receptivity. Buber is describing that which makes 
meeting possible in terms of the individual's mode of living. 
Spirit in this context, is a human movement, fulfilled in 
the mutuality of meeting. As meeting occurs, the two become 
human with each other. 
Buber has placed his concept of spirit in the context 
of human capacities, and awareness; he has not introduced 
as he does elsewhere, the notion of a divine spirit. There 
is evidently room in Buber's thought for conceiving of 
spirit as a human mode of existence. 
Though Buber does not mention a divine spirit, we 
would be hasty in concluding that spirit here can be 
confined to "man's spirit" or the"human spirit". Most 
surely, the phenomenon of meeting takes precedence; spirit 
is discerned only in the context of genuine human inter- 
action--the interhuman. He describes the individual's 
capacities and movements from that vantage point alone. 
Personal making present indicates the modes of openness 
and receptivity, elements of dialogue. Spirit can be 
referred to as a human mode of awareness only in the context 





by a militant humanism. 
The notion of spirit illustrates man's primal 
association with God. R. G. Smith states this well. 
It is spirit, not simply as a category but as a mode 
of man's being which Buber wishes to disclose anew. 
So this realm of 'betweeness' is not a state, far less 
simply an idea derived from looking atmen in relation. 
But it is an action and a source of action. 1 
This second and more familiar reference to man's 
interaction with God has its home in the concepts of grace 
or transcendence. There are numerous references we could 
cite; we shall confine ourselves to a few relevant passages' 
in I and Thou, interpreting them as far as possible with 
his later writings. The notion of spirit as divine grace 
or transcendence is communicated by Buber's use of many 
synonymous terms. 
In every sphere in its own way, through each process 
of becoming that is present to us, we look out toward 
the fringe of the eternal Thou; in each we are aware 
of a breath from the eternal Thou; in each Thou we 
address the eternal Thou. 2 
There is Eros for man only when beings become for him 
pictures of the eternal and community is revealed along 
with them; and there is Logos for man only when he 
addresses the mystery with work and service for the 
spirit. 3 
Forms silent asking, man's loving speech, the mute 
proclamation of the creature, re all gates leading into the presence of the Word. 
1Smith, R. G., op. cit. P. 76-77. 





"Breath", "logos", "Mystery", "Word": these can be 
taken as the poetic synonyms for spirit or transcendence, 
the eternal Thou. All illustrate Buber's position that 
interhuman encounters and individual modes of living are 
grounded in God's action. They introduce us to the critical 
place transcendence occupies. in the phenomenology and onto- 
logy we have outlined. 
We are ready to ask specific questions about Buber! s 
conception of transcendence. That it plays some role in 
his philosophy has never been doubted. The question is, 
what is its role? We have become increasingly suspicious 
that Buber's conception of transcendence dictates the 
content of the phenomenology and shapes the ontology. Our 
first question grows out of this suspicion. In line with 
Buber's second way of referring to spirit, is the acknow- 
ledgment of transcendence a prior requirement for under- 
standing the I-Thou phenomenology? Our question, when posed 
this way asks if the acknowledgment of God's existence and 
grace is a prior requirement which determines the character 
of the phenomenology and resulting ontology. 
The other alternative is that the acknowledgment of 
transcendence is not required to understand the I-Thou 
phenomenology and ontology; rather the phenomenology and 
ontology lead to and introduce acknowledgment, We ask, 
in line with Buber's first use of spirit, if a conception 
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of transcendence is the outcome of a philosophy of meeting. 
This is Buber's declared position; we shall discuss it 
first. 
Two factors give evidence for this alternative. 
Buber speaks poetically about the event of meeting as a 
"gate leading into the presence of the Word. "1 He also 
says that "the relation with man is the real simile of 
the relation with God. "2 This would indicate that the 
affirmation of transcendence is possible because of the 
irreducible nature of inter-personal meeting. The phen- 
omenology cites both the capacity for and the emergence of 
faith in God, as anthropological observations. He backs up 
this position somewhat by claiming that his work is primarily 
philosophical in nature. 
... if that connection of experience (i. e. I-Thou 
meeting in the interpersonal sense, and I-Thou as 
acknowledgment of transcendence)is to be understood 
as an experience of faith, then its communication is 
certainly to be called preferably a theological one. But that is not so. For theology is understood, 
certainly as a teaching about God, even if it is only 
a'negative' one which then appears instead of a 
teaching of the nature of God, a teaching of the word 
of God, the Logos. But I am absolutely not capable 
nor even disposed to teach this or that about God. Certainly, when I seek to explain the fact of man, I 
cannot leave out that he, man lives over against God. But I cannot include God himself at any point in my 
explanation, any more than I could detach from history 
the, to me indubitable, working of God in it, and make 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 103. 
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it an object of my contemplation. As I know no theolog- 
ical world history, so I know no theological anthro- 
pology in this sense: I know only a philosophical one-1 
He intends that the reader understand his work as a 
purely philosophical enterprise which does not exclude the 
experience of faith. It would seem that our second alter- 
native corresponds to these objectives. The phenomenology 
of I-Thou encounter stands as the irreducible; faith is 
dealt with as an experience that is born of intersubjective 
interaction. 
A second factor also lends itself to the latter 
alternative. It is seen in Buber's discussion of transcen- 
dence in the 1957 Postscript to I and Thou. 
The question is, how can the eternal Thou in the 
relation be at once exclusive and inclusive? How 
can the Thou relationship of man to God, which is 
conditioned by an unconditioned turning to him, 
diverted by nothing, nevertheless include all other 
I-Thou relations of this man, and bring them as it 
were to God? 2 
The question, he insists, is not one about God, for 
that can never be answered. It is about man's relationship 
with God, and he insists that this is discernible in the 
I-Thou relation. He reminds us that the only thing that 
can be known about is the conversation man has with God. 
"Conversation" always pertains to historical living and 
social interaction; it will not be other-worldly talk. 
1Schlipp, P., and Friedman, M., eds. op. cit. p. 690. (underlining mine). 
2Buber, M., I and Thou, p. 134. 
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Faith is an expression of the phenomenon of meeting; 
so "religious" language is the language of the everyday 
and- the social. 
Buber seeks to redirect the theological enterprise 
to embrace this-worldly talk, specifically to base any 
God-talk on the interhuman phenomenon. 1 This effort would 
seem to view acknowledgment of transcendence as a companion 
to, but not a presupposition for meeting. Again, this 
corresponds to the alternative under discussion; the theo- 
logical domain is supposed to emerge from the pheonmenolog- 
ical sphere. Theology makes sense in terms of meeting--in 
that order. 
But this is not the whole story. Though he mutes 
the other alternative, it nevertheless remains. Our previous 
quotations indicate that transcendence is often the presup- 
position for his phenomenology: "there is eros for man 
only when beings become for him pictures of the eternal. .. 
only when he addresses the mystery. " Acknowledgment of 
transcendence is here a prior requirement for understanding 
the meaning of inter-personal love. Acknowledgment of 
1"0ne must, however, take care not to understand this conversation with God--the conversation of which I have spoken in this book and in almost all the works which followed--as something happening solely alongside or above the everyday. God's speech to man penetrates what happens in the life of each one of us, biographical and historical, 
and makes it for you and me into instruction, message, demand. Ibid., p. 136. 
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transcendence gives the interhuman proper perspective, 
and in so doing serves as a presupposition for understanding 
the phenomenology of meeting. 
Stripped of this presupposition, the phenomenology 
and the ontology would be without anchor. Faith could be 
"faith in whatever. " And Buber is very clear that true 
faith is faith in"God, who cannot become an It. " The 
theistic presupposition. is essential; Buber permits it to 
operate alongside the other option. 
In saying this, we take issue with Buber's claims. 
His protestations are aceelý"table as statements of his 
vocational intentions, but they are not accurate indicators 
of much that he writes in I and Thou. Once the experience 
of God's grace functions as the key to understanding 
meeting, it becomes a presupposition for the whole phen- 
omenological-ontological structure. Whether he admits it 
or not, his phenomenology and the ontology are based upon 
a distinct theological premise. His philosophical work 
cannot be separated from what animates it; we are obligated 
to see the whole philosophical venture as the expression' 
of a prior acknowledgment of divine grace. 
Buber is not convincing when he describes his work 
as purely philosophical. His claim that the experience of 
faith induces a philosophical vocation different than the 
theological vocation, seems academic. Transcendence is 
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the presupposition for this "philosophical" venture; his 
phenomenology and ontology may be a unique kind of "phil- 
osophical theology" or a "theologically oriented philosophy" 
but it is certainly not philosophy per se. His conception 
of transcendence explains the philosophy and makes it 
credible. 
It is an unavoidable observation that the two con- 
ceptions of transcendence which we outlined did not conflict 
in Buber's mind. R. G. Smith summarizes this quite well in 
his introduction to the second edition of I and Thou. 
For Buber himself God's transcendence, his absolute 
otherness is so thoroughly involved in his whole 
understanding of the relation between God and man, 
that it is difficult to select one point rather than 
another in his exposition of this. The otherness 
which runs through man's whole relation to his world 
points to this transcendence, at the same time as 
transcendence is drawn into the whole world. 1 
Smith says well that Buber's doctrine of transcendence 
functions as both an encountered reality in the context of 
meeting, and as a presuppostion which lends the inter- 
human its phenomenological and ontological credence. The 
lack of contradiction, for Buber, is no more mysterious 
than the aforementioned intertwining of I-It and I-Thou 
spheres which characterized his phenomenology; "for our 
relation to him is as above contradictions as it is, because 
he is as above contradictions as he is. "2 This is another 
1Buber,, M.., I, and-Thou, from the translator's prefaoe, p. x., 
2Ibid., from the author's postscript, p. 134. 
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dialogical truth in Buber's mind, a paradox, and not a 
contradiction. 
SUMMARY AND STATEMENT OF 
THE ISSUES 
We asked in the beginning of this chapter how Buber 
related his phenomenology of meeting to his ontology. The 
answer is fairly clear. The phenomenology of meeting is 
grounded in the primal movements of distance and relation- 
ship. This two-fold movement rested upon Buber's conviction 
that the event of meeting occurs, i. e. it rests upon a 
conviction about human experience. Distancing functions 
as a conceptual principle which makes the occurrence of 
meeting understandable; "relation" is the conceptual capstone 
of the two-fold movement. The pivotal concept which gives 
the phenomenology ontological status is that distance and 
relationship describe the truth about man, i. e. his unique 
capability for being human with another. No philosopher has 
gone further in placing intersubjectivity at the center of 
his thought. Intersubjectivity really defines man; this is 
Buber's unique contribution to ontological thought. 
We inquired about the function of transcendence in 
the phenomenology and ontology. While Buber declares that 
an acknowledgment of divine grace follows from the exper- 
fence of meeting, we saw also that transcendence is the 
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sole means for understanding the true depths of meeting. 
Only by affirming it can we come to know what meeting means. 
Though there is no problem in Buber's mind for 
holding such a position, there is in mine. If we were to 
confine ourselves to his declared emphasis, the "discovery" 
of transcendence could be considered on philosophical 
grounds. More specifically, we could render critique of 
the phenomenological-ontological structure to see if the 
acknowledgment of transcendence does have a place. Buber's 
position makes that approach impossible. We are required 
to interpret meeting in the context of a prior acknowledg- 
ment; its true meaning depends on a prior notion of divine 
grace. Can he have it both ways? 
Because we cannot accept the ambiguous role of 
Buber's doctrine of transcendence, we are led to state the 
issue for study in the following manner. The following 
study seeks to ascertain the proper function of a phenomen- 
ology of intersubjectivity in answering our questions about 
transcendence. Does a phenomenology of intersubjectivity 
really lead to an affirmation of transcendence? If so, 
what sort of doctrine might be inferred from it? Will the 
proper function of a phenomenology be to encourage the 
affirmation of a transcendent God as conceived in Judeo- 
Christian terms or will another sort of conception be 
warrented? Will any affirmation or acknowledgment of 
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transcendence become credible? We must leave all the alter- 
natives open if we are to learn from the introductory study. 
The issue is to determine how, if at all, a phenomenology 
of intersubjectivity affects our views about transcendence? 
Our study is investigative. 
We have learned a number of things which should 
guide the investigation. It is of the utmost importance 
to relate "knowledge about" human relationships to encounter 
situations. If we maintain that encounters are irreducible 
and foundational forms for knowing others, we should be 
able to explain why and how. It will do no good to affirm 
relationships and leave knowledge about them in the back- 
ground. We must attend to the problem of establishing a 
viable relationship between intersubjective encounter and 
knowledge about the other. Methodology will become a major 
consideration in this endeavor. 
Secondly, if we do come to some way of affirming a 
connection between a phenomenology of human encounters 
and acknowledgment of transcendence, we must attend to the 
function of ontology. Though no assumptions can be 
warrented, it seems necessary to draw a coherent relation 
between phenomenology and ontology in the ensuing study. 
If the connecting links between phenomenology and ontology 
are weak or non-existent, it would seem presumptuous to 
affirm a theological perspective. The lesson of the fore- 
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going is clear on this. Buber's notion of ontology was 
built upon the phenomenology; the connections were clear 
and strong. If an acknowledgment of transcendence is 
warrented, its ontological rootage must be there. We 
cannot accept the contradictory roles theology played in 
Buber; we therefore seek to discover if a phenomenology 
of the interhuman should have an ontological status. If 
it does, some form of affirmation of transcendence may be 
possible. 
These issues, I believe, are important for the 
theological community. Theologians have never been of one 
mind, especially with regard to our concern. Though I 
seek no final agreement among them, perhaps, some light 
will emerge to forward theological debate. The relation- 
ship between a phenomenology of encounter and the affirma- 
tion of transcendence is of central importance if it is 
not the only issue theologians discuss. ' 
In our attempt to shed light upon these issues we 
shall concentrate on one philosopher's views, those of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. There are specific reasons for 
selecting him for the study. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological investigations 
1For a good example of the importance of our topic, 
vide, Macquarrie, John. God Talk, an Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology, London, S. C. M. Press, 1967, Chapter I. 
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argue for the centrality of the concrete world of exper- 
ience; he is noted among French philosophers for presenting 
a Lebenswelt phenomenology. Though this in no way means 
that his thoughts coincide with those of Martin Buber, 
it does put the two philosophers in the same arena, in 
terms of their pivotal thesis., 
Secondly, Merleau-Ponty concentrated on a phenomen- 
1 
ology of perception as the vital artery for all phenomen- 
ological reflection. We shall see that the (Lebenswelt) 
presupposition and his study of perception are related; 
how they relate suggests that Merleau-Ponty cares very 
much about the connection between "knowing" and "knowledge 
about". He holds as does Buber that intersubjectivity is 
an irreducible phenomenon, but he does so not by apologogetic 
means but by the more traditional means of philosophical 
argumentation. We shall see in our study a very different 
approach to the irreducibility of the intersubjective 
sphere, one which illumines if it does not "correct" the 
difficulties encountered in the I-Thou phenomenology. 
Again, Merleau-Ponty is notable on the contemporary 
scene for his concepts regarding the way ontology relates 
to phenomenological research. He was a reluctant student 
of ontology, maintaining a first obligation to phenomen- 
ological interrogation, but his later work contains, without 
doubt, some of the most stimulating ontological explorations 
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ever written. We shall not find him as complete or as 
systematic in the later ontological research--he died too 
early; but the existing writings do give us valuable mat- 
erial for relating ontological research to the issue of 
intersubjectivity. 
Finally, the place and function of transcendence 
was a recurring issue for Merleau-Ponty. What makes him 
so valuable for our purposes is that he considered himself 
outside the realm of faith; yet, he could not avoid the 
issue which motivates our study. At many different periods 
in his philosophical career, he took up the issue of tran- 
scendence. It was not a presupposition he could accept 
in any traditional manner. Still he attempted to describe 
its place in a philosophy of intersubjectivity with great 
attentiveness; he could not avoid the issue. We shall 
find important reflections, especially in the period just 
before his death, that bear directly on the problem we 
have chosen to study. 
It must be borne in mind that the issue we have 
chosen cannot be attacked directly, as it were, without 
preparation. The phenomenology itself will have great 
bearing on the way the issue is eventually dealt with. 
We follow an outline much the same as our discussion of 
Martin Buber. Our first task is to clarify the contents 
and structure of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of inter- 
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subjectivity; we shall then deal with it in terms of the 





MAURICE NIERLEAU-PONTY: HIS METHOD 
AND 
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN PERCEPTION 
In undertaking a study of Merleau-Ponty's phen- 
omenology we do, indeed, enter' a different philosophical 
world. Historically speaking, there is no relation between 
Martin Buber and Merleau-Ponty. Martin Buber'wrote a major 
portion of his works before Merleau-Ponty began to write; 
neither gives any indication of having read the other. 
Martin Buber's philosophical heritage was primarily German 
idealism; although he was acquainted with Husserl's method 
he can hardly be called a student of that early phenomenology. 
He had read Heidegger but spent little time in criticism. 1 
Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, learned phenomenological 
method as a student of Edmund Husserl; major principles 
in his work are borrowed from Martin Heidegger. His aud- 
ience is the French academy. He was a colleague, and co- 
editor of a widely respected journal with John Paul Sartre; 2 
'Vid'e-.. Buber, M, q Between Man and Man, Smith R. G. trans. , mew York, The Macmillan Co. , 1967 . For comments on Husserl, pp. 159 ff, for those on Heidegger pp. 160 ff. 
2The co-editorship was for the monthly Le Temps 
Moderne, 1945 to 1952. 
77 
their concerns during the World War II period were broadly 
speaking, formative for French existentialism. Obviously, 
there is little reason to compare Merleau-Ponty and Buber 
on the basis of a historical kinship. Our purpose is to 
see if, and how, Merleau-Ponty's very different philosoph- 
ical perspectives help elucidate the issues-we outlined with 
respect to Buber. 
Once we leave behind the quest for historical compar- 
isons, it becomes evident that there is a common bond 
between the two. The language and setting may be different 
but they share a common presupposition about the philosoph- 
ical vocation. One example illustrates this and introduces 
us to the method employed by Merleau-Ponty. 
Speaking of the aim of phenomenology he says, "all 
its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and 
primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact 
with philosophical status. "1 Merleau-Ponty assumes that the 
world of experience calls the philosophical task into being 
and provides the issues with which it must deal. The world 
is "always 'already there' before reflection begins, "2 and 
the philosopher consciously recognizes that his reflections 
are but efforts to bring that world into focus. Merleau-Ponty 
1Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, 




is a Lebenswelt phenomenologist. His discipline develops 
as it is given animation by the diversity and richness of 
experience, and its objectives are fulfilled only as it 
puts men back in touch with pre-philosophical experience. 
Lebenswelt phenomenology for him has no other credibility; 
it is a discipline which has a thoroughly social foundation. 
Merleau-Ponty's personal and professional interests support 
this notion of philosophy; he was a teacher and writer, 
a political commentator, a person deeply involved in the 
struggle for peace and social change. He was also an aesthe- 
tician of great respect. His own life is a fine example of 
his conception of phenomenology. Both Buber and Merleau- 
Ponty strived to make their philosophical reflections 
responsive to the range of 'man's experience; in the perfor- 
mance of their respective Lebenswelt phenomenologies they 
differed much but they did hold this singular perception of 
the philosophical task. 
Beyond their common committment to do a philosophy 
of concrete experience, the two begin to part ways. Buber 
chose apologetics; Merleau-Ponty is confident that the 
discipline of method will yield a credible phenomenology. 
We faced constant difficulties with Buber in bringing his 
suggestive phenomenology into dialogue with Hepburn. The 
absence of method, was one source of these difficulties. 
We shall also face difficulties with Merleau-Ponty, but not 
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in this respect; he sought above all to elucidate concrete 
experience in the context of philosophical debatae. The 
presupposition that man is deeply involved in this world 
with others is not an article of faith; it is a thesis 
which must be tested and eventually demonstrated. One 
must develop a method which speaks to others who might 
oppose. For our purposes, the development of method is an 
instructive and helpful alternative to Buber's apologetic. 
Investigating its forms is not an exercise of peripheral 
concern; it is essential in the study of intersubjectivity. 
In debt to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty sought to pursue 
his objectives in the context of a phenomenological method. 
Husserl had given modern phenomenology its dictum: 
"to the things themselvess"1 this banner was supposed to 
distinguish phenomenology from the epistemologies of Hume 
and Kant. Borrowing on Descarte's concept of methodic doubt, 
Husserl developed a tool he called the phenomenological 
reduction. Anything outside the sphere of absolute certainty, 
that is, any transcendent object must be submitted to the 
philosopher's scrutiny. The phenomenologist "suspends" his 
judgment or natural acceptance of things in order to discover 
his essential relation to them. Objects and other people 
1Husserl, Edmund, Ideas, Boyce, W. R., trans., London, 
Geo. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952, p. Q6. 
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particularly, come under the reduction. As the true essence 
of man's relation to things becomes available, phenomenology 
can proceed to become a fully "scientific" epistemology, one 
based upon certainty. 1 
Merleau-Ponty also employs the concept of phenomen- 
ological reduction. But it may be suspected, he does so 
with different presuppositions and results. First, the 
epoche2 is used to sharpen the phenomenologist's natural 
attitude rather than dislodge it completely. Merleau-Ponty 
chooses his terms carefully to convey this redefinition. 
"It is because we are through and through compounded of 
relationships with the world that for us the only way to 
become aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant acti- 
vity, to refuse it our complicity (to look at it ohne mit- 
zumachen, as Husserl often says), or yet again, to put it 
out of play. "3 
The movement of reduction for Merleau-Ponty is a 
"step back" to bring an otherwise common-sense world into 
1This is an extremely brief description of Husserl's 
phenomenological reduction. We shall leave it this way, 
anticipating a more detailed analysis in our comparative 
chapter on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Part III, Chapter One). 
We shall also leave until that chapter, the issue of Merleau- Ponty's regard for Husserl as the father of Lebenswelt phen- omenology. 
2From Greek, epechein, to hold on, check. 
3Merleau-Ponty, 
op. cit. p. xiii. 
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focus; again, the eimche "slackens the intentional threads 
which attach us to the world. "1 Merleau-Ponty puts it this 
way, I believe, to communicate the difference between his 
existentialist use of the reduction and Husserl's. In less 
dramatic language we'could say that the epoche is the phen- 
omenologist's critical analysis of otherwise uncritical 
experience; it is reflection upon unreflective experience, 
or as Merleau-Ponty would say, the "pre-reflective. " Mer- 
leau-Ponty cites Eugen Fink, "when he spoke of 'wonder' in 
the face of the world. "2 The phenomenologist employs the 
epoche_in order to see more clearly "the forms of transcend- 
J ence fly up like sparks from a fire. "3 
This concept of reduction is considerably different 
than Husserl's. First, . the. foundati. onäl principle differs: 
not once is the existence of the lived-world called into 
question. Merleau-Ponty saw that such a reservation of 
judgment was motivated by the spurious quest for certainty. 
It led Husserl to an excessive idealism. Consciousness, 4 
in Husserl's tradition represents the world to itself through 








consciousness constitutes the world. Husserl's idealism is 
argued in the context of a transcendental subjectivism-- 
the world is the projection of a pure consciousness. For 
Merleau-Ponty such a doctrine implied that experience lost 
its opacity and concrete nature; idealism sacrifices any 
effectiveness in elucidating experience because it is com- 
mitted to a philosophy of certainty. Merleau-Ponty did not 
accept the notion of a pure consciousness; one finds upon 
the most radical reduction a "subject destined to be in 
the world. "1 The reduction thus returns the phenomenologist 
to pre-reflective experience. When the cords of judgment 
are loosened we discover a vast complex of intersubjective 
exchange and invovlement with objects. The reduction 
heightens the phenomenologist's understanding of the world. 
This is its primary result. 
In addition, the reduction results in a new under- 
standing of human subjectivity. It must be admitted that 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is, at this point anti-sci- 
entific in a broad sense, and is particularly opposed to 
11. Ibid. To state his difference with Husserl, AZer- 
leau-Ponty cornrnents, "the most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction. " Ibid. p. xiv. 
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a rigid empiricism-1 I2erleau-Ponty's argument is that sci- 
ence mistakenly explains man as a bit of the world; it over- 
looks his subjectivity. The Pry serves to correct this 
view for to employ it is to know that human subjectivity is 
operative in any reflection. The Lebenswelt phenomenologist 
is aware that his perspectives, values, and perceptions, play 
a major.. part in philosophical debate as well as everyday 
experience. The reflective attitude or reduction is instru- 
mental in bringing this to the fore of his thinking; to be 
a philosopher for Nerleau-Ponty means to encounter anew 
one's own subjectivity. But by this he does not intend to 
repeat Husserl's error; the subjectivity that is encountered 
is not a transcendental subjectivity. There is no such thing. 
Subjectivity is rediscovered as being at root, an intersub- 
jectivity. Articulating this one insight is our primary 
objective in the first part of this study. We but mention 
it in preparation for Chapter Two which deals with that sub- 
ject. 
It is appropriate here to note that the phenomenolog- 
1"I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of num- 
erous causal agencies which determine my bodily or psych- 
ological make-up. I cannot conceive of myself as nothing 
but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, psych- 
ological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut my- 
self up within the realm of snience. All my knowledge of 
the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my 
own particular point of view, or from some experience of the 
world without which the symbols of science would be meaning- 
less. The whole universe of science is built upon the world 
as directly experienced. .. ." Ibid. p. viii. 
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ical reduction tries to steer between both rationalist 
and empiricist extremes providing a credible alternative 
to both. The phenomenological reduction is in proper hands 
he says, with "existential philosophy. "' 
The existential appropriation of the reduction does 
not mean that phenomenology thereby loses its field of con- 
centration, the study of essences. 2 In the phenomenologist's 
reflection on raw experience he is opened to fields of 
ideality. The exercise of developing ideational themes, 
Husserl called eidetic intuition; 3 this becomes for Merleau- 
Ponty, the second principle of phenomenological method. The 
principle can be described briefly as the phenomenologist's 
ability and determination to "bring the world to light. "4 
Two examples show how the eidetic reduction becomes an 
appropriate tool for Lebenswelt phenomenology. 
The first example concerns the assumptions of the log- 
ical positivists. 
5 At least two themes present themselves when oni 
1The 
context is as follows. "Far from being, as has been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phen- 
omenological reduction belongs to existential philosophye Heidegger's 'being in the world' appears only against the background of phenomenological reduction. " Ibid. p. xiv. 
2Vide. Merleau-Ponty, M., op. cit. p. vii and p. xiv. 
3from Greek eidos, idea. 
4Merleau-Ponty, 
M., op. cit. p. xvi. 
5He 
refers specifically to the Vienna Circle, Ibid., 
p. xv. 
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reflects upon the nature of human consciousness. The first 
possibility, positivists assume, is that consciousness is 
described adequately by orgainizing our language about it. 
Language about consciousness is conceived of as being a 
field of ideas quite separate from one's experience of the 
world. Logical positivism assumes that linguistic meaning 
can be orgainized to form correct concepts of consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty observes that separating language about 
consciousness from man's experience of self and world, is 
superficial. Positivism overlooks this relation in its 
concentration upon language. 
An important task in phenomenology is to scrutinize 
the operation of consciousness which gives rise to our 
language about it. Certainly phenomenology must study 
language, but it does so in the context of its being 
dependent upon man's prereflective experience of the world. 
The eidetic reduction asserts that the philosopher wrests 
ideality from "dumb experience. "1 
Cartesian idealism approaches the notion of con- 
sciousness quite differently: knowledge is the correlate 
to a pure consciousness; the distinct idea is the flower 
of consciousness. Again, human perception is put aside 




ideas we have of the world. Again, the lesson of the eidetic 
reduction is clear. Knowledge, for PJlerleau-Ponty, is not 
the correlate of consciousness or a capturing of the 
world in a thought form. We cannot possess the world 
in thought; the world always transcends our knowledge of 
it. 1 Moreover, any eidos or essence is an abstraction of 
experience. Involvement, or being-in-the-world, precedes 
our ideas about that involvement. 
If we recognize these limitations upon reason we 
are safe in our efforts to conceptualualize essences. Not 
only is the formulation of ideational themes "safe"; it is 
necessary. In order to understand the pre-reflective, 
reflection must be introduced. The sense of opacity in 
experience is not evident apart from thematization; wonder 
for the world which Merleau-Ponty seeks to reawaken, can 
only come with the rigour of describing its forms. "Sparks 
of transcendence" may incite fascination apart from eidetic 
reduction, but their meaning is untouched until thematization 
is applied. Eidetic reduction given its appropriate limita- 
tion, is not only a viable alternative to positivism and 
idealism; it is the proper exercise of reason. 
This should give us aid in clarifying the relation 
between Merleau-Ponty's existential concerns and the peculiar 
1Vide., ibid. p. xvii. 
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role of phenomenology. Existential thought does not exclude 
a methodological "program"; in fact, it requires one if the 
phenomenologist is to be something other than a prophet. 
Merleau-Ponty's method and his subject matter are inter- 
dependent: when a method is specified that depends upon 
the priority of experience (Lebenswelt), and requires fields 
of ideality to scrutinize and interpret its structures, 
method and existential concern truly inform one another. 
We may summarize this brief outline by saying that 
method is the phenomenologist's access--access to the meaning 
of the experience, of truth. If this summary sounds awkward, 
it is nevertheless, a fair synopsis. "Access" is paramount, 
in that methodology is used to serve an existential pre- 
occupation'-the nature of man's involvement in a world of 
things and people. "Access to the meaning of experience" 
signifies that essences are derived from experience, and 
that the philosopher specializes, so to speak, in the sphere 
of ideational forms. The phrase, "experience of truth" 
conveys the notion that phenomenological method couches 
the question of truth in the context of human experience. 
Merleau-Ponty does not so much ask, "what is the truth? " as 
if truth could be captured apart from the phenomenon of 
human interaction; rather, he asks, "what in experience 
is encountered as true? " Experience is the context for 
truth claims; it provides for our questioning and affects 
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our answers. 
Lest we assume that this notion of method issues in 
yet another form of subjectivism, we should be more specific 
about the subject-matter to which the methodology applies. 
This takes us to Merleau-Ponty's concept of perception. 
The "lived-world" is a broad and, perhaps, vague 
category, similar to the term "experience". Merleau-Ponty 
points his investigations specifically to the nature of 
human perception. Dealt with phenomenologically, the prob- 
lem of perception is the problem of the in-itself-for-us. 
Using Brentano's dictum, "all consciousness is conscious- 
ness of something, "1 Nierleau-Ponty particularizes the phen- 
omenologist's objectives; "To seek the essence of perception 
is to declare that perception is, not presumed true, but 
defined as access to truth. "2 From the particular forms 
of perception which give access, the phenomenologist pursues 
the sense which is revealed where the paths of my various 
experiences intersect, and also where my own and other 
people's intersect and engage each other like gears. It 
is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjec- 
tivity, which find their unity when I either take up 
my past experiences in those of the present, or other 
people's in my own. For the first time the philosopher's 
thinking is sufficiently conscious not to anticipate 
itself and endow its own results with reified form in 
the world. 3 
1Ibid. p. xvii 
2Ibid., p. xvi 
31bid., p. xx. 
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Though this affirmation may not quiet all sus- 
picion. of subjectivism, it does advise us to acknowledge 
a different intention on B1erleau-Ponty's part. Because 
the lived-world provides the fundamental subject-matter for 
phenomenology, and that world is never confined to an indi- 
vidual's private vision, subjectivism should be averted. 
The lived-world described here, is an intersubjective sphere; 
his descriptions disciplined by method attempt to make that 
affirmation philosophically credible. ' 
His is a "grand program"; I ask myself if such a 
task can be realistic. He has set before himself a field 
of investigation which is supposed to encompass the forms 
of human perception as well as the general problem of 
being-in-the-world. Yet, his work is meticulous if not, 
at times repetitious, and from this we can learn a lesson; 
it is impossible to sel bt a' topic' such as intersubjectivity 
without reviewing those topics which precede and surround 
it. This requirement, however, is not a superfluous one. 
We cited Buber's failure to develop a phenomenology of 
perception; it is possible that, in the analyses ahead, 
we shall see that it is this which makes-a phenomenology 
of intersubjectivity understandable and credible. That is 
certainly one of Merleau-Ponty's aims. We go now to his 
study of perception particularly as perception pertains to 
the subject's knowledge of self. 
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What makes Merleau-Ponty so interesting to us will 
be the connection he sees between perception and a theory 
of intersubjectivity. The interrogation of human perception, 
for Merleau-Ponty, calls for a phenomenology of intersub- 
jectivity. This is his way of surmounting what had become 
Husserl's mistaken preoccupation--the problem of human 
, 
consciousness. Perception is the vantage point from which a 
theory of experience can be expounded; a theory of perception 
calls the phenomenologist to concentrate on the intersubjective 
as a cardinal form of human experience. 
1 It is far too early 
in our study to demonstrate this, but it can be anticipated 
in the later chapters that Merleau-Ponty is notable in 
modern phenomenological research because of this perspective. 
More than any other, I believe, he will be seen as the 
phenomenologist of intersubjectivity--and for good reason. 
Merleau-Ponty did not explore intersubjectivity in 
the narrow topical sense; 
notable for its theories 
final years he would also 
What we will see below as 
is that intersubjectivity 
connecting thread for all 
his phenomenology is just as 
Df freedom and history; in the 
write the beginnings of an ontology. 
we begin to apply his method 
was his guiding interest and the 
his endeavors. 
1His 
closest ally in this perspective is Gabriel 
Marcel; why Merleau-Ponty did not speak of their kinship in thought is something of a mystery. We shall discuss their affinities below at the appropriate points. 
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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN PERCEPTION: 
THE THEORY OF THE BODY 
Prior to investigating Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
of the corps propre, it is advisable to outline how he poses 
the problem of perception. Omitting this would give the 
reader the impression that Merleau-Ponty's philosophical 
opponents, idealism and behavioristic empiricism, are false 
constructs rather than misunderstandings of real problems. 
He respects these two positions in so far as they respond 
to the knotty problem of perception; they are wrong not 
because they disregard the issue but because they draw 
wrong conclusions about problems inherent in the act of 
perception. The problems are illustrated by the following: 
I see the next-door house from a certain angle, but it 
would be seen differently from the right bank of the 
Seine, or from the inside or again from the aeroplane: 
the house itself is none of these appearance. ... I am trying to express in this way a certain manner of 
approaching the object, the 'gaze' in short, which is 
as indubitable as my own thought, as known by me. We 
must try to understand how vision can be brought into 
being from simewhere without being enclosed in its own 
perspective. 
We can detail this by focusing upon two aspects of 
perception, first its spatial, and secondly, its temporal 
character. To see the house is to see it from an angle, 
i. e. from one point of view. Walking about the house, we 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., op. cit. p. 67. 
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see it from differing angles, "multiplying" them in our 
exploration. The formal expression of this is, every per- 
ception is singualar in nature. But this is not the whole 
story. Perception's singular focus is complicated by the 
experience of the object "in context". Each angle of per- 
ception brings a unique scene; when we focus upon the roof, 
doors and windows "recede". When a view of the entrance is 
the primary focus, roof line and chimney "recede". The 
point Merleau-Ponty makes is that every spatial focus in- 
cludes a "horizon"; in other words, every singular perspective 
has a context and this alters the theme of singularity. Both 
singular focus and context operate in the act of perception. 
More specifically, every singular focus calls into play the 
importance of its context, or horizon. ' This is true in 
the spatial sense; it is also true in the temporal sense. 
I see the house, as an object which is "there". 
Without critical reflection, I assume that the house was 
there yesterday and will be there tomorrow; as an object 
it has a permanent or static "thereness". But this pre- 
reflective assumption is called into question when I 
ask about the house in the past or the future. Perhaps I 
cannot remember its prior condition, or presage the deter- 
1Later in his discussion he refers to "horizon" as 
a "field" of perception. The Heideggerian sense of horizon is also used; we shall specify when that is the case. It differs somewhat from the present use of the term. 
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ioration of its paint, yet these "horizons" are part of the 
scene in the present. What we retain concerning the past 
and protend about the future are involved in any present 
perception. The "duration" of perceptual fields is a prob- 
lem phenomenology must confront as well as spatial contexts. 
When the thinker brackets the immediate perceptive act, the 
problems of space and temporality emerge, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the excesses of empiricism and rationalism are 
born at this point. 
Before we proceed with his criticisms, it is necessary 
to mention a formidable difficulty in making our critique. 
We have attempted previously to use specific examples of 
rationalism and empiricism as the objects of Merleau-Ponty's 
criticism. This is no longer possible in terms of his expo- 
sition. He uses these terms increasingly in an unspecified 
manner; names or schools of thought are seldi 
for his attack. We are aware that there are 
of the empiricist and rationalist traditions 
specific author employs the insights of both 
his writings. Merleau-Ponty gives us little 
fying ''the opposition". 
)m singled out 
different forms 
and often a 
traditions in 
help in identi- 
I lament this condition and consider it a shortcoming 
in his work. One small consolation is that Sartre, Heidegger, 
Marcel, and Husserl also commit the same mistake. It seems 
characteristic of existentialially oriented phenomenologists 
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to generalize about the traditions they oppose. The best 
we can do with Merleau-Ponty is to risk a more specific 
identification on the basis of his writings taken as a 
whole. 
The opposition on the rationalist side is the easier 
to identify. Cartesian philosophy is the main tradition in 
France. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's mentor, titled one of his 
writings Cartesian Meditations, and consciously attempted 
to carry the Cartesian method to its logical conclusions. 
Husserl was anti-Cartesian in only two respects: he dis- 
pensed with the notion of substance which held up Descarte's 
metaphysics and he radicalized the notion of the cogito. In 
Husserl's version, phenomenology issues in a transcendental 
idealism; this is his form of Cartesian philosophy. Merleau- 
Ponty was not as critical of Husserl as he might have been, 
but he was critical of the Husserlian notion of transcendental 
idealism and certainly its Cartesian heritage. The ration- 
alism or "intellectualism" which Merleau-Ponty criticizes 
should be identified as Husserl's doctrine of transcendental 
subjectivity, his idealism, and the notion of the cogito 
as expounded by Descartes. Merleau-Ponty is fairly explicit 
about his disagreements with Descarte's cogito, and we 
believe Husserl's form of idealism is opposed in addition 
to this. We shall elaborate the disagreement with Husserl 
in Chapter One of Part Three. 
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Empiricism is harder to identify. Merleau-Ponty 
seems to have had little contact with contemporary British 
empiricists. His training, however, included a systematic 
study of psychology, particularly of behavioral psychology 
and clinical experiments in America. His argument with 
behaviorist theory is that the stimulii which present them- 
selves to human consciousness are thought of as being 
entirely responsible for human behavior. Behaviorism, he 
believes, succumbed to the sense-datum theory. Whether he 
was right or not is not our concern here, but it seems most 
likely that the term "empiricism" is associated with his 
study of psychology, and particularly with behaviorist 
theory. 
Such identification of the opposition on our part 
should only be seen as an attempt to provide a context for 
argumentation where one is not specified. 
Merleau-Ponty's empiricist treats the problem of 
perspectivism quite literally, attempting to correlate the 
object "there with sense impressions made upon the eye. 
Space can be objective if the perceiver is merely a "receiving 
station"1 for sense data, or a bit of the world, as Merleau- 
Ponty would say. The excesses of empiricism are based upon 
1Vide. Marcel, Gabriel, M ster of Bein , London, Harvill Press Lt., 1950, Vol. I, Chap. 1. 
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the difficult problem of how p ersp ectivism is to be over- 
come; bahaviorism is its error. Space can never be objec- 
tive in an act of perception, not if the subject is projector 
and actor as well as receiver. Merleau-Ponty, of course, 
holds this position. 
Idealism also reacts to the same problem. If per- 
spectivism is to be overcome, is it not the idea of the 
house which is public and objective? The idealist concen- 
trates on the subject's ideas of space and time as ways of 
transcending perspectivism. Again, the explanation is offered 
because of problems inherent in the act of perception. 
Idealism's solution, however, fails to account for the bodily 
nature of perception; one cannot assume that the body is ever 
overcome by the clear and distinct idea. Any viable solution 
to perspectivism must deal with the issue of bodily perception. 
These misunderstandings initiate the following state- 
ment of the problem. "We cannot remain in this dilemma of 
having to fail to understand either the subject or the object. 
We must discover the origin of the object at the very centre 
of our experience; we must describe the emergence of being 
and we must understand how, paradoxically, there is for us 
an in-itself. "1 In other words Merleau-Ponty seeks to find 
1Merleau-Ponty, M. , p. cit. , p. 71. 
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a way to retain a notion of consciousness for the human sub- 
ject which does not borrow the problems of rationalism and 
idealism. 
Consciousness as an ideational, form-making process, 
will play a central role in his theory of the body. The 
challenge is to give it a proper role apart from its being 
considered a "constituting spirit" in the Cartesian manner. 
Likewise his theory must retain a recognition of the 
givenness of experienced objects without adopting the behav- 
iorist notion of the body as a receptor object. His theory 
of perception must find a viable alternative to the sense- 
datum theory. The "in-itself" must be understood in terms 
of its meaning "for us"; the "for us" must be part of an 
exchange with objects and others that are truly "there". 
The theory of the body is not a casual choice of 
topics for Merleau-Ponty. "The theory of the body-image is, 
implicitly, " he says, "a theory of perception. "1 It will 
provide a foundation for the entire phenomenology as it 
speaks to the extremes of idealism and behaviorism. Merleau- 
Ponty is not the first to have seized upon this topic, but 




place of respect in any phenomenology. 
' 
+ + + 
Three important concepts comprise his concept of 
the body. First, we shall deal with his picture of the 
body as a sense-giving organism; secondly, we shall address 
ourselves to his notion of "corporeal scheme". Lastly, we 
shall deal with his concept of the arc intentionnel. 
2 In 
each of these topics we remind ourselves of the purpose 
Merleau-Ponty entertains: the theory of the body is the 
foundation not only for his theory of perception; it intro- 
duces the major theme of his philosophical career. Inter- 
subjectivity is introduced at every turn. 
Merleau-Ponty's first topic is somewhat peculiar, 
the experience of one's own body. The experience of one's 
own body will illustrate the sense-giving nature of the 
human organism. 
His example is a man whose limb has been amputated. 
The patient claims to feel the limb; when a stimulus is 
1It is puzzling that Merleau-Ponty mentions Gabriel 
Marcel but once, by way of criticism. Marcel's studies of 
the body are the pioneering studies of the now familiar theory 
of the corps propre. Richard Zaner remarks that the absence 
of recognition seems to be a point of honor with both Merleau- 
Ponty and J. P. Sartre. Vide., Zaner, Richard M., The Problem 
of Embodiment, New York Humanities Press, 1964, p. 1r7 
footnote. 
20ur topical arrangement follows Zaner' s. Ibid., 
PP. 154-180. 
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applied to the neural path between the stump and the brain 
the patient feels a pain in his "leg". Merleau-Ponty calls 
this phenomenon the experience of a phantom limb. Stimulus- 
response theory would explain such an experience in physical 
terms, but when a local anaesthetic is administered, the 
patient still feels the phantom limb. Behaviorism simply 
cannot account for this. The patient imagines the limb in the 
same position it was at the time of injury; the limb retains 
the same intense pain experienced originally. Behaviorist ex- 
planations rapidly erode in light of this circumstance. 
The rationalist takes over. The patient supposedly 
thinks or imagines his pain, and the limb. But this explan- 
ation encounters severe difficulties as well, for when the 
nerve path to the brain is severed, the phenomenon of the 
phantom limb disappears. A physiological alteration affects 
the supposedly mental retention of pain. "What has to be 
understood, then, is how the psychic determining factors 
and the physiological conditions gear into each other. "1 
The very failure of the traditional explanations suggest 
the need for a new approach. 
Physiological and psychological elements of the 
experience Merleau-Ponty says, are aspects of a much more 
fundamental form. They both play a part in the patient's 
1Merleau-Ponty, P. Z. , op. Cit., p. 77. 
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particular "world", his environment, but they indicate the 
need for a different description of that world. The major 
characteristic of the patient's world or environment is 
his "project". The project of the subject is definitive of 
the lived-world, and it provides the key to understanding 
both psychological maladjustments and physical conditions. 
This new theme does not deny that physical stimulii 
are "real". Stimulii are seen as being introduced to a 
particular world, they are not thought of as instrumental- 
ities which enter a vacuum. Even motor reflexes, share this 
subscription, he says; more than "blind processes, they 
adjust themselves to a 'direction' of the situation and 
express our orientation towards a behavioral setting. "1 
The notion of project will play a fundamental role in the 
description of physical behavior. 
With regard to pyschological elements, the argument 
is similar. In anosognosia, where the patient fails to 
recognize his disability, the theme of project again corrects 
misunderstandings; the patient does not represent to him- 
self an imaginary limb. On the contrary, he refuses to 
recognize his disability because his project has been upset. 




to alter his intentions and desires. Anosognosia is not a 
mental decision or failure to conceptualize; it is the 
refusal to accept the new project world which has limita- 
tions because of the amputation. 1 
The priority of project is called for because of the 
inadequacies of alternate explanations, and its priority 
makes it a fundamental concept of experience which can 
guide phenomenology. The phenomenologist begins his inves- 
tigations of perception with the testable thesis that human 
activity is best characterized as a "project". He is saying, 
in effect, that this concept helps explain the character of 
one's pre-reflective perception of the world. 
It is important beyond this to say what Merleau- 
Ponty means by this concept. His concern is not to say 
presently what projects actually are; he is intent on empha- 
sizing that human perception has the character of a project. 
His term for this is mise en forme. 
lEdward Ballard's analysis of this material brings 
out an interesting and important distinction. We shall 
make use of it later. "The rejection of mutilation which the equivocal phantom limb signified is clearly not the 
consequence of a decision. It is rather indicative of an 
attitude, a posture, which underlies any kind of conscious, decision-making. We are led thus, to one form of a funda- 
mental distinction between two levels of bodily functioning. 
These are the habitual and actual levels, a distinction which 
parallels that between the 'knowledge of' and 'knowledge 
about'. .. . the first is lived, the second is more or less 
abstractly known. " Edward G. Ballard, "The Philosophy of Merleau Ponty", Tulane Studies in Philosoph 
, Vol. IX, i96o, p. 174. 
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First, this means that everything we perceive bears 
the mark of "project". We do not have projects in the same 
sense that we have jobs; we are projects. Everything we 
see, hear, taste, smell, or touch is indicative of our 
active interchange with the world. 
Secondly, our bodies are the medium of the human 
project. 
1 This does not mean that bodies are chained to 
what Buber called the Umwelt. On the contrary, Merleau- 
Ponty's notion of the body can now be seen as emphasizing 
its sense-giving characteristic. Mise en forme specifies 
that the human organism strives to "make sense", to "make 
forms" of the jumble of experience. The person is conscious 
and self-conscious as we shall see below. 
Third, Merleau-Ponty states that his concept goes 
beyond subjectivism. In the example the most subjective 
of all experiences was given a new context. The phantom 
limb was not "manufactured" nor was it a simple reaction to 
stimulii. The phenomenon occurred as part of a total inter- 
action between subject and world. Sense-giving there, was 
protracted and minimal; the patient's adjustment had not 
yet been made. But it showed that supposedly subjective or 
10ne may legitimately ask why Merleau-Ponty uses the term "body" exclusively in describing the human organism; 
we have seen that the notion of consciousness is integral 
to his theory. "Body" is an appropriate term if thought 
of in terms of the Greek word soma; consciousness is integral to that term as it is to Merleau-Ponty's. 
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completely private experience is more apparent than real. 
Even in pain this patient vies with his world. His healthy 
interaction is frustrated, and to adjust is to interact 
successfully again, with the limitation. Project or mise 
en forme then, is interaction with the world; subjectivism 
is combatted effectively in the sense that one cannot create 
a world of his choosing. He cannot withdraw from that which 
is over against him, apart from a complete psychosis. 
Merleau-Ponty has another purpose in introducing 
this concept. Describing the body as a sense-giving organ-' 
ism gives him a way of articulating the relation, or better, 
the interrelation, of the "in-itself .. for us. " To 
see the body as an active sense-giving organism is to lay 
the foundation for a theory of perception with regard to 
external objects and others. In this case, it is the obser- 
vation that one's own body cannot be divorced from one's 
project or worldly interaction. 
One's body, in sum, is not just a tool we use to 
view the world; it is our medium for being in the world in 
a particular way. Our bodies are mise en forme. 
Rlerleau-Ponty amplifies this introductory observation 
with his notion of the "corporeal scheme". The sense-giving 
element is but the first step toward a theory of the body; 
next, comes inquiry as to the larger context in which sense- 
giving is exercised. The topic will be confined to that 
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analysis of the experience of one's own body in terms of 
its movement or activity. 
.... it is clearly in action that the spatiality 
of our body is brought into being, and an analysis of 
one's own movement should enable us to arrive at a 
better understanding of it. By considering the body 
in movement, we can see better how it inhavits space. 
Bodily movements in a normal person exhibit coordin- 
ation of the senses. For instance, we swat a fly on our 
forehead, or light our pipe without conscious attention 
being required. We know indubitably where the pipe is, 
where the fly alights. Merleau-Ponty argues that this is 
not to be explained in terms of cognition. We learn the 
"hereness" of our body apart from conceptualization. The 
body in normal persons is always orientated space. 
But if it can be shown that this kind of orientation 
exists even in "abnormal" subjects, the position is strength- 
ened. To introduce the theme of bodily space he uses the 
famous Gelb-Goldstein studies on brain injury. In the 
example we see that the mentally deficient subject retains 
a "corporeal scheme". 
The patient, Schneider, has no ability to carry out 
simple commands to touch a given area of his body. He 
cannot describe the position of his head or lims, nor can 
he identify the spot touched by someone else. Merleau- 
Ponty observes that psychology traditionally classifies 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., op. cit., p. 148. 
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brain lesions as a kind of "psychic blindness"; Merleau- 
Ponty prefers to say that the patient is unable to perform 
"abstract" movements. 1 The patient is as capable as a nor- 
mal person, carrying out movements which are "concrete". 
Schneider, has no difficulty, for example, in performing 
actions which require coordination and agility when no 
conceptualization is required. He swats the mosquito, or 
uses his handkerchief with little difficulty. 
Here is the opening for Merleau-Ponty's concept of 
corporeal scheme; idealism fails to account for such activity. 
We have to create the concepts necessary to convey the 
fact that bodily space may be given to me in an intention 
to take hold without being given in an intention to 
know. The patient is conscious of his bodily space as 
the matrix of his habitual action, but not as an objec- 
tive setting; his body is at his disposal as a means 
of ingress into a familiar surrounding, but not as 
the mean of expression of a gratuitous and free spatial 
thought. 
The term corporeal scheme organizes what was said 
about sense-giving and it adds an important factor to the 
emerging theory; human activity is characterized as ingression 
into a familiar world or setting. Pre-reflective activi- 
ties such as a daily routine, are known by their constancy 
or lack of surprise. For those with brain lesions, this 
kind of activity is the only kind in which fluidity and 
coordination are possible. For normal subjects, routine 
1Ibid., p. 103. 
2Ibid., p. 104. 
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occupies a major portion of the day. We can learn from both. 
Whether normal or not, systems of worldly interchange charact- 
eri ze man. 
What takes place in this familiar exchange with the world 
is the development of schemata or personal styles of activity. 
That is, the familiar world is appropriated, or "cleared" as 
Heidegger would say, by the development of styles, habits, 
individual preferences and prejudices. A viable theory of 
personality is based upon the development of schemes; what we 
eventually "know about" our world is based upon the constant 
pre-reflective-acquaintance we have with it. Our style affects 
our reflection; our personality colors our observation. 
The concept of corporeal scheme counters a possible mis- 
understanding of the previous concept. It was explained that 
"project" could refer to the various jobs we perform. That 
conscious intentional activity is included under the heading 
of project, is obvious; but the concept is not atomistic at 
root. The notion of coporeal scheme assures us that 
". project" is an essential form of human activity, the mark 
of personality, and not simply an occasionally perceived 
condition. He seeks to introduce us to the phenomenological 
significance of bodily activity and movement. 
Two features can be further distinguished. The grad- 
ual development of a corporeal schemes he says, exhibits 
the "generalizing" capability of the human being. For 
example, certain modes of activity are more successful 
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than others, and they are retained; others are less so, and 
are not. The human subject is most surely generalizing and 
organizing experience as he develops his peculiear style 
of activity. Also, Merleau-Ponty suggests that a "sediment" 
accumulates with the subject and is utilized in ongoing 
experience. Stybs build upon a past. Self-conscious 
remembrance may not occur, but a kind of recognition is, 
nevertheless, integral to this aspect of coporeal scheme. 
One "knows" that one's habits are his and not someone else's. 
The notion of a developing "fund of experience" or sediment, 
also means that some form of selection is going on. When 
tasks are performed successfully, they are used more fre- 
quently; when not, they are discarded. 
' 
It should be emphasized that Merleau-Ponty is not 
suggesting a cognitively oriented structure with his notion 
of the corporeal scheme. The "organizing" form, which is 
a good label for the above characteristics, is a form which 
1A lengthy discussion of psychological theory could 
easily ensue. Merleau-Ponty's interests are philosophical, 
so the relevance of his statement is not to be judged, 
primarily on psychological grounds. It should be said, 
however, that the development of corporeal schemata does 
not depend on the simple principle of success and failure. 
Negative structures are often retained because the world is 
perceived in a particular way. "Positive" schemes are not to be casually identified with successful performance of tasks. To discuss the full import of the notion in clinical terms would take a separate book. Merleau-Ponty contends that 
a personal scheme is developed; he does not care to describe its particulars. 
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gains its life in pre-reflective activity. It is not a 
"mindless" development but it is not a reflective one. 
Corporeal schema become sedimented as structures in acts 
of the most common nature. The Gelb-Goldstein studies 
attest to that. 
The philosophical significance of the body as mise 
en forme and corporeal scheme can be put in general terms 
now. His objective has been to show an interrelation of 
the "in-itself ... for us". The body is always "here" 
for us; it is "my body". This has been implicit in every 
example of the study and is especially important in the 
notion of mise en forme. The theory of the body amply 
illustrates the subjective order, the sphere of "hereness". 
The sphere of "thereness" has also been introduced in 
every discussion. One "knows" his own body primarily in 
terms of project, an interaction with the world, one that 
has certain limits. "To be a body is to be tied to a 
certain world. "' The subject knows his body as being 
"there"; it is his access to the world. 2 
"hereness" and "thereness", though distinct themes, 
are not mutually exclusive in his theory of the body. A 
theory of the body cannot be isolated in the "subject" 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., p. cit. p. 1L8. 
2Ibid., 
p. 149. "Body spatiality is the deployment 
of one's bodily being. . ." Ibid. 
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order; nor can it be confined to the "object" order. Sub- 
jective consciousness and worldly encounter are both essen- 
tial to the theory. 
This is to put Merleau-Ponty's theory in simplified 
form; but it does some justice to his objectives. 
We come now to the third essential concenring bodily 
activity. The body must be thought of as intentional. The 
body transfers itself onto things. A theory of the body 
requires a theory of intentionality. Describing his con- 
cept of intentionality is a difficult but necessary task. 1 
The most appropriate means of gaining understanding 
here is to contrast Merleau-Ponty's concept of intention- 
ality with Edmund Husserl's. There can be little doubt 
that Merleau-Ponty borrowed Husserl's idea, but he makes 
one important revision. 
Husserl notes, as does Merleau-Ponty, that we see 
the "same" object from many different angles or perspectives; 
consciousness is, in this respect, "a consciousness of 
something". 2 Consciousness is indicative of intentionality. 
1Zaner has marshalled a most coherent explanation of 
Merleau-Ponty's concept of intentionality. We cannot deal 
with it as thoroughly as he does, but we are indebted to 
him for his critique. c. f. Zaner, R., op. cit., pp. 172- 197 
2c. f. Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations, The 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 39. ff. 
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But the intentional structure of consciousness merely poses 
the philosophical problem for Husserl. His question was, 
what constitutes "sameness" in the objects of experience? 
His answer was that intentional unities are results of a 
synthesis made by pure consciousness. Intentionality 
serves as the clue to a pure or constituting consciousness. 
That is, the "I think" explains the intentional structure 
of consciousness; the principle of transcendental conscious- 
ness becomes the solution because it explains intentional 
activity. Thus, the task of phenomenology is to describe 
the constituting nature of consciousness which in turn 
explains intentional activity-' 
This brief notation should allow us to see the differ- 
ent course Nerleau-Ponty takes in his description of inten- 
tionality. 
Merleau-Ponty is interested in the question of same- 
ness also. But he observes that the sameness of experienced 
objects is rooted in the notion of task or project. We 
"know" the pipe bes?. de us both visually and tactually. By 
bodily deployment we also "know" that this pipe, seen from 
differing angles or touched in different ways is the same 
pipe. The emphasis upon bodily deployment marks the point 
at which TMierleau-Ponty differs from Husserl. His notion of 
lWe discuss this in detail in Part Three, Chapter One. 
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the perceived situation as being the subject's project leads 
him to claim that Husserl's emphasis upon the constituting 
process- of consciousness is needless abstraction. 
' One 
does not need to think the pipe in order to perceive it; 
rather one "knows" the pipe through praxis; the human's 
medium is his body. 
The difference between the two can also be illustrated 
this way: Husserl argues that intentional activity, or 
consciousness of ..., necessitates the positing of a pure 
consciousness; Merleau-Ponty says that intentional activity 
is itself the primary form of consciousness. Whereas Husserl 
believes that the eidetic reduction necessitates positing 
a transcendental consciousness, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
the eidetic reduction concludes with the recognition that 
intentionality is the essence of experience. We are a 
system of intentionality; it is the fundamental form of 
experience. The concept, therefore, becomes the phenomen- 
ologist's most important tool. Intentionality is the eidos 
or form upon which the whole phenomenology rests. 
Expressive of the importance of this, is Merleau- 
Ponty's notion of "general synthesis". Intentionality is 
not an abstract theme, but its presence does force the 
phenomenologist to observe that, "my history must be the 
1Vide. Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 
112 
continuation of a prehistory and must utilize the latter's 
acquired results. "1 Every person expresses this unique 
heritage. A "general synthesis" has been made for him; 
man is man because he shares this inheritance. Merleau- 
Ponty is not interested in explaining how intentionality 
came to be, but he is interested in emphasizing its per- 
vasive nature. Each perception is indicative of this 
deeply embedded form; once the phenomenologist sees how 
essential intentionality is in describing experience, he 
recognizes that the synthesis is not individual but his- 
torical and all pervasive. 2 Intentionality is the mark 
of being a member of the human race. 
Husserl has nothing of this in his phenomenology. 
Intentionality is the clue to a transcendental consciousness. 
If we wish to call Merleau-Ponty an existentialist, we are 
obligated to see that he is one because of the central 
importance of intentionality in his phenomenology. Inten- 
tionality indicates "a communication with the world more 
1lbid., p. 254. 
2Merleau-Ponty, 
unfortunately, does not detail 
this concept. It is mentioned but not expounded. Our 
interpretation is likewise brief because of this. 
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ancient than thought" .1 
Such is Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body. The 
viability of his alternative to idealism and behaviorism 
rests upon the concept of intentionality; his research has 
led him to submit it as the foundational concept in phen- 
omenological studies. 
OBSERVATIONS 
Concerning P9lerleau-Ponty's method, two themes are 
most important. 
First, the existential preoccupation so well expressed 
in the Lebenswelt notion is given focus by the use of method. 
Discipline is brought to the study of phenomena. Though 
it cannot be argued at this point that Merleau-Ponty' is 
successful in every interpretive effort, it can be said that 
his objectives meet the standards required of philosophical 
research. 
His stated aim to develop philosophically credible 
views of pre-reflective experience led to the adoption of 
1The extended quotation deserves our recording. "My 
personal existence must be the resumption of a prepersonal 
tradition .... This captive or natural spirit is my body, 
not that momentary body which is the instrument of my per- 
sonal choices and which fastens upon this or that world, 
but the system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every 
particular focus into a general project. ... Space and perception generally represent, at the core of the subject, 
the fact of his birth, the perpetual contribution of his 
bodily being, a communication with the world more ancient than thought. " Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 254. 
114 
ground-rules; phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction 
specify the discipline which in turn opens- the door to philo- 
sophical credibility. We can be more specific, however. 
Phenomenological reduction brings to an existential 
interest, the discipline of objectivity. Distance. is put 
between the philosopher and his subject matter. He cannot 
afford to exempt pre-reflective experience from constant 
questioning; the views, beliefs, and relationships of daily 
experience, the physical-emotional reactions to crisis or 
routine, are all brought under the critical eye. This is 
the purpose of'phenomenological reduction. Even at this 
early point we can see a distinct difference between Mer- 
leau-Ponty and Buber. Experience for one, gives occasion 
for apologetics; for the other it gives occasion for an 
almost clinical investigation. 
Another aspect of the reduction can also be seen if 
we turn the coin. Phenomenological reduction is attempted 
with the realization that it concentrates on the pre-reflec- 
tive. Its subject-matter is experience, not the operation 
of the understanding or our ideas about experience. We 
emphasize this because it is so appropriate for our study. 
To say that T4.1erleau-Ponty has an existential preoccupation 
is to say also that he intends to investigate the "encounter 
mode" found in such prominence with Buber. In fact, this 
is inferred in the notion of Lebenswelt, the "lived-world". 
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The very phenomena which matter to him are those which can 
be specified as encounters; the "encounter mode" is synony- 
mous, I think, with "the pre-reflective". We have seen this 
in his study of the body; we shall see it more in his work 
on intersubjectivity. Phenomenological reduction demands 
the critical approach to the encounter mode. The door is 
at least open to gain philosophical credibility; it is 
fostered by the adoption of method. 
Secondly, it should be observed what kind of cred- 
ibility is possible in light of method. Eidetic reduction 
helps us specify it. Eidetic themes do not, and cannot 
claim the stamp of certainty. The quest for certainty has 
been put away, in that themes are checked by phenomenological 
reduction. This is one deterrent to the quest for certainty. 
Another is that eidetic themes are seen as being wrested from 
the lived-world; they have no independent status. 
When the antipathy towards certainty is coupled with 
the concern to reachieve a philosophically credible view of 
the world, we can see what Merleau-Ponty means by philosoph- 
ical credibility. Credibility is confined to proximate 
judgments. Proximate judgments are sufficient; we can only 
know for certain that we are involved in a world. We need 
not seek, as would some omniscient observer, absolute know- 
ledge about the world. Method dictates that proximate 
"knowledge about" be an acceptable goal. 
116 
Whether this will remain a viable goal we can only see 
through his continued studies of perception, but it should be 
emphasized at this early stage that this is his objective. 
Phenomenological method is essentially a discipline for 
research; as we shall see, this is why Merleau-Ponty was 
such a reluctant student of ontology. He was constantly on 
guard to protect against "high-altitude thinking", a term 
used frequently in later years. We can expect eidetic themes 
to be tested and modified because of their non-absolutistic 
character. 
' 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body can be seen as his 
way of introducing -a theory of intersubjectivity; it'will play 
a central role in the discussions of object perception and 
intersubjectivity. Let us be as specific as possible about 
its importance. 
The notion of human consciousness has been retained 
in the contest with behaviorism, but it has been given a new 
structure. Ballard's comment is appropriate: we "know about" 
the world primarily because we "know" it pre-reflectively; 
this is the fact which phenomenology must explicate. Inten- 
17, NNe cannot afford the space to discuss whether this 
characteristic implies that : rerleau-Ponty's idea of reason 
is adequate or not. Thomas Langan has a fascinating book 
which concludes negatively on . this matter; Langan, Thomas, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Reason, London, Yale Univ. Press, 
1966. 
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tionality, corporeal scheme, and mise en forme are attempts 
to conceptualize this fact. Most important, the conscious 
being knows the world by his projects, and he knows primarily 
through the medium of his body. Merleau-Ponty's idea hinges 
on the proposition that consciousness is "embodied"; it is 
activity; it is intentionality. 
Such a doctrine of consciousness, it seems to me, 
provides a suggestive context for making the experience of 
others philosophically credible. We have not yet looked at 
that experience in detail, but I do not see how it could be 
articulated apart from a theory of the body which found 
encounter at the very roots of all experience. In other 
words, a phenomenology of intersubjectivity is groundless 
without a phenomenology of the human subject. We are not 
concerned at this early point to say that Merleau-Ponty's 
specific theory answers all the problems that we found with 
Buber, or any other encounter oriented phenomenology. But 
we are benefitted, I think, by i ierleau-Ponty's insight that 
a theory of the body is a necessary component in a theory of 
intersubjectivity. 
r"erleau-Ponty's theory of the body "introduces" the 
phenomenologist to intersubjectivity in another sense as well. 
We are thrown into the intersubjective sphere because the 
theory of the body itself puts the subject in a world of 
social experience. There is no hint of solipsism, given the 
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centrality of intentionality; the world of projects is a 
world of others. His theory of the body implies that 
subjectivity is, as he says, an intersubjectivity. 
1 The 
individual is always in contact with others. We shall see 
below how this is articulated but it is important here to 
recognize that a phenomenology of intersubjectivity is 
being protended by his doctrine of the body. 
The distinction made between knowledge as encounter 
and knowledge about has another application at this point. 
Ronald Hepburn, we noted, said that knowledge about the 
other is a primp factor in estimating the worth of encounters. 
His aim was to induce the encounter oriented thinker to 
utilize checking procedures instead of apologetics. That 
effort would surely correspond to Merleau-Ponty's, with one 
important qualification. Judgment about the other grows 
out of relationships with the other. Merleau-Ponty can 
be expected to reorder the priority in this regard; his 
major objective is to emphasize the impact of the encounter 
mode in reflective judgments. Hepburn, on the other hand, 
argues that empirical evidence Must be developed in order 
to judge either the relation or the other person. Distin- 
guishing the phenomenologist's perspectives this way may not 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., off. cit., p. xiii. 
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solve the issues raised by Hepburn, but is does show us a 
different approach to analyzing human interaction. It high- 
lights the fact that phenomenology will attempt to defend 
the primacy of the encounter mode without resorting to 
apologetics. 
It cannot be said that he will accomplish his task 
but the alternative approach is worth pursuing. Intention- 
ality is the central concept in this approach; we have seen 
its importance in the foregoing. It may well be the key to- 
a viable theory of intersubjectivity. 
CHAPTER TWO 
MAN AND THE OTN. ER: 
THINGS AND PEOPLE 
We proceed to the area of Merleau-Ponty's phen- 
omenology which is central to the issue of our study, the 
perception of external objects and , other people. 
If the 
reader asks why we discuss'his theory of object perception, 
the answer can be stated briefly. What Martin Buber called, 
the sphere of "It" is ordinarily associated with the per- 
ception of objects, though the form is not confined to it. 
Knowledge in the It form, however, was exclusively "know- 
ledge about". Very little was done to expel the supposition 
that the It sphere was separate from the mode of encounter. 
It is interesting that DIerleau-Ponty deals with object 
perception in the same way he explicated the theory of the 
body; that is, he describes object perception in terms of a 
mode of encounter. "Knowledge about". objects is dependent 
upon "knowing" as an intentional activity. Explication of 
object perception, therefore, further introduces what rierleau- 
Ponty will say about intersubjectivity; it extends the foun- 
dation laid in his theory of the body. 
"Primary experience" and the "perceptual synthesis" 
are the organizing themes in his discussion of sense exper-. 
ience and space. 
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Primary experience refers to the pre-reflective "receiving" 
of objects by the subject and his "taking them up" in inten- 
tional activity. We can assume from the foregoing chapter 
that this is Tlierleau-Ponty's fundamental category in describ- 
ing the experience of objects. If one is to understand 
experience, however, reflective activity must also occur. 
His second category, perceptual synthesis, refers to our 
drive to understand primitive encounter. Perceptual syn- 
thesis is Merleau-Ponty's alternative to idealist and behav- 
iorist explanations of object perception. 
Our first task is to detail the aspects of "primary 
experience" as they are exposed in sense perception. Mer- 
leau-Ponty uses an interesting illustration to introduce the 
concept. 
Just as the sacrament not only symbolizes, in sensible 
species, an operation of Grace, but also the real presence 
of God, which it causes to occupy a fragment of space and 
communicates to those who eat of the consecrated bread, 
provided that they are inwardly prepared, in the same 
way the sensible has not only a motor and vital signifi- 
canca, but is nothing other than a certain way of being in the world suggested to us from some point in space, 
and seized and acted upon by our body, provided that it is capable of doing so, so that sensation is literally 
a form of communion. 1 
The paradin is used for the sole purpose of empha- 
sizing the intentional character of sense experience; no 
theological overtones are intended. The perceiving body 




by Christian communion. Two elements are in turn essential 
to this notion of primary experience. 
' 
In primary experience, the subject is caught up in 
the experience of the "in itself", for example in the per- 
ception of the blue sky. 
As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over 
against it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it 
in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue 
such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself 
to it and plunge into this mystery, it 'thinks itself 
within me'. .. . my consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue. 2 
The perceived thing "presents" itself to the subject. He 
finds no need to justify this notion of presentation; such 
would be folly in a phenomenology of pre-reflective exper- 
ience. One assumes this is because the subject's conscious- 
ness is surely encountered in the lived-world. The notion 
of presentation is integral to a definition of "phenomenon". 
(In later years he will make much of "presentation" for 
ontological pprposes; this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. ) 
1 ''le note that . 1lerleau-Ponty discusses perception 
of objects and colors concurrently, i. e. he does not ob- 
serve the distinctions of Locke that there are primary and 
secondary qualities in sense perception. The whole notion 
of sense qualities comes under attack by P. Terleau-Ponty, 
though he attacks without naming the opposition. 
2Merleau-Ponty, : ". , R. cit., p. 214. In a foot- 
note the translator appropriately ; appends the words of Valery's "Le Cimetiere marin" : 
"Midi 1ä-haut, P,: idi sans mouvement En soi se pense et convient ? soi-meine" 
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A second factor compliments and clarifies the notion 
of presentation; the subject seizes upon or "takes up" what 
is presented. "It is my gaze which subtends colour, and the 
movement of my hand which subtends the object's form, or 
rather my gaze pairs off with colour, and my hand with hard- 
ness and softness. "1 As was true with the perception of 
one's own body, the perceiving subject is not passive. In 
pre-reflective intentional activity, the subject both responds 
and participates by "seizing" the object. He sees the blue 
sky because he is "sensitive to colours:, and not only for 
the moment. He engages the object because he is the inher- 
itor of a primal human acquisition, intentionality. 2 
Both factors in primary experience work together to 
upset the idealist and behaviorist arguments. Sense per- 
ception cannot be confined to a sense datum theory; the object 
is seized upon by bodily activity. "Sensation is not an inva- 
sion of the sentient by the sensible. "3 Our perception is 
not entirely determined by the thing; the body becomes 
party to the transaction. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty 
says that it is not the mind which assi s qualities to the 
1lbid. 
21bid., pp. 215-216. Ise is referring again, with the term "primal acquisition", to his position that the person grows and develops as an intentional being; note our dis- 
cussion of the "general synthesis" in Chapter One. 
31bid., p. 214. 
124 
sensation; the primitive transaction is nothing apart from 
the probing eye or exploring hand; no amount of thought 
can prepare the subject to describe the object out there. 
Rather the body heeds the presentation of the "itself" 
and perceives it "for himself". 
Such a theory is suggestive but not quite convincing 
unless further refinements and qualifications are made 
which deal with the behaviorist and idealist positions. 
He says that the communal nature of sense experience is 
credible on two accounts. 
First, every perception of the thing "takes place 
in an atmosphere of general ity. `! 1 We do not decide to see 
a thing or hear a whistle; our perceptions occur apart from 
the necessity of a conscious act of will or intention. 
This is what he means by the phrase "atmosphere of gener- 
ality"; we are participants because we are of that genre-- 
we cannot help but perceive. Presentation is also associated 
with his notion of general synthesis. The human is an inten- 
tional being by nature; he is the inheritor of the primal 
acquisition of intentionality. (This, of course, makes the 
notion of a constituting consciousness unnecessary; the 
primary fact is that we are perceivers who encounter objects. ) 
1lbid., p. 215. "PMy perception even when seen from 
the inside, expresses a given situation: I can see because I am sensitive to colours, whereas personal acts create a 
situations I am a mathematician because I have decided to 
be one. " Ibid. 
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Secondly, presentation is credible only if we admit 
that a given perception is "incomplete". In other words, 
bodily exploration is always approximate in its "knowing". 
Our hands and eyes explore the object, but they do not 
possess it' its plentitude escapes us. Or better, the 
object's transcendence becomes evident in pre-reflective 
encounter. Merleau-Ponty admits to a form of perspectivism 
here but only in one senses sense perceptions are encounters 
which can always be improved, enlarged upon, and "refined": 
through further exploration. Moreover, we are never in full 
possession of the thing; the succession of exploratory 
activity necessitates this qualification. "When I see an 
object, I always feel that there is a portion of being 
beyond what I see at this moment, not only as regards visible 
being, but also as regards what is tangible or audible. "1 
In contrast to both behaviorist and idealist explanations, 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of knowledge will be continually 
critical of the quest for certainty; knowing at the most 
primitive level is, for him, approximate. The notion of 
presentation enforces this position. 
Primary experience can be capsuled as follows: the 
object presents itself to an intentional subject; the subject 
explores it through the medium of his body. He explores 
1lbid., p. 217. 
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because he is by nature an intentional (perceiving) being; 
the object is explored but not known in its plentitude. 
This brings us to Merleau-Ponty's theory of the perceptual 
synthesis. The question of reflective knowledge has not yet 
been directly addressed, but the foregoing bears fairly 
obvious implications. 
Turning to the nature of reflection, he says, 
When I say that I have senses. and. that. they give me 
access to the world, I am not the victim of some 
muddle, I do not confuse causal thinking and reflection, 
I merely express this truth which forces itself upon 
reflection as a whole: that I am able, being connat- 
ural with the world, to discover a sense in certain 
aspects of jbeing without having myself endowed them 
with it through any constituting operation. 1 
The resource for developing adequate descriptions 
of sense experience is the primary experience itself. 
Reflection is born of the drive to make sense of the ob- 
jects we perceive. Stated as a principle of method this 
becomes: eidetic forms can be wrested from the lived- 
world. Perceptual synthesis characterizes an aspect of 
experience as did "sensory communion"; it is not a tran- 
scendental category in the ? iusserlian sense in that it 
has no independent status. Its credibility is based, upon 
the exDerierce of reflection. ?. 7ith this as a guide, perhaps, 
1Ibid., p. 217. 
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we can make clear its content. 
1 
He introduces perceptual synthesis by noting two 
forms of primary experience, the distinctness of sensory,. 
activities (touch and sight modes differ), and sensory 
cooperation (sight and touch "cooperate"). 
One objective is, as always, to demonstrate that 
the perceptual synthesis is preferable to the idealist 
and behaviorist explanations of sense experience. Con- 
cerning sensory distinctness, patients blind from birth 
who gain their sight by surgery, claim to experience "space" 
for the first time. The claim makes sense as a personal 
attitude, but is also credible in that spaces are still 
habitually "learned" by the patient's touching what is now 
seen. The world of sight is at first dependent upon the 
already familiar mode of touch. ºMTerleau-Ponty observes 
that vision is facilitated by the "quasi-spatial tactile 
field, into which the first visual perceptions may be 
inserted. "2 Touch has its own distinct mode, sight per- 
ception, its ovum. The former activity is more limited in 
1: 
": erleau-Ponty anticipates an objection to his method i. e. does the reflective consciousness differ significantly 
from the pre-reflective experience? He says "but the reflec- tive I differs from the unreflective at least in having been 
thematized, and what is given is not consciousness, or pure being; it is as Kant himself profoundly put it, experience, in other words the communication of a finite subject with 
an opaque being from which it emerges but to which it remains 
committed. " Ibid., p. 229. 
21bid., p. 223. 
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its movements, sight being more inclusive. Space, perceived 
tactually, is circumscribed by the body's actual contact 
with objects, sight subtends "the afar off". "The whole 
significance-of our life. .. would be different if we were 
sightless. "1 Though some substitutions for each mode can 
take place, we are sure, he argues, that the modes of touch 
and sight are not equivalent. 
Sensory distinctness does not threaten, however, the 
"co-existence" of modes in perception. "Sight would never 
communicate directly with touch, as in fact it does in the 
normal adult, if the sense of touch, even when artificially 
isolated, were not so organized as to make coexistences 
possible. "2 
The common occurrence of-sensory cooperation'is 
expressed this way. 
"One sees the weight of a block of cast iron which 
sinks in the sand, the fluidity of water and the viscosity 
of syrup. In the same way, I hear the hardness and uneven- 
ness of cobbles in the rattle of a carriage, and we speak 
directly of a 'soft', 'dull' or 'sharp' sound. "3 There 
expressions may seem non-sensical to the language analyst 
llbid., p. 225. 
2Ibid., p. 223. 
31bid., p. 230. 
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but they do reveal how sensory perception operates at the 
pre-reflective level. A subject under mescalin reports 
that, sounds have colors, trees grow greener. Plterleau- 
Ponty'says that a synaesthetic experience is being under- 
gone, and mescalin illustrates dramatically the way we 
ordinarily perceive. "Synaesthetic perception is the 
rule .. . "l The senses do intercommunicate. 
The question, of course, is not so much, "do synaes- 
thetic and distinct forms of sense experience exist? " It 
is rather, in Merleau-Ponty's mind, "how are they to be 
explained? " Other studies of perception take the distinct 
forms into consideration, but they do not give credible 
accounts of the synaesthetic or intentional form of the 
operation. The notion of perceptual synthesis is his alter- 
native, designed to explicate the drive to make sense of 
sensory experience. It is his answer to behaviorism and 
idealism; we must look again at the experience of objects. 
For example, when holding the hand before the eye, 
as we look at an object some distance away, we see a double 
image of the hand. 2 Whereas the image of the remote object 
is single, the images of the hand are double or "divergent". 
If vision is directed from the object to the hand, the images 
1Ibid., p. 229. 
21bid., pp. 230-231. 
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gradually "converge" or become unified. The idealist says 
that an a priori knowledge that the hand is "one", consti- 
tutes or "causes" the image's unification. That is, through 
a mental act we accomplish the convergence of the images; 
apperception shapes perception. Merleau-Ponty counters 
that thought cannot constitute the "fusion of images". 1 
Were it an act of thought, the fusion would take place 
immediately; but, he says, we have "to wait". 2 The images 
fuse gradually. The idealist cannot account for this. 
The behaviorist attacks the problem in another way: 
his explanation, is based upon the physical or anatomical 
arrangement of our visual apparatus and its way of operating. 
Convergence of the images becomes a necessity because "focus" 
takes place. Focus, then, is the cause of the unified image 
of the hand, and this is because the anatomical structure of 
the sight organs dictate our reception. The behaviorist 
says that physiological conditions support the stimulus- 
response theory. Merleau-Ponty asks if the notion of 
"focus" can be accounte?. for apart from intentional activity. 
Of course, it cannot; "It is necessary to 'look' ý. n order to 






double images. Focus occurs because the subject is an 
intentional being; the body strives to "correct" the double 
vision only when it fastens upon the phenomenon as a project. 
We must be careful in stating the case for "per- 
ceptual synthesis"; the spectres of rationalism and behav- 
iorism are but inches away from Merleau-Ponty's alternative. 
The question again, is not, what can we know about the single 
or double image of the hand? It is, what can we know of the 
experience of divergence-convergence? How should the exper- 
ience be described? 01hen this question is properly specified, 
it is obvious that, 
The unity of the object is intentional. But--and this 
is the point we are trying to make--it is not therefore 
a notional unity. We pass from double vision to the 
single object not through an inspection of the mind, 
but when the eyes cease to function each on its own 
account and are used as a single organ by one single 
gaze. It is not the epistemological subject who brings 
about the synthesis, but the body, when it e-acapes from 
dispersion, pulls itself together and tends by all means in its power towards one single goal of its activity, 
and when one single intention is formed in it through 
the phenomemon of synergy. " 
An important clarification of intentionality is made 
here: :. serleau-Ponty's concept is not to be identified with- 
willed actions. The notion of perceptual synthesis is 
supported by the subject's primitive drive to make sense of 
his world. In fact, we may say that the synthetic act is 
1lbid., p. 232. 
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the drive to make sense; the subject's attendance to the 
hand is the press for a concrete form. The action does 
not stem from a mental decision to seek meaningful forms; 
the look itself is the act of pressing for meaning. P. ier- 
leau-Ponty often says, we look in order to see. 
One way of explaining the concept is to distinguish 
between conscious action and self-conscious action. In 
terms of the above example Trlerleau-Ponty holds that the 
act itself occupies the subject so that he cannot, in the 
act of striving, be self-consciously aware of his striving. 
That is, the at occupies the subject; there is no room 
within it, for casual reflection. In another example he 
says, "my act of perception occupies me, and occupies me 
sufficiently for me to be unable, while I am actually per- 
ceiving the table, to perceive myself perceiving it. "1 
His main concern in this important distinction is 
to counter the rationalist explanation of the phenomenon, 
namely the synthesis by apperception spoken of by Descartes. 
If perception is to be described adequately, that solution 
must be eschewed. To separate "consciousness of .. . 11 
from pure sei -consciouosness is i: erleau-Fonty's best option. 
His way of emphasizing that distinction is to claim that 
the perceptial synthesis is made bfr "the body". We shall 
1Ibid., p. 238. 
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return to this in our evaluation. 
Secondly, the perceptual synthesis is partial. 
"Being supported by the prelogical unity of the body image, 
the per-ceptual synthesis no more holds the secret of the 
object than it does of one's own body. "' We encounter 
objects and find them beyond total comprehension. Our 
knowledge of anything is rooted in encounter; therefore, 
"knowledge about" can never become complete, or full. The 
opacity or "density" of experience is affirmed; the per- 
ceptual synthesis is incomplete because transcendencies 
are never absent. 
Merleau-Ponty also says that perceptual: syntheses 
are tenporal; one's own history is brought into play in 
each experience. The significance or forms of sense per- 
ception are conveyed through "the medium of time". 2 At 
this point Merleau-Ponty gives very little attention to 
what is meant by the temporality of perceptual synthesis. 
Temporality and transcendence are but mentioned in these 
examples; he will deal with them at a later point. 
With these structures of the perceptual synthesis 
1Ihid., p. 233" Again, in this passage, he refers 
to the body image as the inheritor of an acquisition, and 
what he means is that it cannot be described apart from 
the corporeal scheme, a kind of familiarity that is more 
ancient than thought. 
2Ibid., p. 241. 
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in mind, we can proceed to his discussion of space perception. 
We need not detail the many examples; our purposes are servod 
by concentrating on the forms of temporality and transcend- 
ence which are mentioned more frequently in connection with 
his notion of lived-space. We shall see that description 
of these two forms forces the all important discussion of 
intersubjectivity. 
The fundamental category for discussing space is 
lived-space; it is the primary mode of sf3atial perception. 
For exar... ple, when we look casually at someone's face upside 
down, there is at first nothing odd about it. But if we 
concentrate upon the spectacle, the person's facial expres- 
sions become almost frightening. 1 If we imagine an upside 
down position to be a "natural" position, the mouth is 
where eyes ought to be, the "head" is hairless, and so on. 
We have difficulty making sense of the spectacle; Merleau- 
Ponty uses the French word lens, which translates "signifi- 
cance" or"direction". "To invert an object is to deprive it 
of its significance. Its being as an object is, therefore, 
not a being-for-the-thinking subject, but a being-for-the 
gaze which meets it at a certain angle, and otherwise fails 
to recopnize it-"' "P, atural space" is not a simple orggan- 
'Ibid., p. 252. 
2Ibid. 
, p. 253. 
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ization of things, unrelated to the perceiving subject. The 
unnatural spectacle must be engaged by the sense-making 
process of the look or it remains non-sensical, lacking 
significance. In one sense it is not even a spectacle apart 
from the look. Natural space is certainly not an arrange- 
ment constituted by the subject's thoughts; it is the 
arrangement of things as perceived or lived. 
His concept of lived-space has the same twofold 
characteristic as did the primary sense experience. Objects 
present themselves; the subject seizes and makes sense of 
objects according to his project. Lived space is "orien- 
tated space", organized in terms of the subject's parti- 
cular project. 
His descriptions of lived space are more easily under- 
stood when he is talking about "geometrical space". 
Geometrical space, illustrated in drawings of three 
dimensional figures on flat surfaces, is perceived first 
of all, by "the body". The rationalist argues that we 
constitute an understanding of geometrical figures by thought; 
the behaviorist argues that our look is determined by phys- 
ical. stimulii emanating from the fi . ire. Both, he says, 








Merleau-Ponty suggests that Figure one "recommends" 
itself as a cube seen either from below or above, or as a 
"mosaic", whereas figure two is quite clearly a cube. Figure 
three recommends itself as a cube even with the squiggly 
lines added. This mention of recommendation is synonomous 
with his notion of presentation; it simply emphasizes that 
the perceptive act is shaped by the object's presence, and 
by the figures' peculiar structure or properties. He says, 
"the circular trunks of trees had already, before Euclid, the 
properties, that Euclid discovered in them. "1 
But "recommendation" is not a tip of the hat to 
behaviorist theory. The impetus to perceive a cube especially 
in figure one, or figures two and three, is not overriding. 
With each, we must attend to the figures in terms of possible 
ambiguities; the drive to make sense of them as three dimen- 
sional figures requires the subject's attention. Figure 
one may look like a square surrounded by triangles; or it 
1lbid., p. 267. 
Fig 1 
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may "take on depth" because we perceive it alongside the less 
ambiguous, figure two. Merleau. -Ponty's point is: our con- 
centrated gaze takes up what is presented and replies to 
it. Epistemologically speaking, we think of the figures 
as cubes in terms of a perceptual synthesis. We strive 
to see them organized before us; the figures are "lived"; 
this is what gives rise to concepts, of geometrical space. 
The mathematician may easily forget that universal 
concepts or theorems, are dependent upon lived experience. 
"The vertical and the horizontal, the near and the far 
are abstract designations for one single form of being in 
a situation, and they presuppose the same setting face 
to face of subject and world. "1 This statement makes 
explicit his criticism of the rationalist and behaviorist. 
Space is not merely the arrangement of objects, and we 
do not constitute space through pure reason. The most 
abstract concepts of geometrical space are rooted in 
lived-experience. 
If this is the "beginning" or source of abstract 
knowledge, we must reaffirm what was sai. d in the discussion 
of sense experience; the mode of synthesis, or making sense, 
'Ibid., 
p. 267. Again, he says, "Thus, depth cannot be understood as belonging to the thought of an acsomic 
subject, but as a possibility of a subject involved in the 
world. " Ibid. 
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is a perceptual mode, and it is temporal. 
1 Knowledge about 
objects depends on "knowing" by encounter, encounter is 
understood as the subjects' temporal "living of the object". 
The notion of transcendence is further introduced; 
our partial grasp of two dimensional figures only dramatizes 
the fact that there is "more to be seen" in the figures or 
in three dimensional objects. Objects connot be captured 
in perception any more than in the abstractions which arise 
from perception. 
The same themes hold true with Merleau-Ponty's inter- 
pretation of movement. This phenomenon is, perhaps, the 
most suggestive, for it defies "objectivism" at every point. 
His descriptions are particularly directed to the threat of 
subjectivism, for that seems to be the characteristic feature 
of the phenomenon of movement. Let us see how both are 
countered. 
When on board ship near a shoreline, we perceive the 
ship's movement by focusing upon a landmark. On the other 
hand, when we focus upon the handrail of our ship, it seems 
that the land is moving while the ship remains stationary. 
Another example: when we are sitting in a train, it is 
1i'; °erleau-Ponty conveniently confines his discussion 
to the mathematics of geometry. We could ask if the same theory would apply to other fields of mathematics e. g. 
algebra.. The findings might be much different when a thoroughly abstract field is interrogated. 
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difficult to say whether it is our train that is moving or 
the one on the adjoining track. We can "verify" only by 
fixing upon a stationary object. It seems in both examples 
that the phenomenon of movement depends primarily upon the 
gaze of the subject; is movement determined solely by the 
subject? 
Merleau-Ponty's answer draws upon two conceptions. 
cited in chapter One. Movement is, first of all, perceived 
within a given setting or situation. 
1 Interestingly, the 
setting refers first to a notion of historical importance, 
not a geographical situation. The notion of setting, points 
to the fact of past experience; the one who sees the train 
or shoreline is familiar with it on the basis of his percep- 
tual history. The corporeal scheme becomes an "anchor", 
which cannot be disregarded in a given situation. "We have 
been led to bring out, as the condition of spatiality, the 
establishment of the subject in a setting and finally his 
inherence in a world. "2 Movement and spatiality are under- 
stood not as isolated perceptions but as experiences which 
elaborate a personal environment. That environment includes 
the past; every present occurrence is perceived according to 
our history. iý"erleau-Ponty argues that temporality itself 
1He 
also calls the setting a "field". 
2? 
olerleau-Ponty, 1'17-, op: cit., p. 280. 
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is a sort of anchorage. Note that personal history is another 
word for temporality; movement is perceived in the context of 
a personal history of perceptual activity. He will empha- 
size this aspect when he turns to intersubjectivity. 
Movement is also significant in terms of its broader 
personal geographical setting. The movements of Paris traf- 
fic, - for instance, have-significance-in terms of the city's 
"whole being". 1 We perceive according to our broader exper- 
ience of the city, so that one's perceptual familiarity 
functions not only in terms of personal history but also in 
terms of other geographical-personal settings. The specific 
experience is perceived according to the general familiarity 
we have-with the city. Quite obviously, there is the possi- 
bility of being unfamiliar with a "whole:, so that exper- 
iences of movement or space can be "new". The ambiguity of 
perceptions, he says, has to do with the nature and extent 
of our familiarity. 
As was true in the preceding discussion, no single 
experience of movement can be complete; no "whole" is trans- 
parent, so no particular perception can be. The "new" 
form, and the "familiar" nercentions sup; ý, *est again, the notion 




These'discussions of sense experience, space and 
movement have provided the background for an important' 
transition, perhaps, the most important one in Phenomenology 
of Perception. One is quite aware that each area of human 
perception has a common form or theme. Though he makes the 
transition quietly, so to speak, it is the aim of the book 
to relate all topics to. the fundamental theme of human 
involvement, and as we shall see, social existence. 
We thus find ourselves led to a broadening of our 
investigation. Once the experience of spatiality is 
related to our implantation in the world, there will 
always be a primary spatiality for each modality of 
this implantation. Z 
The immediftte reason for broadening the discussion 
is not hard to figure out; "primary spatiality" refers us 
to the involvement of man in the world. As was true in 
his discussion of sense experience, the theme of Lebenswelt 
is encountered at every turn. Now it must become a specific 
topic of discussion; he will concentrate increasingly on 
the interpersonal or intersubjective aspects of perception. 
A brief review will easily show how !. ierleau-Ponty comes to 
1At this point he leaves behind the discussion of 
movement. It does not seem to me that he has given it 
adequate treatment. We are left with the relativity of 
movement which may, in the end, be justified. But it still 
seems to depend on the domain of the subject and is not, as is true with space and sense experience, an adequate dis- 
cussion of the "in-itself-for-us", the problem he posed in the beginning. 
2 erleau-Ponty, 'ý., on. cit., p. 283. 
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ooncentrate on "human space". 
' 
Both sense and space perception, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, must be characterized as communion, a kind of prere- 
flective transaction between the subject and the object of 
perception. Objects of perception present themselves as 
objects in depth, movement, etc. The factor of human 
orientation and object presentation go together-in his 
theory of object perception. Previously, the experience of 
one's own body revealed that the human subject is project 
oriented and is the'inheritor of a perceptual history--a 
past. In object perception this was given an additional 
notation, the perceiver is one who perceives objects in 
terms of his relation to a total environment. At each level, 
the account points to the broad theme of the lived-world. 
Each subject of investigation is a way of further describing 
the notion of the lived-world. In the preface he offered 
the general affirmation that phenomenology studies man's 
being-in-the-world; his problem was to make that affirmation 
philosophically credible. In the preceeding chapter, the 
affirmation wa^ given specific application in the theory 
of the corps pro-pre; opre; Lebenswelt was described as the body's 
way of knowing itself in terms of projects. In terms of 
object perception there is further specification of the 
lIbid 
, p. 287. 
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of the tern; man knows objects primarily through living 
with them. Knowing oneself and things, therefore, forces 
a discussion of the history and environment of the indivi- 
dual. Historical existence becomes the next logical topic 
for the Lebenswelt phenomenologist. 
Specifically, the two themes which give credibility 
to the lived-world are temporality and transcendence. Object 
presentation indicates. a plenitude which cannot be fully 
grasped. The subject is an "explorer"; vision and tactility 
demonstrate orientation rather than full comprehension. 
Transcendence is an inescapable theme for human perception. 
About temporality: present perceptions call upon the subject's 
past; the particular calls upon a sense of the whole. Human 
perception is described as being pregnant with meaning be- 
cause it utilizes a past. Consequently, if we are to under- 
stand the nature of perception we must look to the environ- 
ment and to the history of the perceiver. Merleau-Ponty 
will describe temporality and transcendence as dominant 
forms of man's cultural and historical existence. 
Lastly, it is evident that the very notion of histor- 
ical rootage cannot be confined to the perception of self 
or object perception. The term itself points to the prob- 
lem of social existence; the issue of intersubjectivity is 
posed the minute we take seriously the history of any parti- 
cular subject. The next portion of our study will show how 
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r: Terleau-Ponty attempts to demonstrate this. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of object perception 
has tried to preserve the distinction between "knowing" 
(as encounter) and "knowledge about". He has done so with 
the following relationship in mind: 
Perceiving is pinning one's faith, at a stroke, in a 
whole future of experiences, and in doing so in a 
present which never strictly guarantees the future; 
it is placing one's. belief in a world. It is this 
opening upon a. world which makes possible perceptual 
truth and the actual effecting of a Wahr-Nehmung 
. . There is absolute certainty of the world 
in 
general, but not of any one thing in particular. 1 
Knowing in the encounter mode is the primary form 
of man's experience, and makes knowledge about possible. 
In recognizing this structure he is, at the same 
time driven to state that knowledge about is contingent 
both because it is derived from an encounter situation and 
because it inherits the incompleteness of primary experience. 
If this holds true in the sphere of object perception, how 
much more true will it be in the sphere of personal and 
inter-personal history! O'le can expect :: erleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology of intersub j ec , ivity to preserve both the 
primacy of, enco. znter and the partiality of "knowledge 
about" . 
This should intro duce us to °'. erleaii pont j' s most 
basic concern; it is a primary concern of this study, the 
description of human perception in terms of life with others, 
his phenomenology of intersubjectivity. 
1Ib d., p. 2)7. 
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"THE OTHER": PEOPLE 
The topic is posed by drawing a correlation between 
the world of nature and the cultural world. 
The world of objects has within it, cultural objects; 
the latter are there just as the tree or the sunset, so 
that the world I live in is a mixture of the human and the 
"natural". 
Just as nature finds its way to the core of my personal 
life and becomes inextricably linked with it, so behav- 
iour patterns settle into that nature, being deposited 
in the form of a cultural world. Not only have Ia 
physical world, not only do I live in the midst of earth, 
air, and water, I have around me roads, plantations, 
villages, streets, churches, implements, a bell, a spoon, 
a pipe. Each lone spreads round 
it an atmosphere of 
humanity .. 
The presence of a human world implies that intersub- 
jectivity must become a phenomenological problem. It is 
a problem in this sense: the presence of others poses the 
question of how we know them, and they us. Merleau-Ponty 
is clear about their presence; other people are there to be 
known. The Lebenswelt is a world of human interchange. 
He does not assume that his affirmation has, as, yet, phil- 
osphical value, but the wort(' of others is there; how are we 
to explicate our connection with it? "The cultural world 
is ambiguous, but it is alreaCy present. I have before me 
llbid., p. 348. 
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a society to be known. "' 
In a more obtuse statement of the issue, he says, 
"--how can the word 'I' be put into the plural, how 
can a general idea of. the I be formed, how can I speak 
of an I other than my own, how can I know that there 
are other I's, how consciousness, which by its nature, 
and as self-knowledge, is in the mode of the Ii be 
grasped in the mode of Thou, and through this, in 
the world of the 'One'? 2 
The clue to disentangling the problem in Phenomenology 
of Perception is found in his fundamental category, the body; 
specifically, it is his interpretation of intentionality 
which provides the opening for a phenomenology of intersub- 
jectivity. 
This observation is the guide: people's form of 
behavior is first of all "childlike". The term "childlike" 
should remind us of the way T, Ierleau-Ponty began his analysis 
of sense experience. "Communion" designated the subject's 
prereflective transactions with sensible objects; it was 
a form of "faith", the unquestioned, naive form of perceptual 
experience. The present term is parallel. Bodily conduct 
reveals the intersubjective significance of intentionality 
and its childl*. ke form. , erlea-u-Ponty illustrate an T -t. 
adult playing with a child pretends to bite the child's 
hanc; the child opens its mouth in imitation of the act. 





subjective significance. "' The intersubjective impact is 
the immediate conveyance of the adult's behavior to the 
child; this provides the clue to the problem. Merleau- 
Ponty reviews the traditional opposition. 
The behaviorists' interpretation of the phenomenon 
is that perception of others i's, in the first instance, a 
behavioral confrontation. One form of behavior incites 
the other's. But behavior cannot be reduced to physical 
reflex; the child does not pull back as if the adult will 
inflict pain. Merleau-Ponty argues that the adult's inten- 
tion is perceived by the child; the behaviorist has over- 
looked this. 
On the other hand, the adult's intentions are not 
conceived; there is little sense in assuming that the child 
makes a mental note of the biting act and translates it as 
play in a conscious or deliberative manner. Instead of 
reaction by mental association, the child "reenacts" the 
intentions of the adult. The child's body, as pre-reflec- 
tively lived by him, is capable of biting in its various 
modes of eating, playing, etc. The adult's intentions are 
perceived, and immediately incite the response of the other. 
The adult's world slips into the child's; the child responds. 




of childlike immediacy; he refers to it as the "intentional 
vortex". The phrase implies that a given individual's 
perceptual field swirls outwards, taking other people into 
its sphere of action. The world for us, is never private; 
it is intersubjective. The intentional vortex should remind 
us of . 
the. notion of project; the individual lives in a world 
as an acting-interacting being. He shapes and responds to 
his world as an intentional subject. The social aspect of 
intentionality fills in the meaning of project; the projects 
of one invade those of another. To act is by definition, to 
interact with orthers. 
The notion of vortex infers that a given subject is 
affected by others; our projects are influenced and modified 
by the presence of others. Our world is no longer merely. 
ours; it is shared by others and their projects influence 
ours. The things which we use are used by others. A fresh 
significance is added to the notion of intentionality. As 
we elaborate our environment so others become involved in 
and interact in the process of elaboration. The intentional 
vorte-- ip a notion which bear: the ! tann of plurality, or 
better yet, of sociality. 
These prereflective forms of e: -per_ience provire I:: er- 
leau-Ponty with the paradigm for dealing with the problem 
of knowing others. There it a pre-established system of 
interaction underlying the adult's question, "who is this 
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other? " The "basic do Kc- "1 is that we are situated in an 
intersubjective world, where interaction is the norm. The 
"adult" question of knowing others is dependent upon the 
fundamental "childlike" form of interaction. Knowledge 
about others is an issue only because we encounter others 
in the childlike form. Once again, as we found with the 
theory of the body and object perception, pre-reflective 
intentionality is the foundation for the philosophical 
description. 
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty says, "--in reality, it 
must be the case that the child's outlook is in some way 
vindicated against the adult's. . ., and that the unsoph- 
isticated thinking of our earliest years remains as an 
indispensible acquisition underlying that of maturity, if 
there is to be for the adult one single intersubjective 
world. "2 
There can be little doubt, that Merleau-Ponty thinks 
the encounter form is central. to his phenomenology. What 
he says in Phenomenoloy of Perception, is later clarified 
and developed. :e shall review hie later thought to see 






resource is a series of lectures delivered in 1960, just a 
year before his death. 
' 
His purpose in the lectures is to specify the phen- 
omenological significance of intersubjective experiences 
first he seeks to establish an adequate relation between the 
intersubjective forms of experience and his theory of per- 
ceptual activity; secondly, he specifically intends to see 
the relation between intersubjectivity and the acquisition of 
language. The studies utilize experiments in psychology but 
they are reviewed for the sole purpose of developing an 
adequate phenompnology. 
2 We shall see that the intersub- 
jective functions as more than an appendage in phenomenology; 
it operates in fact, as the very backbone or nerve center 
for the whole. 
Else Frankel-Brunswik's article, "Intolerance of 
Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable", 
1These lecturese are printed in the followings W er- 
leau-Ponty, °. "., The Primacy of Perception, Edie, James, trans. 
Evanston, T'orthwestern Univ. Press, lo t pn. a6 ff. 
20f his purpose he says, ". .. recent studies have ten-'ed to --how that even external perception of sense oual- 
ities and space--at first glance the most disinterested, 
lea. Fýt e. ffecti_ve of' all the functions--i, ' profoundly modified by the personality and by the interner=tonal relationships in 
which the child lives. The r, ^cond example ha-) to do with the 
le_rnin7 of language. Certain authors show that there is a 
very close and profound relation between the development of language and the configuration of the human environment in 
which the child develops. " Ibid.., pp. 99-100. The points he 
make:; refine the theory introciveed in Phenomenology of Per- 
ception; his thinking here is at its finest, most mature level. 
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utilizes experiments made on fifteen hundred school-children 
between the ages of eleven and sixteen, and their parents. 
This clinical study is I. "erleau-Ponty's prime source. 1 
The link between perceptual activity and interper- 
sonal environment is established by focusing upon the con- 
dition called "psychological rigidity". Rigidity is described 
as a condition in which the subject is unable to make fine 
distinctions or recognize conflicting conditions. He cannot 
accept ambiguities or ambivalences in experience. Rigidity, 
however, is but the symptom of an underlying difficulty; it 
is what the Freudians call a "reaction formation", a facade 
for thinly veiled conflicting attitudes towards parents, 
teachers, or peers. To illustrate: when given question- 
aires which require little decision making, the children's 
answers indicate that parents are "perfect"; on the other 
hand when asked to list who they would take with them to 
live on a desert island, they exclude their parents from 
the list. Other rigidity traits established through testing 
incluc'e a mania. for cleanliness, the acceptance of a "dualism 
of good and evil, virtue and vice, anal. an inflexible con- 
ception of n a:, culinity and femininity. "2 
1Vide., Elsa Frankel-ßrunswik, "Intolerance of Ambi- 
guity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable", 
The Journal of Personality, Vol. 18, Sept., 1949, pp. 108-143. 
2'ýerleau-Ponty, rt". , The Primäcy of Perception, p. 102. 
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The influence for such rigid perceptual attitudes, 
Merleau-Ponty believes, comes from the family environment, 
and indeed, when the parents were tested, traits such as 
authoritarianism, excessive reliance upon "training", and 
strict discipline, were characteristic. The correlation 
between the rigid personality traits of parents and those 
children who were most rigid (one hundred twenty were "ex- 
treme" cases) is easily established. There is he thinks, 
a link between the affective states of parent and child; 
the correlations are convincing. 
rlerleau-Ponty employs this correlation in asking, 
"how the type of personality and of interpersonal relations 
designated by the term 'psychological rigidity' express 
themselves in the anonymous functions of external percep- 
tion. "1 
All students were shown films in which the image of 
a dog is slowly transformed into that of a cat. The severely 
rigid children saw no transforiiation; subtle changes were not 
recorded. 'v:: erleau-Ponty observes that the psychologically 
rigid child is adverse to, or incapable of altering the first 
established mode of perception. Other torts confirmed this 
view. Rigid students viere given probble: ne in which a parti- 
cular method of solution was recommended; later, they were 
1lbid., p. 104. 
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given problems which appeared similar but could be solved 
more easily by another method. The students did not alter 
their techniques. Psychological rigidity, he concludes, 
is linked to perception in problem solving. In summary, 
the more rigid the "reaction formation", i. e. the more 
emotionally disturbed the child, the less able he is to 
alter his reasoning techniques or accept change in perceptual 
situations. Manifestly, "emotional ambivalence is what 
demands the denial of intellectual ambiguity. "1 
Merleau-Ponty is careful that his interpretation 
will not be construed as affirming a causal sequence between 
the interpersonal and the perceptual spheres. He does not 
say that intersubjective influences(parent-child) "cause" 
loss of perceptive agility; neither does he hold that per- 
ceptual rigidity causes psychologically rigid relationships. 
The studies do not show this. What they do show is the inti- 
mate connection between interpersonal relations and percep- 
tual abilities. The intersubjective sphere may not deter- 
mine perceptual activity, but it cannot be separated from 
trat srýhore. The two interrelate. 
... there is no moment at which you could grasp, in 
a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social conditioning that influences him. 
Inversely, you can never say that the way the child 
1lbid., p. 105. 
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structures (met en forme) his social environment is 
unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispo- 
sitions of his nervous system. ie himself is the one 
who structures his surroundings. 
From this we can see that the personal activity and 
the interpersonal exchange are of equal importance to Mer- 
leau-Ponty in describing the lived-world. 2 He does not 
try to assign each form a "percentage of importance'; and 
this is by design. He wants to say that the individual 
and the interpersonal elements cannot be given proportional 
status in describing human activity; they are present in 
every activity, and they are tied together. 
This is not the first instance in which Merleau- 
Ponty has emphasized the significance of the intersubjective, 
but it should be noted that the interpersonal sphere here 
plays a pivotal function in his phenomenology. This helps 
correct a possible misunderstanding of the earlier exposi- 
tions. His theory of the body in Phenomenology of Perception 
seemed to "anchor" all descriptions of the interpersonal; the 
theory of intentionality was characteristically discussed 
in terns of hir theory of the body. From the immediate 
tucy we can cee that the conceit of intentionality is 
f orm1..,. la ted by two i m-oortent factors. The interpersonal 
shapes the individual's domain anc' visa versa. It is much 
1Ibid., p. 113. 
2". 
.. the two orders are not distinct; they are 
part and parcel of a single global phenomenon. Ibid. 
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more evident from this study that i , ierleau-Ponty recognizes 
the fundamental importance of both elements in his phenomen- 
ology of perception. 
Additional descriptions of the link between affectiv- 
ity and language acquisition provide further evidence for 
this position. His examples are introduced by the generally, 
accepted, psychological observation, that the second year of 
childhood is the sensitive period for learning language. If 
the child has no "linguistic model to imitate, "1 he will 
have difficulty speaking as others do. Children forcibly 
separated from parents at this age often fail to gain normal 
speech habits in later life. "This allows us to presume that 
there will be a profound link between the acquisition of 
language (which would seem to be a strictly intellectual 
operation) and the child's place in the family environment. "2 
His example, concerns the study of jealousy in a 
"middle" child. 1, W1hen the new baby is brought home the child 
shows definite signs of linguistic regression. Only a new 
icentification with the olýer brother seems to counter this 
remression; the older brother gives him a new sense of his 
role in the family by teaching him to be the "older" brother 
1Ibid., p. 109. Lis resource for this and the follow- ing illustrations is the article by Francois Rostand "Gram- 
maire et affectivit4" , Revue Francais de'Psychanalyse, Vol. 14., April-June, 1950, pp. 299-310. 
1. 
2i, 
erleau-Ponty, hi. , The Primacy of Perception, p. 109- 
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in relation to the new-born. When a fourth, even older 
child comes to stay with the family, the middle child is 
further aided in learning the relativity of "younger" and 
"older" roles in the family. He learns during this period 
to talk in past, present, and future terms. IJerleau-Ponty 
notes with interest that the child's linguistic schema 
develop markedly; the child expresses himself in new terms: 
"I have been the youngest, but I am the youngest no longer, 
and I will become the biggest. "1 
That there is an intimate connection between inter- 
personal environment and linguistic acquistion is obvious 
to IIerleau-Ponty. The child learns to master words in new 
ways as he responds to his new environment. Again, there 
is no causal pattern suggested; no final sorting of the 
interplay between environment and linguistic development 
is possible. But the interplay between the two indicates 
that language acquisition is a matter of more than intell- 
ection; it is inserarable fron interpersonal environment. 
sum, the irtellectu., -. J. elaboration of the world is 
cc tantl; T ^u porte b; r the affective elalý _orý, tion of r f o,, i 
ii-iterhun, an relations. 7r e use of lin7ui_st3. c tools is TMas- 
tc ýýec' in the play of forces t' at constilute the ubjcct' s 
1Ibid., p. 113. 
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relations to his human surroundings. "1 
These observations lead Merleau-Ponty to formulate 
a personal, historical pattern when describing human per- 
ceptual development. He believes that a developmental 
pattern can be explicated that makes sense of the above 
mentioned interplay of forces. Specifically, he addresses 
himself to the relation between interpersonal exchange and 
self-awareness. 
Phenomenology of Perception refers to the interplay 
as a "system". This was suggestive but we found little 
material describing that "system". As we said, it is easily 
taken that his theory of the body is the basis for a theory 
of intersubjectivity; the article under scrutiny has not 
enforced that view. We noted that intersubjectivity is 
linked to the development of bodily perception and language, 
not as a "cause", but as an important factor. The "system" 
as presently elaborated, gives the individual and the inter- 
personal equal placement. 
"le s: -lall see in the following discussion, even more 
weight given to the intersubjective nexus. It becomes the 
central element in his phenomenology of the lived-world. 
This does not mean that his theory of the body is replaced 
or subordinated; it means that bodily intentionality is 
'Ibid. 
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itself understood as being infused with the intersubjective 
element. This was implicit in the first part of the article; 
it is now made clearer. 
Periods in the child's development can be organized. 
The earliest period is characterized. by a state of "pre- 
communication"; the new-born child is unaware of itself as 
being a separate entity in the world. Its attitude, 
... is the attitude of a me which is unaware of itself and lives as easily in others as it does in 
itself--but which being unaware of others in their 
separateness as well, in truth is no more conscious 
of them than of itself. 1 
'Syncretic sociability", a term used by Henri Wallon, 
also describes this period. 2 That is, the child does not 
distinguish himself from others. The consciousness of the 
body is at first fragmentary and is only gradually inte- 
grated; the consciousness of others is at first a sense of 
well-being in the baby and changes only with the beginnings 
of the exttoceptive function. This first period is important 
in both the physiological anc phenomenological sense. Physi- 
ologically, the baby's environment is shaped by the care it 
is given, v-armth, milk, anc holding. Phenorrenologica. lly 
speaking, the baby's life is incomplete apart from the care 
of others; it never lives as a completely independent bein a. 
Though there is no awareness of this on the child's part, 
the intersubjective field raust be seen as a fundamental 
1Ib? d., p. 119. 
2Vide. 
, Wallon,, Henri, Iles on dues du caractere chez l' enfant, Ta. ris, 1040. . 
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factor in life-sustenance and influence. 
The period, generally from six months onwards, is 
characterized by the gradual deliniation of self as a 
separate entity; it is also described as a period of 
"incontenent sociability", a term coined by Henri Wallon. 1 
This term for sociability refers to the near explosion of 
the child's curiosity about others, its imitation and explor- 
ation of the other's body, its alertness to expressions and 
general environment. The importance of sociability can be 
seen in the following: the experience of beholding others 
in a mirror teaches the child about his own body. 
let us begin by considering not the child's image of his 
own body in the mirror but instead the image he has of 
other's bodies. One notices, in effect, that he acquires 
the latter much more rapidly, that he distinguishes 
much more quickly between the other's specular image 
and the reality of the other's body than he does in the 
case of his own body. Thus it is possible that the 
experience he has of the other's specular image helps 
him arrive at an understanding of his own. 
The child is taught gradually be means of intersub- 
jective interchange to become aware of his own body. Using 
the mirror experiments, Merleau-Ponty argues that a kind of 
"reduction" become operative. 3 The child first distinguishes 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., The Primacy of Perception, p. 125. 
2Ibid., 
p. 127. He refers to the experiments of Henri Wallon, oE. cit. and Thiery Wilhelm Preyer, The Mind 
of the Child, trans., H. W. Brown, New York, 1893. 
3This Husserlian term is not used as a philosophical 
term in the present context; "distinction" would have been 
a better choice given his intentions. 
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between the image in the mirror and the other's body. He 
separates "the real from the reflection" first with others, 
then with himself. The important point is that in this 
"intellectual" operation, contact with others is vital; it 
is the intersubjective encounter which aids the child's 
perception of his own body. The beginnings of self-aware- 
ness are intimately tied to human interchange. 
It is important to understand that the child's 
"reduction" or act of differentiation is not a rational 
abstraction, particularly when we speak of it with refer- 
ence to the development of self-awareness. Contact with 
others should not be understood as a "context" which incites 
a subsequent intellectual maneuver. The intersubjective 
environment is "an actual structure in its own right. "' 
Namely, it is more than a condition for self-awareness; 
interchange is the ay that self-awareness comes about. 
Self-awareness is doubtless the child's own accomplishment, 
but he accomplishes it with another. 
A helpful illustrative image is that of the physician 
or mid-wife attending a birth. The mid-wife aids the expec- 
tant mother in delivery; birth is, phenomenologically speaking, 
a cooperative venture of all concerned. Without interchange 
the birth is in jeopardy. With it, there is the prospect 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., The Primacy of Perception, p. 140. 
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of a healthy child and mother. So with the development of 
self-awareness. Others aid what the child does to gain a 
conscious perception of self. The reduction is the acknow- 
ledgnnent of the other as "over there" and the simultaneous 
recognition that "I an here". The exchange not only provides 
a context for perceptual activity; it is an integral part of 
the process of growing self-awareness. 
Merleau-Ponty adds that we can readily see why the 
childhood state is never completely put away or replaced. 
The "adult" notion that consciousnesses are totally isolated 
entities is betrayed by the occurences in later life of sym- 
pathy or transitivism. Merleau-Ponty describes transitivism 
as a relapse into childhood, the point being that we never 
completely put away the syncretic or incontinent sociability 
of the early years. In a similar vein, intersubjective 
environment can be expressed in healthy responses of sympathy. 
The child's growth, his distinctions between "me and the 
other" are as "fragile and variable as are our affective 
relation; t%rith others and with tl,. c= world. 1+1 
'his doec not mean that gen. ýine intellectual activity 
i denigrated by 'ý-'erleau-Poni; y. Intellection, or what he 
calls the act of reduction, is the bn7inning of sophisti- 
cation and will be develo-zýcd . Tuch further, given normal 
lIbid. 
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growth, and its development goes hand in hand with the modes 
of sociability, or intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity 
continues to play a structuring role in the development of 
the intellect. 
Reciprocity is a structure in adult life as well as 
in childhood; his comments on adult love illustrate this 
beautifully. 
Could one conceive of a love that would not be an 
encroachment on the freedom of the other?. .. There is a paradox in accepting love from a person without 
wanting to have any influence on her freedom. If one 
loves one finds one's freedom precisely in the act of 
loving, and not in vain autonomy. To consent to love 
or be loved-is to consent also to influence somebody 
else, to decide to a certain extent on behalf of the 
other. To love is inevitably to enter into an undivided 
situation with another. 
Intimacy and trust are adult forms of intersubjective 
relations, and Merleau-Ponty believes they play a major role 
in the individual's perception of himself. Though there is 
preciously scant exposition of these particular forms it 
should be obvious that intersubjective modalities continue 
to shape concepts of individual consciousness. 
T_iis can be seen also with the fo?..? s of alienation. 
ýicparit r can occur between per^ons because one cannot fully 
: cýorý the fcelin s of the other. The lack of "knot lec'ge about" 
however, e: - ? st. s onl'r bee, -. USA' one's 'nor^ona i sphere has ^lrear5y 
been invaded by the other. 
1Jbid. 
i ?. 94. .. W 
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The normal, and non-pathological attitude consists 
in having confidence above and beyond what can be 
proved, in resolutely skirting those doubts that can 
be raised about the reality of the other's sentiments 
by means of the generosity of the praxis, by means of 
an action that proves itself in being carried out. 
1 
The adult capacity for self-differentiation is not 
complete in itself; the intersubjective is not only a struc- 
ture shaping the child's grasp of himself, it is also a form 
in which adults continue to know themselves. In Merleau- 
Ponty's terms, the childlike forms of sociability are never 
put away; they reassert themselves continually. 
The intersubjective form is a primary characteristic 
of the lived-world. Individual consciousness is infused with 
the forms of intersubjective relationships. Intentionality, 
therefore, is a mixture of the personal and the interpersonal. 
It is evident that the intersubjective must be considered 
a dominant form when questions about adult perception are 
being discussed. The interpersonal is a major form of living 
for the adult as for the child; the social is a primary 
source for "knowledge about". 
Taken as _, _erleau-Ponty presented it, this latest 
position rest, upon an interpretation of human growth or 
evelo3-l r: °n e u-t3_lizes ccc t ancý clinical e: perimentc to 
trace the ('evelopment of ri. ýr~a. ^ conscious mess from childhood 
to Maturity. The theory of the intersubjective form is presented 
1Ibid.. It is the forms of trust, love, and alienation 
we shall return to in our concluding chapter. Their further 
exposition is an important key to a phenomenology of the inter- human. 
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as a dominant form because human growth indicates it. Is 
this an effective means for demonstrating a phenomenological 
position? We cannot answer that question fully at this point, 
but one observation should be made. Any theory,. of human 
consciousness which disregards evidence which can be accrued 
from the study of human development would face the indictment 
of being "high altitude thinking". That is, it would pit 
phenomenological theory against other disciplines, especially 
psychology which employs theories of growth. This seems 
unnecessary. Saying this, I an, aware that phenomenological 
theory cannot depend. solely upon such evidence and this will 
be emphasized when we look at the method of phenomenology. 
The investigations of phenomenology cannot be confined to 
gaining evidence fron ±sychology or any other discipline. 
But neither can we disrc, aarý" such evidence. The question 
of the adequacy of. i'_erleau-Ponty's theory will be taken up 
after we gain further perspectives on method. 
3.:. J ARY A1, ß. Q: ýS_, RVATIOi s 
Our an.: ý. lysis of r. rlea?. z-ý ontýý' - 3tuf-y of the relation 
belcween --an en(f otherc and its, Dhenomcrol_otrical ^i_, mni ficance 
lea. is to the followin.; ob, %erve. ti_ons. '. %Ten v, e re-iiemher that 
he addressed an audience of philosophers and we in turn sought 
to obtain a more philosophically credible view of the inter- 
human, guidelines can be folloited in outlining his contribution. 
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In general terms Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that social 
existence plays a central role in the quest for knowledge. 
In particular he aids us in developing a credible connection 
between encounter and knowledge about encounter; the rela- 
tion is best described as derivative; and can be summarized 
as follows. The specific character of experience, which 
serves as the foundation for reflection, is communion. We 
suggest that encounter is an equally appropriate term even 
when it is not identified with Buber's typology. We know 
about others, Tdierleau-Ponty says, because we interact with 
or encounter them. What we can know is deeply rooted in 
the kind of relationships we have. It is this aspect of his 
thought that is so instructive. 
It infers that a phenomenology of intersubjectivity 
must, first of all, be attentive to the phenomenon of en- 
counter in all its diversity and complexity. 
Early works of Dt. erleau-Ponty' s did not establish 
the intersubjective a. a primary form although it was cer- 
tainly a component in his notion of the lived-world. We 
outlined the early po lition because it i^ evident to me 
that a rhenonenology of the bogy 9. s important in building 
an epistemology. It cannot be left to speculation how vie 
become Self-aware. gut a "erleau-Ponty's thought developed 
he became convinced that social existence and the human 
project were intimately tied together. The interaction 
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between subjects came into the limelight increasingly as 
he studied the phenomenon of self-consciousness; he sought 
to describe how the two related. In his most detailed study 
of human growth we saw how the intersubjective became a 
dominant theme in the development of self-consciousness. 
In "The Child's Relation to Others" the human sub- 
ject is described as a social creature, and this is so in 
the context of an encounter form of living. Studies of 
early childhood disclose that sociality is the primary form 
of pre-reflective activity; intentionality, as well as t, Ter- 
leau-Ponty's broad notion of the lived-world, become infused 
with the theme of sociality. 
of describing the lived-world. 
Sociality becomes a major way 
With the importance of human 
exchange established during the child's first years, it is 
described as remaining a fundamental structuring factor for 
perception in later years. As P.: erleau-Ponty sees it, the 
human subject is always party to exchanges from which "know- 
ledge about" is born. 
The lesson shoul? be clear. If one is to attempt 
iArri'tin^ a crec'ib1e episte-rolo y he rust place the xiher_o_enon 
o" hum 1n e: rchan ;e at the T"o, u Y'ation level of reflective know- 
led-97e. In terrlc of our n»ore 3necific oue; -tion it becomes 
cleýirer than before juxt how central the phenomenon of 
interaction is, in claims to know about others. It will be 
even more evident in the next chapter that claims to know 
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God will refer back to our life with others, and particu- 
larly our encounter forms of living. The importance, of 
the encounter mode could not have been stressed more forcibly. 
I... ierleau-Ponty became a phenomenologist of intersubjectivity, 
certainly in his later work. 
But Merleau-Ponty was never able to write the parti- 
culars of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity; no typology 
was ever created which articulated various forms of inter- 
action. He intended to write on this as we shall see below, 
but because he did not execute the particulars, we are not 
able to construct meaningful comparisons between him and 
Buber or Hepburn. "_'his limits our ability to say e. g. how 
a particular mode of interaction bears upon knowledge about 
the other. We should remind ourselves, however, that we did 
not set out to describe exhaustively a particular form, such 
as the interhuman. We set out to answer whether or not such 
a form bears upon our l owledge of others and upon faith in 
God, and if so, how it should be understood in philosophical 
ter-ms. shall hol:? our conrient on the ontological and 
t'ieoloMical implications for the ne: -t chapter and for our 
conclud. inr chapter; but we can make an appraisal of the 
function of a nhenomenology of intersubjectivity for know- 
lege about others here. 
The importance of social encounter so well cited by 
L. erleau-Ponty teaches that description of-forms which con- 
ceptualize inter- 
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chan ge is both necessary and instrumental in making claims 
to know about others. We are taught to deal with knowledge 
about others in a fairly specific context, I think. 
Knowledge about others has a derivative or subordin- 
ate significance. We appreciate L? erleau-Ponty` s argument 
that subjects know about one another in light of their en- 
counters. In plain terms, knowledge about others will be 
described in terms of encounters or relationships in which 
we play a part. It will not be a third-person description, 
but an "I-other" oriented description. This does not pre- 
clude a "we-other" context but the requirement in any des- 
criptiön is that we remain party to the description. To 
say that knowledge about has phenomenological significance 
is to admit that it grows out of experiential modalities, 
i. e. our lived-world. 
The first inference to be made from this insight is 
that certainty is by and large eschewed in any description 
of our knowledge about othcrc. Cn the one hand we can say 
wit, Hepburn that i: nowler-ge : Wollt coe'ý have "chocking DZ o- 
cep urcc" an' he avior iS certainly a norm for chc-ckinc the 
nature or FAgmif'ic nce of encounter.. ? lit we cannot rely 
ur, o^ behavior or anýT other chcc'_ in? -rrocedure to demon^trate 
for certain that a relationship is thus and so. We can only 
look to it as an expression of the encounter mo'? e; we can 
not conclude that o'ir knowledge about the other is in any 
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way independent of pre-reflective interaction. 
A better context for using behavior as a checking 
procedure is thus suggested. It is that behavior is itself 
an encounter mode, and that what we see in it as a factor 
for making judgments is our own deep involvement with others 
as social subjects. Just as behavior has a pre-reflective 
dimension, so it also has a reflective one, the latter is 
rooted in the former. This, -At seems to me, is a correction 
of Hepburn's view that behavior is a primary way of asserting 
knowledge about the other. 
With regard to Buber's typology one comment should 
suffice. Merleau-Ponty leaves room for such a typology 
and its credibility with one important qualification. Buber's 
I-Thou form cannot be accepted on the basis of its sheer 
appeal, and it should be viewed critically because Buber 
failed to integrate knowing with reflective knowledge. Spec- 
ifically he failed to put encounter into a perceptual con- 
text. Our study of Merleau-Ponty makes that quite clear. 
Encounter is interaction at the perceptual level. When it 
is seen as a perceptual interaction, however, it neither 
loses its force as a possibly non-manipulative form nor does 
it face the threat of mystical typing so easily presumed about 
Buber. Merleau-Ponty, I think, would have expanded and refined 
this proposition had he lived to write of the particular". 
forms of encounter. But he has given much in guiding our 
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effort this far. As we shall see, this phenomenology is 
expressible in ontological terms and aids us in approaching 
our main concern. 
CHAPTER THREE 
PI NO!. LNCLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 
ACID ITS BEARING ON TP. IS, -)U_!: OF TRAIISCL; T,? D 'PLACE 
"In the dark night of thought dwells a 
glimmering of Being. "I 
We shall divide this portion of the study into two 
segments: first, we shall describe Merleau-Ponty's ontology 
as a phenomenologically rooted endeavor; secondly, we shall 
attend closely to what he says about the issue of transcen- 
dence, a topic that . was merely 
introduced in the foregoing 
chapters. 
Concerning the first segment, the ontological re- 
flections of Merleau-Fonty cannot be capsuled easily--for 
two reasons. lie was a reluctant expositor of ontology, 
perhaps, because he thought that ontological specialization C. D 
would take him away from his primary concern; every early 
piece is intent upon interpreting pre-reflective experience, 
the distinctive nh, _enomFnon of 
the T. ehensweit. 
_erleau-Ponty's early reDictance to Oo ontolo, ýy, I 
trink, -may -ter fror ,. tong; c+ion that the interr, uhjective 
3n! z2re could become a suborci. ýa. 1, e theme in the effort to 
elýzciý' +te Erin=f. ,. his may "-e srecul_, '-t c$ , hit it i^ not 
1i, erleau-Ponty, '. , ýiwl s, .. cCleary, R. , trans. 
Lvanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 196Lo p. 15. 
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speculation that he believed the science of pure ontology 
was "high altitude thinking". 
1 When he eventually concen- 
trates on the question of "Being", it will be by retaining 
his early committment to phenomenology, and specifically 
to the intersubjective nature of the lived-world. We shall 
see this in the ensuing analysis of "Eye and Mind", the 
collection of writings entitled The Visible and the Invis- 
ible, and in a very brief comment in a working note of 
February 1959.2 All indicate this perspective. His ontology 
will be a "phenomenological ontology"; it will never be 
construed as a self-contained sphere of discourse. 
One consequence is that there is no system to his 
ontology. The ontology arises from reflections upon the 
diverse phenomena in experience, and what structure there 
is in his thinking cannot be called systematic. His'obser- 
vations are at. best, heuristic, rather than systematic; 
the reluctance to write an ontological system remained to 
the end. Though this makes his thoughts more difficult to 
analyze, it is a perspective we may soon appreciate. 
"1Vide. , :, »Ierleau-Ponty, M., The Primacy of Perception, 
pp. 160-161 and rvlerleau-Ponty, I., The Visible and the Invis- 
ible, Lingis, Alphonso, trans. Evanston, Northwestern Univ. 
Press, 1968, the Editor's Forward, Claude Lefort, ed., p. XXV. 
2"Results of Ph. P. --Necessity of bringing them to 
ontological explicitation. " Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible 
and the Invisible, p. 183. 
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A second reason for difficulties in analysis is that 
i,! erleau-Ponty died before his ontological reflections were 
ready for publication. We are left with unfinished texts 
and working notes; only "Eye and I"ind" reached publication 
before his death and it cannot be taken as a final statement 
of his position. 1. Such a circumstance is assuredly lamentable 
for the analyst. 
Still, the material now published does present the 
thought of T rIerleau-Ponty' sufficiently to permit an outline 
of his ontology. We shall not attempt to spell out what he 
might have said, had he lived longer; what he did say about 
phenomenological ontology will aid us considerably to see 
its bearing upon the issue of transcendence. 
,: erleau-Ponty did not make a smooth transition to 
ontology after writing Phenomenology of Perception; there 
are imaginative and provocative articles which precede "Eye 
and. i, 1ind" and The Visible and the Invisible. But it strikes 
the reader that he looked back to that first major work in 
writing these last pieces, seeing the reed for further 
explication. Charter One of Part Two explained t erleau- 
ron-ur's concern to interrogate the perceptive act, to give 
a pheno- enologica1 answer to trr problem of the "in-itself 
I "Eye and f,: ind" was a preliminary statement to be included in the second part of The Visible and the Invisible. See Derleau-Ponty, M., The Primacy of Perception p. 150 
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for us". The lived-world is fundamentally a pre-reflective 
transaction between the seer and the seen, the sentient and 
the sensible. Verleau-Ponty did not reject this notion of 
transaction in the ontological writings but he did refine 
it. The effort to refine his phenomenology partially ex- 
plains how he came to regard his phenomenology as having 
ontological dimensions. We shall explain. 
Whereas we may characterize the early notion as a 
"transaction" between the perceiver and the perceived, his 
later concepts require other terms. "Entrelacs et chia. sme", 
the title of a most important chapter of ontological writing, 
illustrates his effort to refine the early phenomenology. 
Entrelacs refers to the patterns of knotwork in embroidery, 
chia. sme to networks or crossed lines; both are metaphors 
suggesting a manifold network of relationships between the 
perceiver and the perceived. 1 By this title, Merieau- 
Ponty seeks to explicate man's relation to the world as a 
subtle complex of interchanges; more complex than a trans- 
action, it is the perceiver's many-faceted participation with 
things and others in the world. 
Even more is involved. Though the human subject is 
always distinguished from "the other", the phenomenologically 
1Entrelacs et chiasme is translated "intertwinings 
and chiasm", by Alphonso Lingis, the translator of The Visible and the Invisible, See Chapter IV. 
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oriented thinker sees that the orders of subject and object 
need to be "broken down". Contrary to Sartre, the for-itself 
and the in-itself are not completely separate structures for 
V! erleau-Ponty; as we shall see, the concept of networks 
illustrates his continued effort to force distinctions in concepts 
of massive being. The subject-object typology is a rigid 
categorization which crumbles under a serious examination 
of experience. 1 It introduces us to the ontology. 
How does Merleau-Ponty describe intertwinings? We 
shall first follow his discussion of the relation between 
the toucher and the touched. Then we shall see the networks 
he seeks to explicate between the seer and the visible. 
Concerning the act of touching, knowing that we are 
beings who touch is a primary phenomenological theme. tier- 
leau-Ponty still calls this our opening onto a world. He 
also speaks of the act of touching, in terms of our being 
"touched" by the object. The object's course or smooth 
texture is given to u, co that we become the touched as 
well as the toucher. Our bor'iiy activity is affected by 
touching the hot store, or the furry rug-. Phenoraenolo^ically 
speaking, we are "objects" in this occult transference. ? 
1Vide, 
,: ible, p. 130. 
,. erleau-Fon-ey, L_. ' The Visible an, -' the Invis- 
2This notion is a refinement of the idea of "presen- tation" introduced in Phenomenology of Perception. 
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Thirdly, he speaks about the experience of touching as a 
"touching of the touch". 
1 It is a relation illustrated by 
the action of the right hend grasping our left hand as it 
touches an object. In this third dimension of the tactile 
act, we-are simultaneously the "touching subject" and we 
are the one who is touched. These three elements, he says 
are experienced simultaneously; they are networks which 
exist in the single phenomenon of touching. 
These networks are the thematic structures which 
pertain to the pre-reflective act. The rigidity of the for- 
itself and the in-itself orders break down if one attends 
to the event. Even more important, Merleau-Ponty is 
suggesting with his notion of networks that the experiences 
of the touched and touching belong together. They are part 
of one world; they are "two halves of an orange". 2 Much 
will be made of this. 
It is the phenomenon of seeing, however, that inter- 
e7ts :, erleau-Ponty most. -: pit before focusing upon seeing 
it. is necessary to cite the connection between touching 
and seeing. äi, ey for: n another network if we understand his 
intentions. 




We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible 
is cut out in the tangible, every tactile being in some 
manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroach- 
ment, infringement, not only between the touched and the 
touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, 
which is encrusted in it, as, conversely, the tangible 
itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not with- 
out visual existence. Since the same body sees and 
touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world. 1 
Once this intimate connection or "common world" is 
recognized, we can pass to a discussion of. "t-he seer and the 
seen", and do so More knowledgably. The experience serves 
to support the notion of networks he seeks to convey. It 
will help in the following discussion to keep in mind what 
we have previously called "presentation". 
What is the "virtue of the visible", he asks, "that 
makes it, held at the end of the gaze, nonetheless much more 
than a correlative of my vision, such that it imposes my 
vision upon me as a continuation of its own sovereign exis- 
tence? "2 Such questioning leads "L-Ponty to discuss 
the notion of aale, so common in C . artesian thought. His 
concern is to "pit rack, into the object,,, the dualities 
C11 te-iari thoU. t -tint se-Qaratýr_ fron it. }'e contends that 
cu^liti er, a. re modes o -r rr. e. eý ; ý. tior. -. n, --,. arc, not inter"cOiate 
entities, which He )etwPen te rercei-%, (r and th e nercei_vo-O. 
11bi(. 
, i). 134. 
using the model of the 
strate his care. This 
writing that it hardly 
one reference to the b, 
not surprise us. 




: )dy as 
that : erleau-Ponty is again 
as an intentional being to demon- 
obvious in his ontological 
mentioning. When we meet his the exemplar sensible, it should 
2 erleau-Ponte, The Visible an-1 -the Invisible, ;,. 1 1. 
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Color: one cannot separate it from the object, color 
presents texture; it creates identities, introduces depth, 
and line. (He is speaking of painting. )' Depth, likewise, 
is object locality, not a third dimension abstracted by 
determining. height and width. The thing is sought by vision 
in terms of its locality; in depth the visible "comes to 
itself" before the viewer. Line also, is not an imitation 
of the visible thing; rather it is the thing rendering itself 
visible before us. The gaze, or perception, is captured 
by the visible world; the painter's secret science is to 
"render" the visible on canvass. His vision has been cap- 
tured and he works to put that experience in visible terms.? 
Three points can be abstracted from this odd form of de- 
scription; - first, 
the thing reveals itself in different manners 
simultaneously i. e. in form, color, depth, etc. In contrast 
to Sartre's concept of "massive Teing", I. "erleau-Ponty 
attempts to capture the variation, diversity and inter- 
changeableness of the object's presentation to conscious- 
ness. ? ho thing is not sirrrolyy "ther^" in one sin=rle manner. 
p. 132. See aiso, -'erleau-I-onty, :.. , Sirns, 
2--- `Tice. , e_rleau-Ponty, a c: tine lnvi jhle 
. .. 





P5" no ot'ner technique than what his eyes and hands discover in seeing and painting, he persists in drawing from this world, with its din of history's glories 
and scandals, canvasses which will hardly add to the angers or the hopes of man--and no one complains. " i,: erleau-Ponty, M. , Si=mss, p. 161. 
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Each mode invades another, and so on; every mode of presen- 
tation belongs to each other. Secondly, the visible exerts 
force upon the seer. In other words, the visible invades 
and shapes perception; the in-itself is not separable from 
its "magic".. -power upon consciousness. Objects "belong" to' 
consciousness. 
Lastly, 'the visible "radiates""beyond itself. The 
particular visible is a network, not compassable through 
any one mode of its presentation and is also not fully 
understood as an in-itself separate from other things. It 
is an expression of the total lived-world. Merleau-Ponty 
almost reverts to poetry to make his point in the following. 
The red dress a fortiori holds with all its fibers onto 
the fabric of the visible, and thereby onto a fabric of 
invisible being. A punctuation in the field of red 
things, which includes the tiles of roof tops, the flags 
of gatekeepers and of the Revolution, certain terrains 
near Aix or in Madagascar, it is also a punctuation in 
the field of red garments, which includes, along with it 
the dresses of women, robes of professors, bishops and 
advocate generals, aný also in the field of adornments 
and that of uniforms. 
He is talking obviously, of an experience which is 
reminiscent and evocative of other experiences. The bold- 
ness of his statement, however, is not so simply captured. 
The thing, seen in its color not only "refers" to like others; 
it participates in forms of visibility beyond itself, i. e. 
the particular belongs to the whole and vice versa. 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible p. 132. 
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This last point is not entirely new; we saw previously 
how perception both opened onto a total world, and assumed 
it in each particular situation. The new element is the 
notion of "networks"; it says that there is an essential 
connection between experiences; a notion of universal patterns 
is being introduced. His phenomenology is leading him to make 
ontological observations. 
The networks between the seer and the seen, between 
the sentient and the sensible, have revealed what Merleau- 
Ponty calls the form of reversibility. He does not expound 
the term in detail but it is evident that it pertains to the 
peculiar way the orders of subject and object are broken down. 
Reversibility is a phenomenological form, an eidos which is 
given its life by the experienced world. If "networks" is 
a general term for perceptual experience, reversibility is 
the peculiar form of those networks and, hence, experience, 
The toucher is also the touched, the seer is also the seen. 
The orders of subject and object are at least partially inter- 
. an., 1 
1'!. t rust he adý. eci that reversibility parallels the con- 
c ýýcrceptt.. al sýn-t ýeý is in one important respect. As 
perceptual synthesi7- wa^ partial, so "reversibility (i-! ) ; -nminen'i never z i.. - ý' reali ry "ý a. c .,. " erleau-Ponty el l :"., The Visible and the Invisible, p. 147. The form of rever- 
sibility is never complete experientially; I think Merleau- 
Ponty means by this that we can never be in any final sense, 
both object and subject in the lived-world. The form of rever- 
sibility is credible in his mind because the subject-order 
is invadec'. by the object-order, though it is never completely 
taken over. 
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Merleau-Ponty has discussed the emergence of this 
eidos in terms of man's perception of the natural world; 
reversibility is the fundamental truth of man's perception 
of the thing. There is no great transition required to say 
that it is-also the fundamental form of man's relation to 
other men. The importance of reversibility is clearly evi- 
dent in this domain as well. 1.2erleau-Ponty does not discuss 
intersubjective experience in connection with reversibility, 
but were it described it would be highly reasonable to think 
he would have related intersubjectivity to the notion of 
reversibility explained here. We mention it here because it 
is not an oversight on his part; he died before the material 
was writtnn. 
1 
In working notes he gives us some idea of what shape 
the discussion would have taken. 
It is through. it(reversibility) alone that there is 
passage from the 'For-Itself' to the For the Oth: r--In 
reality there is neither me nor the other as positive 
subjectivities. There are two caverns, two opiennesses, two stages where something will take place--and which2 both belong to the same world, to the stage of Being. 
This suggestive passage cannot be construed as anything 
more than a notation, an indication that reversibility will 
1: "any working notes refer to his intention to write 
on intersubjectivity. See especially : r: erleau-Ponty, TJ,. The Visible and the Invisible, p. 165. 
2Ibid., pp. 263-264. 
182 
call for a full ontology. 
It is completely credible that his position on the 
childlike character of intersu'ojective encounter would 
have been used in the above context. 
' The point, if made, 
would have been obvious: reversibility-is the way we exper- 
ience the other; his world invades ours, and ours, his. 
There is exchange; we see the other and are seen by him, 
we touch and are touched. Moreover, we share the sane world, 
and in this sense belong to each other. 
What the concept of reversibility does make plain is 
that the connection between seer and the visible is not 
accidental. Intertwining is possible only because we are 
present in the world, not simply beholders from the outside. 
erleau-Ponty makes an introductory observation as to the 
ontological character of reversibility. It is a key comment 
and we quote it in full. 
: ence without even entering into the implications proper 
to the seer and the visible, we know that, since vision is a palpation with the look, it -must also be inscribed 
in the order of being that it discloses to us; he who 
looks r'iist not hir"1^elf be f. orei, ^ i to the world that he 
loo's at. As soon as T see, it is necessary that the 
vision (as iss so well indicated by the double meaninr, 
of the worms) 'tie = oixble -a core limentzry vision or 
with another vision: riyself seen from without, such as 
L,. 1-1 othc r vi01; 1" :, ",:; E rye, in . falle.:. in the midst of the 
visible, ocerpied in considering it from a certain snot. 
oý- - ire ! orient we -hall not e, Tami-. Ze how . 
far this identity 
of the seer and the visible goes, if we have a complete 
1c. f. Ibid., p. 180 and p. 26Q. 
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experience of it, or if there is something missing, 
and what it is. It suffices for us for the moment 
to note that he who sees cannot possess the visible 
unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it, 
unless by principle, according to what is required by 
the articulation of the look with the things, he is one 
of the visibles, capable, by a single reversal, of 
seeing them--he who is one of them. 
The sense of this quotation is put most briefly, 
Pen suis, "I belong to it". He has been preparing for this 
claim in every description of intertwinings and reversibility. 
The toucher belongs to the touched, the seer to the seen.. 
Man is bound to his world at every level of experience; to 
know this is to discover the meaning of man's very being. 
One avenue of clarification is to illustrate this 
affirmation, ''en suis, by the concept of a "circuit". 
Merleau-Ponty does so in "Eye and Mind". 2 
The painter is again the privileged expositor on the 
truth of belonging to the world. There is that which reaches 
his eye directly, (the object or scene) and there is that 
which ignites his imagination (vision). "Vision encounters, 
as at a crossroads. all the aspects of Being. "3 Eyes and 
hands respond in the creative act to render this world on 
canvass. No one can say of a painting, where "nature ends" 
and human expression begins. The work's visibility is bound 
1Ibid., pp. 131-135. 
2Merleau-Ponty, M., Signs, pp. 159 ff. 
31bid., p. 188. 
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to the painter and to the world; a circuit is formed between 
the painter's vision, his creative act and the painting 
itself. The world speaks and is spoken of on cenvass. The 
painter has rendered a relation between himself and his 
world. The example. reveals the magic of every perception. 
Given a means of expression, every perception is a rendering 
of the world we see, hear, or touch, and it is so because 
we are part of the circuitry. The concepts of networks and 
reversibility express the particular truth that man belongs 
to the world. 
' 
Before further pursuing the ontological dimensions 
of his phenomenological studies, it is appropriate to examine 
the concept Merleau-Ponty proposes as the principle which 
explains his claims thus far and gives him direct access to 
the ontological issue. 
So far, we have said that the networks can be de- 
scribed iA terns of one major characteristic--reversibility. 
Reversibility conceptualizes the circuitry binding human 
consciousness to its world. There is commonality between 
1A g-ain our exposition is cut short if we are con- 
cerned to know what specific role human consciousness plays in this relationship of belonginq-. 1.: erleau-ronty was either 
unconcernerl with giving specific, believed that he had 
already done so in his earlier writings, or intended to and 
died before putting things down. I favor the second possi- bility; the human for-itself was characterized in detail in 
Phenomenology of Perception. The only addition required in 
his mind was to show how consciousness "belongs" to the 
world it perceives. 
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subject and world, and there is a connectedness between 
various forms of experience. A general term is needed to 
express this connectedness and commonality. The term , "er- 
leau-Fonty chooses is "flesh". Flesh is the "tissue that 
lines them (networks), sustains them, nourishes them. ... 
"Flesh" is obviously not a literalistic term; its 
synonym is "element" or "general thing". 2 'ierleau-Ponty 
says that flesh is designated as "midway between the spatio- 
temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate prin- 
ciple that brings a style of being wherever there is a frag- 
ment of being. "3 In other words, flesh is the eidos spec- 
ifying the commonality of perceptual experience, and the 
connectedness man has with the world he perceives. 
Perhaps, it is best to dissect this notion in terms 
of its application to experience. The notion of flesh attempts 
1Prerlea_u-Ponty, ". , The Vi- P, -)le and the Invisible p. 132. 
2Ibi(I., 
r. 130. "The flesh i:. not matter, in the sense 
of corrýu cles of heir, 7 which % ovld adc' ur or continue on one 
another to form hein=. s. ', or i: - the vic'ihle (the things as 
well ac my o-: rn body)' oc, je material that would 'cc-- 
Goc' knows howv--broup*b,, t into beinnr by the thins factually 
an, actý__ý or my factual body. 7r q--nera1 it, is 
rot af pct or a starr of facts 'material' or' -spiritual' . ; 'or i it _, ro, -t a'tion : for' 3. : tlnd: s. _inr coulc not re 
captured by its own representations; it vrould rebel a6ainst 




to guard against what 1, «erleau-Ponty calls high-altitude 
thinking, in that it is a principle required in the analysis 
of experience. A phenomenology of perception indicates for 
example, that seer and seen belong to each other; it does not 
imply that they are interchangeable in any final sense. The 
reason is simple: analysis of perceptual experience does 
not permit such a conclusion. Perceptual experience: ' shapes 
the concept of flesh; that is why he calls it an "incarnate 
principle". The concept of flesh, as well as that of the 
networks, strongly infers that connectedness is not acci- 
dental. Reversibility and the networks only conceptualize 
the forms of perception; his position is that experience 
itself exhibits connectedness. "Flesh" attempts to bring 
its forms under one heading. Merleau-Ponty maintains his 
phenomenological perspective in this transition to ontology; 
the principle of flesh is not constructed; it-emerges oixt 
of the structures of experience. 
We are now ready to eVarine directly the ontological 
eir: ension_:, of the rhenorienolocy. In , sen! -! e, the for_eroing 
has bor. cieireý on ortolo-y at every roint; we have withheld our 
diocussion of it only for convenience. There are a number 
of ways we could describe the ontolo-y; th' most suggestive 
approach i; given in "Eye and kind". 1 The prose there is 
1i,: erleau-Ponty, I., Signs , p. 159, ff. 
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difficult, but if we keep in mind the title of his posthumous 
collection, The Visible and the Invisible, the task may be- 
come easier. 
The artists' vocation is to render his participation 
in a world visible to all. In the above accounts, we indi- 
cated a circuit in which world., vision and visibility could 
not be neatly separated. The network we described pertained 
to a relation between a particular painter's vision and the 
visible work of art. But the artistic act is also a paradigm 
for a philosophical view of existence. 
Every visual something, as individual as it is, func- 
tions also as a dimension, because it gives itself as 
the result of a dehiscence of Being. What this ulti- 
mately means is that the proper essence (le propre) of 
the visible is to have a layer (doublure) of invisibility 
in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain 
absence. "l 
,. his bold claim can be organized in two ways. First, 
JMIerleau-Ponty is saying that perceptual experience cannot 
be confined to a simple relationship between the perceiver 
a-nd the perceived. . 'et:, rorhs are particular, but the per- 
ceiver is a1ýo 1är' to "coýrýýý nicýte -i, ': -'roi h those thingz 'to 
p. 11 -Erier_, 'tion of the c are arivi; el to mite 
"eriou. sly "irre myth of t-ic- w iri, owws of the soul_. '': he eye c 
the wir do', v, o,? er, s the -o,, 1 1 "to what IF rot the Üou].. "% r he 
'Ibid., P. 187. 
21bid., r. 18r. 
3lbiýt. 
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painter paints in the conviction that the visible thing 
discloses not only itself, but presents a dimension of 
universal meaning. That is, particular circuits relate to 
the whole, the world and Being. Vision opens us to a world 
in general, a universe of "sun and stars", he says. The 
visible shows forth the sphere of invisibility. 
1 
That leads us to a second way of organizing his con- 
cept of the ontological dimension of the phenomenology. The 
vision-visible network opens one to invisibility; that state- 
ment should be taken alrcost literally, and when so taken, it 
is not indicative of "reversibility" in the strict sense. 
That is, perception and vision do lead to confrontation with 
the invisible, but there is no suggestion that there is a 
1At this point it is wise to interrupt our exposition 
for the following observation. Just what the terms "invisi- 
bility" and "being" mean specifically. cannot be stated. Ner- 
leau-Ponty is fond of suggestive terms which remain undefined, 
but a few observations can be mace. : rhether we talk of nat- 
ural things or social phenomena, the particular visional 
"openir_7s" indicate a sphere of wholeness in which man lives. 
One gets the distinct impression that the I"ebenswelt is 
telyy conceives' o" j. s a totelity of networks; its unity 
remains mysterious. Our author is certainly not a theologian 
in this respect; he Fives no na- -- to this sense of wholeness 
or unity; there is no Go-' vo-ite' a- __o 
the ein. disclosed 
through t}bi_nrs. Invisibility roints to the mystery of the 
world, and not necessarily to a creator. Invisibility is a 
descri rtive term and is not to be ý; ýýJ en literally; itý means 
iirý? ; of all, tI, at the whole is presented through the parti- 
cular. The whole is "there" before him, yet it is not avail- 
able for definition; it is in a certain sense, an absence. 
By this, he means, it is not to be possessed. Wholeness or 
invisibility is a mystery to the one who grasps it and is 
part of it. When we take up the issue of transcendence we 
should be aware of this perspective. 
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confrontation with, or conception of invisibility which gives 
access to the particular. No "reverse" is possible if we are 
to retain his notion of phenomenology as an opening to ontology. 
Perception opens onto vision, vision to the whole; perception 
is still the lynch-pin. Phenomenology leads the thinker to 
ontological observations. It is a one-way thoroughfare; 
ontology takes its life from an interpretation of experience. 
This structure should not be construed, however, as 
limiting Merleau-Ponty's concept of ontology. Though phen- 
oznenology is -. access to ontology and supports it, we can say 
that the world does open itself as a totality through the 
particular perceptual event. '?. The world is in accordance 
with my perspective in order to be independent of me, is for 
me in order to be without me, and to be the world. "1 
Me acknowledge that the thing is "given" to us. It 
is there " for us" because it can be " without us". This is 
to say that vision is responsive to the thing beheld, in its 
inderenc1ence; we recognize that what comes to view does so 
because it ha. - its own Vi7ion for r"erlean. -Fonty is 
not entirely subjective or projective; vision jr a. response 
to the perceived world. 
or. cover the q 1lotat . on atte'np"ts to e-"preýs; s the exn r- 
lencc of invisi-aility. `-hat this means was never fully 
1:: erleau-Ponty, -K. , SiF-4n , p. 187. 
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explicated by Merleau-Ponty but one observation is warrented. 
Invisibility has to do with the being of the world; the mys- 
terious even awesome nature of the experience is that the 
mystery of the world's being is opened to the viewer. "That 
it is there",. this is what fascinates the thinker. We shall 
return to this theme below and in our conclusions. 
This formulation is not a complete change from the 
early Phenomenology of Perception, but there is one important 
new emphasis. In terms of the above observation that invis- 
ibility affects the vision, a new idea of consciousness is 
being forged. It is one he intended. Briefly, human con- 
sciousness is no longer thought of as being solely a "seizing 
operation". 
1 The ontological insight is that the worlds 
wholeness shapes consciousness and vision, as well as the 
other way around. For example, what is not present, strictly 
speaking, in a given perception, does affect consciousness. 
The person is aware that what is before him does have its own 
1Speaking of the problems left unresolved in Phenomen- 
ology of Perception, he says, "they are due to the fact that 
in part I retained the philosophy of consciousness. " I,. erleau- 
Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, working note, Feb- 
ruary 1959, p. 16-3. One of the specific problems was that 
the opposition considered consciousness as eithor a consti- 
tuting operation or as a "receptor station". In responding 
to these alternatives 7,, 7erleau-Ponty did not consider other 
philosophical options. Hence, he may have believed that his 
theory of that time was a compromise theory and. not a full 
exploration of the place consciousness would have once onto- logy was possible. This new series of reflections would 
correct that deficiency. 
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Being, and is part of a broader environment. Consciousness 
in this new posture, "asks" the thing to reveal itself as 
it truly is. 
In sum, ontology has no autonomous status; phenomen- 
piogy is the conduit which opens us to Being. That is why 
we call it phenomenological-ontology. But once Being is 
confronted via perception, we must acknowledge that conscious- 
ness has not constituted it. Being has priority as a non- 
thetic dimension, discovered in the act of perception. This 
conception is a unique contribution to ontological studies. 
No notion of apperception is required to aclmowledge 
the presence of Being; Merleau-Ponty holds that the world's 
totality is encountered rather than anticipated or apperceived. 
His position keeps us in touch with phenomenological method 
and interpretation. 
It is now left for us to spell out as far as is poss- 
ible with the existing material, how relations with others 
functions as a fundamental opening to the mystery of Being. 
As always, he begins with the body. The established 
truth of one's own body is that it is the exemplar sensible. 1 
; 'fie have seen that reversibility is the peculiar form of all 
v 
personal existence; the subject touches and is touched, sees 
and is seen. t'`erleav-Ponty first discussed this with the 
1T'erleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 135. 
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individual in mind. Everything about the subject suggests 
that touch and sight interact with each other and with "the 
thing". In this connection we concluded that human conscious- 
ness was "responsive" as well as "intrusive". It works with 
particulars in a context of wholeness. Consciousness is 
synergetic; it works with its world in order to discover 
its own significance and the meaning of its world. Merleau- 
Ponty now suggests, 
Why would not the synergy exist among different organ- 
isms, if it is possible within each? Their landscapes 
interweave, their actions and their passion fit together 
exactly: this is possible as soon as we no longer make 
belongingness to one sa`ne'consciousness' the primordial 
definition of sensibility, and as soon as we rather 
understand it as the return of the visible upon itself, 
a carnal adherance of the sentient to the sensed and of 
the sensed to the sentient. 1 
He is speaking of perception in the presence of an- 
other. What one touches and what one sees is not only his 
ovm. It is better that we sneak of objects perceived with 
another; the perceived world of one becomes shared with the 
other's; it "passes into him". 2 The visible is then perceived 
in terms of an "intercorporeality" and not just by a single 
body; it is truly a "for us". 
3 This notion of intercorpor- 
lIbid., p. 142. 
0 
21bid. 
3Merleau-Ponty did not live to give full exposition 
to the notion of intercorporeality. It is, to my mind, the 
most suggestive term yet in illustrating the significance 
of intersubjectivity. We shall utilize it in our concluding 
chapter. 
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eality becomes much clearer when we discuss it in terms of 
seeing Brother person. , 'That occurs there exposes the heart 
of man's openness to "eireg, and. it exposes most boldly what 
Lerleau-Ponty believes true of the visible-invisible network. 
The lesson of seeing things with another is not totally 
different than if we saw it by ourselves, but the ine:: - 
haustible depth of the visible, whiTh is its proper 
essence, is made far more apparent. 
In the presence of another the subject really begins 
to see that he is a seer; the other person confronts him 
with his own vision, In this experience the subject is 
redirected from beholding "the thing" directly, to the other 
person. In other words, his own vision is discovered to be 
incomplete; he turns to the other for the completion of an 
otherwise "individual" exchange. The other's vision of the 
thing becomes a neces, -nary factor in there being an authentic 
perception. 
"_'his turning towards another also seems to have its 
own sphere of value for _erleav-Ponty. The two perceivers 
bcco -(: c preoccup2iec' wit', eacl. other r ch the sane as two 
lovE: r i: 0 1 t. 6: 'I ZOY c each other. r. CE rt r. ew horia takes 
21 
1! 12. ". "hat is Vieroper to the visible is, we said, to be the surface of an inexhaustible depth; this is what makes 
it able to be open to visions other than our own. " Ibid. 
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For the first time, the body no longer couples itself 
up with the world, it, clasps another body, applying 
(itself to it) carefully with its own e tension, forming 
tirelessly with its hanc-s the strange statue which in 
its turn gives everything it receives; the body is lost 
ou aside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the 
unique occupation of floating in Being with another 
life, of making itself the outside of the inside, and 
the inside of its outside. 1 
''o more poetic means of expression than this could 
be found in philosophical writing. The exchange of look, 
the experience of reversibility, reminds us of the communal 
nature of intersubjectivity in Phenomenology of Perception. 
Kerleau-Ponty's point is that the world of one is intimately 
shared by another, and is shared as an interpersonal explor- 
ation. But in addition to the euphoria of sharing there is 
the experience of seeing things as they are. 
Beyond the euphoric sharing of vision (reversibility), 
the subjects"pass definitvely beyond the circle of the vis- 
ible. "2 The experience of reversibility brings us to the 
rrvlorl(' tja silence", or invi. ^-] :; "iiity. 
3 
A? ain, .. e may rep re ; ha L=r1 eau-moo ti,, C'i's not live 
to spoil 0; V ý'l'' zG ;cT 'ant b! he tC'T'7's, f::, ýCc 
. '. 
ý. ý. rr". El I rr , 
ißt) 
a: ý- IC '' ronty rlacý erased mad the phrase was rc torec3. by the trwielator. 
2 Il, ic. 
3Ibi 
(l sT. 14$. 
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was to return us to wonder in face of the world. We are 
left with a series of references to encounter with Being which 
were never fully elucidated. 
We emphasize here the extent to which encounter with 
Being is affirmed as a phenomenological truth. The per- 
ceiver is never an autononous being; he is bound to his 
world and he is bound to others who rake him aware of his 
belongingness. The aware person is inescapably a social 
person; there is no other way to describe him. To be bound 
to others, however, does not preclude the experience of 
being thrown open to Being. In fact, the very nature of 
man is, in a sense, fulfilled in his exposure to Being. C) 
In the, perhaps, rare experience of encounter with others, 
man faces the mystery of Being. 
Put in technical terms we conclude that inter-sub- 
jectivity forms the backbone of the ontology. -, ýn_counter 
experience provides a major access to ontological reflections. 
Intercorporeality, in his terms, is a peculiar conduite to 
the sphere of Being. 
We are fully aware that Terleau-Ponty never describes 
the sphere of Being. We have mentioned this frequently. 
7 For the purposes of analysis, therfore, it is risky and 
unwise to force a description at this juncture. . le are given 
help, however, in his occasional discussions of transcen- 
dence. If we are to achieve some clarification on what Tier-- 
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leau-Ponty meant by "3eing" it is adviseable to see what 
he meant by the term transcendence. Once that is accom- 
plished we may be able to specify more closely, the meaning 
of such terms as "invisibility", "mystery", and Being. 
We can proceed with strong indications that, what- 
ever his view of transcendence, the intersubjective phen- 
omenon will play a central role in uncovering its meaning. 
He will say little about its importance in the ensuing 
discussions but we can assume that his ontological reflec- 
tions will inform his views on transcendence. It remains 
for us to say how. 
PHEN0_: 3 OLOGI CAL- ON TOLO GY AND 
ITS BEARING ON THE ISSUE OF TRANSCENDENCE 
As in the previous study, we shall outline the growth 
of T: Ierleau-Ponty's thought; we hope that this is understood 
as a patient approach and not an overly laborious one. The 
growth of the thinker, in this case, shows us subtle changes 
which directly affect our appraisal of his concept of trans- 
cendence. 
Three periods can be discerned with regard to his 
notion of transcendence. The first period centers about his 
first two works, The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomen- 
ology of Perception. We can be brief here in light of the 
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earlier investigation. 
Phenomenology of Perception stated his conviction 
that trag cenicnce is to be thought of as a "movement" inte- 
gral to the perceptive act, a structure of consciousness. 
First, man "transcends" his ov, -n isolation by seeing other 
things and people; he knows himself as a subject in a world. 
He is a being in traffic with those over against himself. 
! 'an in the perceptive act overcomes the sphere of private 
subjectivity. He makes the movements of transcendence. The 
first notation we must make, therefore, is that. man'is identi- 
fied with transcendence in that he is the one who "transcenc's" 
his own subjectivity. 
The same concept of perception also led ''erleau-Ponty 
to conclude that "the other" is always more than we can know 
of it. ae transcend our su-. jcctivityy to gain communal contact 
and interchange, but we are constantly faced with the fact 
trat the, world- n'c inve _t^; ''' cencc our '. ino: ýwleca ;e of it. 
ra nsc6_^_'e is in -Ccoi!. C Sr re, i the "more" o. '" the 
worlr', wort. -" 1, e, 'oi- or c `IC. it 
r(. rCC"'' t: i. 0'P, T. It '" ore" C. rr'"CC: 
_l`''_ e 0'^ 
0 .. ii 00,11 ? .. . j10.1-111". 
Ci 




This two-folc conception of : rar 3cendence explains 
to some e2-: -tent why Alphonse de ;; 'ha o calls I erleau-Foný:. iTý s 
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phenomenology, a philosophy of ambiguity. 1 It becomes 
relevant to ask if the two notions mentioned above are 
adequately explained in that early period; or, was not 
ambiguity left as the major theme of perceptual knowledge? 
My belief is that Merleau-Ponty did not attempt to resolve 
the ambiguity until the period of his ontological reflections. 
We shall see that below. 
Merleau-Ponty did address himself to the issue of 
transcendence, however, after Phenomenology of Perception 
and before the time of his ontological writings; it is 
quite useful to review those expositions. They explain 
in detail the issue he sought to resolve in the period 
just before his death. We shall label this his second or 
middle period; it is a period of transition. 
Merleau-Ponty writes of Christianity in an article 
entitled "Foi et Bonne Foi"; he is considering an argument 
about social ethics in Catholicism. 2 Father Herve had said 
that Catholic tradition as a whole, encourages conservative 
social attitudes. Merleau-Ponty agrees but holds that 
Catholic tradition does not explain the condition; he 
suggests a theological reason for the conservatism. 
1Vide., deWhaelhens, Alphonse, "M. Merleau-Ponty et la Philosophie de L'ambiguite", Pensee, No. 68, July-August, 1956. 
2The issue was suggested to him in an article by Father Pierre Herve, "Action", Dec. 144,1945. 
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There must be an ambiguity in Catholicism as a spirit- 
ual way of life to correspond to its ambiguity as a 
social phenomenon. 
Catholicism posits a belief in both an interior and 
an exterior God. This1is the religious formulation 
of its contradictions. 
The notions of interior and exterior God, he 
believes, expose a double standard in Catholic teaching. 
In Augustine, the theme of interiority is evident; "turn 
inward ... truth dwells within the 
inner man. "2 God 
is discovered in the inner recesses of man's spirit; the 
experience of God is self-authenticating and adequate for 
faith. But Catholicism also teaches an "exterior God", a 
God learned through dogma and institution. The Incarnation 
and Pentecost are not only teachings which express one's 
faith; they are doctrines which call for blind obedience. 
The standard is that God has already decided how to make 
Himself known; one need only conform. 
Quite obviously, Merleau-Ponty decries the latter 
form in Catholic teaching; but it is negative only in greater 
degree than the former. The latter he calls "bad faith", 
1Merleau-Ponty, M., Sense and Non-Sense, Dreyfus 
Herbert L., trans. Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 
1964, p. 173. Catholicism was Merleau-Ponty's heritage. 
In his youth he had been a faithful adherant. Under- 
standably, Christianity and Catholicism, are interchangeable 
terms; they are synonomous for him. 
2Ibid. 
200 
the former, simply "faith". "ac'_ faith has the look of 
borrowed values, and authoritarianism; "faith" has the 
sense of sincerity or reliance upon one's o_wn inclinations. 
The important point is that a Christian is not able to 
choose between the two forms; he floats between them. This 
is why his social stance is amnbigLiov,, . If the Christian 
senses the need for revolution as a private individual, he 
is restrained by the Church's value-. If he holds to the 
Church's position he is plagued by guilt and the need. to 
right wrongs. "He is a poor conservative and an unsafe bet 
as a revolutionary. "1 
We need not go on with . -erleau-Ponty' s judgments; 
in light of Catholic teaching in 1945 he was probably correct. 2 
: ost important, i, `erleau-Ponty believed that theology gets in 
the way of responsible human action and comrrnittment. It 
keeps us from recognizing the need for decisive action. In 
o? lr, hristii. iý_it keeps men suspen -U., whereas what is 






ecisi ve lr art 
in this Výorl'1 
rýýnp ; _- ý; it; c, t ran 
CGIl( en CF" .Ii: "1ý ; l'': 11: ca. -r-. 1l0 ý'r'^ Z' li^ Fi a they are 'lE'- 
11 L; ]. (. ,). 178 . 
2, Iic'e. , Kwant, Remy C. , The Phenomenological Phil- 
osoph of Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburg: Dusque', ne Univ. Press, 1Q63. Chapter 2. 
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cause of their suspension; in this sense, they are incap- 
able of self-transcendence. In sum, the Christian notions 
of transcendence get in the way of authentic self-transcen- 
Bence. 
We interrupt exposition for one observation. Is 
2]ierleau-Ponty's brief critique consistant with his ovm early 
teaching on transcendence? blany commentators have seen an 
inconsistancy. 1 I-ierleau-Ponty was sympathetic to Marxism 
at the time and though this need not discount his criticism 
of Christianity, it does indicate that he leaned toward a 
revolutionary stance regarding social movements. Particu- 
larly, his espousal of _ý°_arxism may explain his impatience 
at remaining content with the ambiguities of experience 
so well documented in Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau- 
Ponty never fully embraced MM: arxism, 2 but in this period he 
turned somewhat from his earlier notion that'-there are ainbi- 
gui--ý; ies involved in describing man's perceptual history. 
1Vide. 
, Kviant, Remy, the Phenomenolocj. cal Philos 
Pont; and Rabil, Albert, '.: erleau-Ponty: xistentiali s-t 
the : ]ocia. l World, New. York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967, 
Chapter 7. 
2"If the individual goes along with the party and 
against his own private opinion, it is because the party has 
proven its worth, because it has a mission in history, and 
because it represents the proletariat. There is no such 
thing as an unmotivated committrnent. " i, "erleau-Ponty, D. 7.0 
Sense and Pon-Sense, p. 180. c. f. his article concerning 
i'arxism ibid., pp. 99 ff. Eventually, such a critical 






ti: critique of Christianity may hold but it 
read that he is not sympathetic with the man 
flicting perceptions about transcendence. ; -' 
counseled such a position in his formulation 
meaninTs of transcendence. 
is a bit odd to 
who holds con- 
a had earlier 
of the two 
One other article of this reriod records what he is 
most concerned to criticize about concepts of transcendence, 
and it reveals more directly his then current concept of 
transcendence. 
In the "I.: etaahysical in Lan" , ä; Lerleau-Ponty reasserts 
the earlier notion of ambiguity in human experience. But 
this time he is clear that the contingency of perceptual 
knowledge opens Man to the "metaphysical". 
Fetanhysics is the deliberate intention to describe 
this parado. of consciousness an truth, exchange and 
communication, ... From the moment I recognize that 
r, y e; _rcrience preciý. ely in so far as it is riy own, makes 
me accessible to what is not myself, that I am sensitive 
to t''ie worlrl em to o*'k.: i: rs ... all the beings which objective thou ght olaceO at a ý_, t nce dray singularly 
Ä:: ar to me. _y lip e seems absolutely inc ividual and 
absoli.. tel , t? ý1_ý. vor : al to r: ýe .1 
'ý. i is a fine e; _r, ression of I is iöeas in terry of 
SOC. '-. -I ýi '. 'ltrs i's 'ý/ý r0(ß ýý ance o--, -' the rar-L-dal1 y o his 
1-10--.: 1 '-i'. G z:; 0: .. -, 0i 't': =4 kY O\, -Zee C. 1 
I1E'. i, '.. 1}1ý 1C2.1 bei ec '. '. e he t? ; ý' 
_i -os a 
i; L'Lº. C cor. coDt 0I" 
1 'erleau-Pon ty, Sense a-ne_ Non-Sense, p. C)1,.. 
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of his own capacities for knowledge. 
' This interpretation 
of the human situation, much akin to the Phenomenology of 
Perce-pti on e. rcli d. es any acceptance of absolutes, especially 
God. "Such a metaphysic~ cannot be reconciled with the mani- 
fest content of religion anc' with the positing of an abso- 
lute thinker of the vrorlc?. "2 Acceptance of a transcendent 
God necessitates positing a world as man would like it to 
be. To introduce transcendence is to posit a force behind 
consciousness. "Vertical transcendence" cancels the essen- 
tials of "horizontal" or self-transcendence. 
3 He obviously 
rejects all concepts of transcendence which dilute the human- 
ist notion of self-transcendence. 
In this context it is a bit odd to read his comment 
that Christianity can be viewed positively. Ehri ý; tianity, 
he say, also rejects the "^o, of the nhilosop ers" and 
teaches a "Go'9 who take- or the human condition. " 
tý ':. erleaU. - 
i Oi? "` ' fl0": ZO! ". of :,., , -ý.. (2n 'C is -oco'"1217 ClC3%. 7. 'Cr; if 






.; G rOO:! U . 2' C tý'. O 
'1 C'' 
! Cc. 1r'U1'lc1 
rý 
3, le. rleauz-P-onty will use these two terms, "vertical" 
anc' "horizontal" trans ceneerice in Sims; it is convenient 
to introduce them here. 
L. erleal: -Font; r, ., I 
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it has positive value. Any doctrine which contains a humanist 
element is viewed with respect. 
In an interesting footnote he clarifies the position 
further; he refers again to the conflicts between horizontal 
and vertical transcendence, and rejects the concept of "trans- 
cendence in immanence", which he attributes to i. usserl. The 
explanation for his rejection is simple: "for I am not God, 
and I cannot verify the co-existence of these two attributes 
in any indubitable experience. "1 He excludes at this point, 
a notion of transcendence which would compromise its human 
origins. 
The concluding article in Sense and Non-Sense, written 
especially for the collection, should fill out Lerleau-Ponty's 
position adequately. 2 It corrects our suspicion that Mer- 
leau-Ponty had opted for a militant hu: -nanis? , leaving behind 
the gnawing question of transcendence put forth in Phenomen- 
ology bf Perception. 
The models that one first considers when thinking of 
1lbid., p. 96. The same footnote is interesting in 
another context. The phrase "tranocend. ence in immanence" 
so emphatically rejected here is an appropriate label for 
his conception of transcendence in the period off ontological 
reflections. We need not say more about this at present; 
i.! erleau-Ponty's view in 1947 specifies that this title still 
smacks of postulational thinking. A God who transcends 
consciousness in any respect is not acceptable to the Lebens- 
welt phenomenologist. 
2ýierleau-Ponty, 'ý:. , Sense and Non-Sense, pp. 182 ff. 
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heroism are those of Hegel and Nietzsche. Hegel's hero 
engaged in struggle to attain self-consciousness; he is the 
slave in the first instance, an unhappy consciousness in the 
second, and so on. p`an's vocation is the struggle to gain 
absolute truth, but for Hegel the end is always in sight. 
He struggles only to "realize" the Spirit guiding him; his 
destiny is assured. 
1 Nietzsche's hero on the other hand, 
has no such assurrance, but he also struggles. Social 
morality must be overcome; death is the final opponent. 
His hero is the master, the overman, who overcomes all by 
the strength of his will. 
These models, i.. 'erleau-Ponty says, are the heritage of 
every contemporary, but they d. o not live for us. Men today 
do not have Hegel's assurance, nor do they in light of the 
war, have Nietzsche' s choice of raw power. They ask Neit- 
zsche's questions about death, but they cannot accept the 
answers embodied in his model. 17hat are the viable models 
for heroism? 
Robert Jordan, the hero in ^or ; Vhom the Bell Toll. -,, 
lies wounded. He tells ?.: aria he must die alone, but his 
acceptance of death comes not from a sense of the Hegelian 
pre-determined destiny. Nor does his sense of purpose center 
1This is ,: erleau-Ponty' s vision of Hegel to be sure, but an apt one. Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
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about the 1%ietzschean concentration on transcending all oppon- 
ents. He will die alone but he loves life; his life is em- 
bodied in his relätion with :: aria. In this he is loyal "to 
the natural movement which flings us toward things and toward 
others. "i The viable Model is the man who attempts no final 
escape from solitary death. through religion or the exercise 
of will. He is also unlike the egoist in that he rejoices 
in the rare experience of being with others. Merleau-Ponty's 
humanism is neither a militant individualism nor a blind utop- 
ianism. He says it is a humanism "without illusions". 
No transcendent being exists to shape human expecta- 
tions; nevertheless a kind of faith is suggested. The hero's 
faith centers upon "that very movement which unites us with 
others, our present with our past, and by which we make 
everything have meaning ... . "2 Faith is an attitude of 
confidence that this life has meaning; assuredly, we bear 
the responsibility for making that claim and for realizing 
it, but we claim specifically, that life lived with others 
is worthwhile. In other words, faith is confidence in the 
worth of human interchange. The sphere of meaning is not 
the individual; it is the interpersonal. This 5, s the focus 
for a faith "stripped of its illusions"; the hero has no God, 
1Ibid., p. 186. 
2Ibid., p. 187. 
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but he does have others. 
A sumriation of this period is now in order. Any 
notion of vertical transcendence is rejected. i: erleau- 
Ponty firmly opposes any notion that would take away from 
man the responsibility for his own destiny. "Vertical 
transcendence" has been replaced by "horizontal transcen- 
dence". The peculiar character of self-transcendence is 
that it is not individualistic; it is social and interper- 
sonal. In short, man transcends himself by seeing the social 
world as the center of meaning. 
Social concerns were not forgotten during Merleau- 
Ponty's final years of writing but they were complimented 
by a renewed interest in phenomenological method and aes-,. 
thetics. 1 is thoughts about the concept of transcendence 
during that tin-, e also shifted. : =e no longer sought to spell 
out the differences between himself and theologians. The 
feýv he speaks of religion it is with a sense of appre- 
ciatio", accompanied by his long-standing distaste for 
17's', 7 ;ý onaý 'ractlces. 
ryJ i co _to. _ ý_z ., ~cý. rý. ",. rý _ý in fact., co. nes cloccr 
: 'a>> L, : >>. 'on. ci i-,. 1ýar. 7, "-wan tý, 
" ro he. 'o --nolo, - ". o E, cs: -n T raixä ry into the I, a ýt I eri ors of . _erleau-ronty' s Philosophical Life, rittsbur7h, r)uquesne Univ. Press, 11E ý .; and '? annan, John F., The Fhi. loso-o'iv of erleav-Ponty, York, Harcourt Brace 
and , iorlCt, 1967. 
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to a traditional Christian idea than before. We must keep 
in mind all that was said in the first segment of this chap- 
ter as we review this issue. 
Two brief sources show the shift on transcendence. 
The first is an exploration of the relationships that are 
possible between philosophy and Christianity. 1 Merleau- 
Ponty reviews several alternativest philosophy, as Maritain 
and Gilson conceive it, can have a Christian status; that 
is, thought can so mingle with faith in the thinker that it 
becomes integrated. Merlea. u-Ponty observes that it need 
not become so; 'philosophy has no one essence that dictates 
such an integration; the integration is a matter of praxis. 
But this leaves the theoretical questions of a relationship 
unansý"r^red. '"_alehra., '! cýhe saýr there is an identity between 
rhiiosopr_y and Christianity; what the philosopher "sees" 
is really "natural revelation". 
"Fatural rhilo=: Ohy' :3 concept, invac'o -theology; 
roll`.. ou - tonte-)tr_ invade 
iLat ral irnowlocl '"? i. ", alebranc? )e, 
1r Sr. ) ;rrr !ý i-, -U"orr t .^ '+ Oi ýi lJa, cüI ?F 
-" "C CJ Cv,.. -1. 
nli cv ""ý ' "_h va " -e 
1V 
'e. eri'o-i- i. l q Ian nr 
21bid., 
p. 1' . 
3Aur ustine is auotec : "true reli7ion is true phi. l- 
oeophy; and true philosophy in turn i^ true religion. " Ibir'. l p. 145- 
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of our rational being by religious reversals, introducing 
into it the paradoxical thought of a madness which is wisdom, 
a scandal which is peace, a fight which is gain. "1 ! Reason 
and faith are manifestly not identical; neither are-phil- 
osophy and Christianity. 
i. Laurice Elondel is considered last. Briefly, ' he 
holds that philosophy "asks" while Christianity "answers". 
Philosophy introduces the need for its own reversal; it 
questions what it cannot answer; its "negative" is ful- 
filled by religion's "positive". I; erleau-Ponty asks how 
philosophy, if it is an authentic field of discourse, can 
yield its conclusions to theology. Of course, it cannot. 
At this point he suggests a surprising alternative 
of his own; at least it is surprising in one aspect. "Phil- 
osophy's relationship to Christianity cannot be simply the 
relationship of the positive to the negative, of questioning 
to affirmation. Philosophical questioning involves its own 
vital options, and in a sense it maintains itself within a 
religious affirmation. "2 He does not explain what the "reli- 
gious affirmation" is which exists in philosophy, and he 
goes on to say that presently, the two disciplines "play the 
1Ib d. 
21bid.. 
j p. 146. 
(underlining mine)- 
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role of warring brothers". 
1 ; Nevertheless, there is a sur- 
prising notion of intimacy which was not present before. 
Religion and philosophy cannot have a neat boundary between 
them because their concerns are common. The common ground 
cannot be explained by the question-answer pattern or the 
theory of identity, or just by praxis. But philosophy 
and Christianity do share a common task. They both seek, 
when practiced wisely, to relate men to the truth. 
One qualification is added to this otherwise general 
relationship. Theology must take upon itself, without 
reserve, the "task of mediation". Again, he does not 
explain the terms, but his sentiment is fairly evident. 
As always, he looks askance at "externalized faith", the 
faith that is no faith at all but blind obediance to dogma. 
There is no "mediation" in this form; he thinks of it more 
as a form of propaganda. : 1ediation is that function in 
philosophy of e: _ploring with openness the forms which 
emerge in human experience; we cannot be far afield in 
saying that this is the vocation he commends to the theo- 
logian. 
Elsewhere he elaborates the term mediation; in it O 
we catch the shift in his concept of transcendence. 
'Ibid. 
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ro philosophy has ever consisted in-choosing between 
tray: scendences--for example between that of God and 
that of a human future. They have all been concerned 
with mediating them (with understanding, for example, 
how God makes Himself man or how man makes himself 
God). "? 
Mediation is the peculiar effort of confronting gran 
with the false extremes of vertical and horizontal trans- 
cendence. Neither extreme serves to give the truth about 
existence. 
In saying this, I.? erleau-Ponty tacitly admits a charge 
in his thinking; whereas, vertical transcendence had been 
the mal genie of the middle period, he now adds to it, 
horizontal transcendence. 2 Both blind faith, external 
faith, and self-transcendence are singled out as obstacles 
to truth. In light of'his massive studies on human perception, 
this is indeed, an important change. 
In the same passage he speaks about Christianity. 
ýnr', this ti-: e 'he, sa=tes positively what he believes its 
Con vri'y ition i_ fo tl! 1e false Extremes of ver 
-eital -2' ' ', o_-_i_zontal 
ot, ' Cr ; ýe recorr- ri" 
"^ 
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subordination .... There is a sort of impotence 
of God without us, and Christ attests that God would 
not be fully God without becoming full man. 1 
When we see this in contrast to the preceeding period 
a-marked change is evident. He has-not given up hic critique 
of external faith which would promulgate a God who had 
decided how man should believe. But he claims now, that 
there is a deeper essence to Christianity. It makes an 
authentic contribution to man's understanding of himself; 
Christianity is not, as we first suspicioned, captive to 
the theologian's errors. It teaches with regard to trans- 
cendence that man "becomes, strangely, its privileged 
bearer. "2 
i-lerleau-Ponty's work is not a detailed description 
of the issue of transcendence, but it gives an indication 
where we might begin in stating it, and how we might under- 
stand its relation to i: erleau-Porty's ontology. Philosophy 
and theology, both center upon mediation. The task of 
-niec'iacion Foes bear u, o.: the nuectio ol transcendence; 




' c are f lsc 
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ý1 G. "(-ý. 
" 
', i,. J. o71 ý. n r, l_(J !l ; "; 'r "ý-'-. h'V. 
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1: cr1oau-F on t. y, 
2Ibid. 
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it also indicates that man's self-transcendence cannot em- 
body all that is meant by the term in question. The concept 
of mediation specifies that transcendence would involve a 
relationship between man and God., one that does justice to 
man's responsibility and to the affirmation of meaning 
beyond his own creative capacities. 
The terra that is faithful to these guidelines is the 
very one ferleau-Ponty had rejected during his middle period; 
it is the term "transcendence in inmanence" .1 
O73 S-JRVATI0i? 
S 
To demonstrate the appropriateness of the term, 
"transcendence in it anence", we need to return to the form 
of his ontology. 'Specifically, men, in some encounters, 
are exposed to the mystery of Being. They are opened to 
each other, and through the other's presence, are opened 
to a new aiiarenesc of self. The experience may be termed a 
c isc]. o1ýr. e of o7_E' s own true net>>. re or Lein the disclosure 
forces T . "ra1'cnesr of b -. lo _-. n-ing 
to others and to a world at 
la. r. ý:, ''ins1J .e e=: ýc_ý' is e cccr' a, an or ý. co-a,, ). tc . r. 
with th- n rstery of _,;,. e worF , oi ný , 'r": , tý r " --- eý_ ýý_ . description 
o. ' the r, ', eno-, leron wit' 11iß re-nar1: s On transcerv r_ce, 
c. f., Rabil, Albert, on. cit. Chap. seven. This term 
is used by Rabil also to describe 1, 'erleau-Ponty's position. 
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perhaps we can understand what is meant when Yerleau-Ponty 
says, "-rnan becomes strangely, its (transcendence) privileged. 
bearer. " 
A person comes to know himself through the intersub- 
jective experience as one who opens and is opened by others 
to transcendence. The parties encounter each other and them- 
selves as being instruri: ental in disclosing the meaning of 
their existence. The parties also, in Merleau-Ponty's 
conception, participate in disclosing the mystery of Being; 
people in genuine interaction are the conduites to the exper- 
ience of transcendence. 
This is a different conception than was indicated in 
the early concentration on self-transcendence; the emphasis 
on the intersubjective exchange has grown in importance. 
an does not so much transcend himself; he becomes aware 
that he offers and is offered "what is not himself, " i. e. 
a new sense of belonging to another an-' to the whole worlýý. 
This . n-tcl. 
i;, a re! -.: -onable 5 ni rence when the ontology is 
ar. 'ý'_C' : ". C, ''i-. '. to . 
ý, i; rý', c °i i'i ý", i. ý:. C ro'i^'ý 
, 
ýT 
re i1 ce t of the 3't tir r. "1 C: Lnotil is "CL 
tr, tfb abort _'an arc, 
'-gis Wo}^l(; týýýZ ýta^ ne: 1 no app ^. 1 :. o 
"outs?. C, e force", i. e. vertical transcer1cl. erce. )1, i. t now that 
truth is broader and more mature; t? be new element is that 
ran mediates a truth about hin elf that cannot be confined 
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to himself. He is -? participant in a relationship which 
discloses new meaning about himself, others, and the whole 
of worldly existence; as such he has become party to some- 
thing greater than self-transcendence or self-awareness. 
The focus is upon intersubjectivity itself and the aware- 
ness is that the interhuman is an important opening to the 
meaning of his existence, and to the mystery of the world's 
being. 
The emphasis is still upon worldly existence; the 
realization of being a participant or mediator does not 
betray its humanist context. But the application of the 
term "transcen'. ence in immanence" is none the less appro- 
priate. It is, because the doors have been thrown open so 
to speak; the idea of Tiriedia- 
text than ever before. an 
but what he learns in it is 
g of 'ei .e : Tha11 discuss 
tion has provided a broader con- 
bears the ; veight of mediation 
that he is part of the mystery 
this asý-, ect directly. 
1ý seconrr way of secil1; t-: ^ ap, ropriate1 ess of the 
Ler, . 
"' :. rýar: ýcc:. c. erýcý in i: -- -..: c -" .., - 
to refer a. aýý_n to dis 
c'! -to 10,. -, !ý- 
ýc ý:;: pericnce or -. eir_p cannot ', e confined to 
cucsilo! ', ;; he term mediation 
is not simply another' s pe 
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shortly, mediation opens the participants to What is not 
themselves. It omens them to the mystery or the world's 
being; it opens them to wonder and awe. 
If we remember this lesson from the ontology we can 
then say that transcendence cannot entirely be identified 
as the act of interhuman exchange. It would be much more 
appropriate to say that interhuman exchange is a conduite 
to transcendence. . xchange cannot be bypassed, as man does 
know himself in it as mediator. But, as mediator he cannot 
confine the question of Being to himself or to the exper- 
ience of another. l+'he mystery of Being is the mystery of 
transcendence; the two terms are interchangeable. 
When we say this vie realize very little has been 
done to define the term rein, _, or transcendence. But re- 
flection yields this: does not pertain solely to 
the "fact" that the world e: rists, or as 7erleau-Ponty sale, 
the vi, ai-ol. 0 , world. Thi; j is a r. inimal deduction; hecau;: e 
n --. I -I Oc ic it raust not be 
o .-e 
C0: ? ý_['iC` to c'. of the "nhenom^. al ý 
0 ý:: r, t ýt: i i 1_-"'-'-r'. i; ý L''Z6 
o, opl: eý ? 10 
-Fl. 2c¬; it io. icý,. to o F-ýr " ":: i .ý , _-" eý hiin ýo 
-cf. 'i: C1_ :ýcn in 1111.1. 
term 'ein. means this also; : being is e, --,, -)erienced 
as rrtystery, even silence. : of only does -mediation open men 
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to ask about the meaning of the world, it faces them with 
its apparent mystery. i'erleau-Pontýr hay' something quite 
intimate in mind when he described men in exchange as 
floating on the waves of Peing. At least he meant that 
men truly sensed the mystery of their own existence and. 
the world's. The wonder that summarizes the philosophical 
vocation is an experience of awe, not simply the questioning 
of an onlooker. Lierleau-Ponty did not have the opportunity 
to detail this aspect of his philosophy but it is quite 
evident in The Visible and the Invisible that man confronts 
the mystery of transcendence or Being. The philosophical 
questioner brings one thing to that experience: he inter- 
rogates the experience reflectively; he seeks to know mystery. 
We have su. g ested two ways of viewing ? erleau-Ponty's 
concept of transcendence. Poth drew heavily upon the fore 
and content of his ontology, and are compatible components 
v; 1-_en rut in r: r_ ope -'. s hir; self and others 
to the n? y-tcrJ of r2nsce; 1o 
Ti' ''? j. "fr ^? '"r 1S looked - ,.,, , _. 
t c_^ically, one aues- 
ti. 0 i? vI : ''n COYiC l on. - way 1? 'Q'? 
early conci-: l-'k; rations on perception? 7-ras 
so: ethnin been lost in t'. "hc lon` t_-r-tion : °ro-m militant 
hu: üaniS:.! to the intersub jective i Can we speak with phil- 
osoahica. l credibility about the experience of Being? 
Je shall save this for our concluding chapters. 
PART Ti R-E 
CO:. 'PARATIV. L:, sTUDI=, S 
riusS3RL" S TRAN SC-, * ID NTTAL PI-ENO ENOLOGY 
ITS BEARING ON THE STUDY OF INTERSUBTECTIVITY 
The method of i, erleau-Ponty was outlined briefly in 
an earlier chapter; but it was impossible to trace the devel- 
opment of the phenomenology's content and the methodology at 
the same time. Phenomenological method tends to become a 
subject in its own right. 
We asked immediately above if L_erleau- 'onty' s ontology 
had lost touch with the earlier emphasis upon perception; 
we were, indeed, asking a question which involves method- 
ological discipline. It is an example which should illus- 
trate why we are taking space to discuss the function of 
methodology in phenomenological analysis. 
Put briefly, it is often difficult to tell why "Iler- 
leau-Ponty is making a particular point. When he speaks of 
the tre-ref'lecti. ve as the unique resoi rce for philosophical 
juc? nentý- , why cons he do -o? The ar. wir can be found in 
the prlnci r l'e Of r; 1E' orie oý o is 
.i ('1`=C 
l_'''). lne. Or '! when he 
, flea of 
the lr t. : ', -. ib j_-c tine a, 
- 
th ro 'inan thE, rn of i; 'Ie 
lived vior1d, why does ne ýreal. of it ac, a the-e or "e 4once". 
':. tic an ,,,, zGr, again, is fol'nc in nnoviin, - t'-. e -principles of 
phenomenological analysis. j`:: erleau-lonty often uses the 
terms common 1o methodology but he does not inform the reader 
how he has reached his conclusions or observations. 
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If this is a fault in his work, we are obligated all 
the more to know the tools of phenomenological method. A 
disciplined application of method may help us decide that 
particular truth claims are appropriate. Or, particular 
themes may seem more questionable when evaluated from a 
methodological viewpoint. The proper function of method is 
an issue when evaluating I'erleau-Ponty's work; to under- 
stand its function in his phenomenology- is-our . first objective. 
The best access we have to Merleau-Ponty's peculiar 
use of mod is through Husserl. There is no doubt he 
fashioned his method from a close reading of the father 
of phenomenology. As a young philosopher Merleau-Ponty 
spent a year at the archives in Louvain where Husserl's 
work was being collected and translated. 1 His interest in 
Husserl was rekindled in the early fifties and his peculiar 
interpretation of him was argued more forcibly than before. 
We shall concentrate on ierl. eau-Fonty's use of Husserl's 
discipline. His modification of Husserl is of special 
interest to us. 
Secondly, it is al^o i mnort-ant that runserl' s 
description of intersubjectivity come into focus. Vie shall 
attend to his view of how we can speak about intersubjectivity 
with credibility; this is also a matter dictated by method. 
1The Husserl Archives are under the direction of Fr. Herman Leo VanBreda. 
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Because Husserl is primarily a methodologist, we shall ask, 
does his discipline promote credibility in descriptive 
analysis; or must ideas be 'altered to retain sensibility in 
analysis? Our first concern is: what is the proper func- 
tion of method in describing the intersubjective phenomenon? 
Related to this is the issue of Husserl's position on inter- 
subjectivity: is a position adopted because of a method- 
ological dictum, or does the phenomenon of human interaction 
inform method? Should the lived-world, as tierleau-Ponty 
said, act as the prime resource for reflection? If so, on 
what basis? Can there be a way of relating the lived-world 
concept to methodological procedure? The objective is to 
gain insights into method and its relation to intersubjectivity. 
In order to get at the issue of intersubjectivity 
found in Husserl, we undertake first, the more general task, 
the exposition of his method. Husserl's method is his phil- 
osonhy in one sense; he never ceased refining and expounding 
it. is objectives are easily stated. Husserl was a self- 
conscious inheritor of the Cartesian tradition. Not only is 
his most thorough exposition of Method entitled Cartesian 
: editations; his statements of purpose sound like passages 
directly from the Master. 
Philoso? hy is the supremely personal affair of the one 
who philosophizes. It is the question of his sapientia 
universalis, the aspiration of his knowledge for the 
universal. In particular, the philosopher's quest is for truly scientific knowledge, knowledge for which he 
can ssume--from the very beginning and in every sub- 
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sequent step--coi!: plete responsibility by using his own 
absolutely self-evident justifications "1 
'she purpose of his reflections is properly found in 
the last three words, "absolutely self-evident justifications". 
rierleau-Ponty remarked appropriately, that Husserl saw phil- 
osophy as a "rigorous science" and would strive to make phen- 
omenology its most confident expositor. His goal, as 
Descarte's, is to construct a complete structure upon 
self-evident, -apodigtic truth. 
For Husserl, this meant that philosophy was to be 
"presuppositionless". This is the driving force behind his 
method. His conviction was that philosophy differed from 
the other sciences, notably psychology and logic, in that 
it entertained no assumptions about the world or man. On 
the contrary, philosophy could be the universal science in 
that it discovers a unitary and primal fact about thinking- 
its its essential structure or essence. 
To make this understandable we should translate a 
bit. Husserl did court a presupposition; it was that phen- 
omenology rests upon an unquestionable truth; when he says 
philosophy must be "presuppositionless", this is what he means. 
His watchword is the oft repeated statement, "to'the things 
'Husserl, Edmund, The Paris Lectures, The Hague,, 
: 'artinus ý'i jhoff, 1063, p. 4. An expanded version o? ' this 
quotation is given in., Husserl, Edmund., Cartesian °. -. editati3ns, The ,. ague, : 'artinus ivi jhoff, 1060, pp. 2-3. 
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themselves" (zu Sachen Selbst). `'7'nen this dictum is followed, 
he contends, no presupnositionc are needed or permitted. And 
yet, the watchword itself involves a presupposition about-the 
goal and capability of phenomenological discipline. . 'le shall 
elaborate the content of this particular. pr. esuppositiof 
later in the discussion. 
Though Husserl's objectives are clear, his method is 
not always so. As with many other thinkers, his thought is 
a changing and developing phenomenon. We cannot afford the 
space necessary to elucidate the changes which occur between 
Logical Investigations (1900), and The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology of 1Q314-37. We can 
only indicate the changes germane to our topic; it should 
be assumed that others occurred and are not mentioned due 
to practical considerations. We shall stress those points of 
method which remainec' more or less constant in his development. 
. 7; oreover, .11 .c -- r1' 1 1anýýa_e is not always preci se. 
Ric'-iari Schmitt ha documented 
ran ce! _denta Pn eno. r. eno 1o 
o l, ci .,. cc f _:.. ti ':. . 
, his Geite 
or 
1r`O1o. r '1 
well in his article 
yj ery? I1 We ,, hall 
t ti; iall e. 7"lai n : da 
., e 
'_`, oC- in ar sir 1 if? °Cý. a ? 'Or as' ro r$bZF. This 1 rol 
1', 
"'iý, e. , iUichar. =, "Transcendental Fhenoiien- 
ologys 'Fuddle or "ystery? " Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomeno). o, -y, Vol. 2, Jan . 1071. 
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because we think the confusions are unimportant; they do 
incite objections. But our main argument with Husserl does 
not concern the preciseness of his language; it concerns 
his concept of method and its conclusions. Our criticism 
can be made effectively without dealing with the issue of 
confusing terminology. 
Husserl's method is founded upon his execution of 
"the phenomenological reduction". It is the first, and 
perhaps, most essential of the three reductions which he 
employs. 1 He is much more e: Tplicit than r-lerleau-Ponty ever 
was about it. 
What 1,1ierleau-Ponty called the "pre-reflective", 
Husserl calls "the natural standpoint". When we are engaged 
in hunting for a red -oencil anii st the shuffle on our desk, 
we are completely occia-ried. rte never stop to glAcstion the 
act of. earchin '; we invariably go abo>>t the hunt believing 
that te ereil c : iý-ts. In ro_: e genera]. terns, the d. esl., our 
LIaT)ax.: ', oc'2'-', etc. , re "there" as well. ''The' world, as 
a ?. ': '.. C l4 12 . 'Orr 
' ýlF 
.Ei C7ý^Ci ='_1.021 r 
it l; > i? ^l }: X 21 othC 
1 e c: ýoo^^. 'to i; ý_ti sýeriý sr , ýc tý o»: GS 
1,3.011 C- 6 




-avf t_: ei_.. of 
reduction.; " . rlc t: ink se-pa. rate naming aids clarification, for there are different forms of reflection which will become evident. 
225 
I supposed, .. . "1 This natural attitude characterizes 
all experience; we invariably accept the eyistence of the 
world. 
This attitude also applies to the sciences: the 
object-world is studied by the natural sciences; the exper- 
ience-world is investigated by psychology. 2 Hence, all 
sciences, save philosophy are referrer1 to by Husserl as 
"sciences of the natural standpoint. "3 In their descriptions 
and formulations these sciences automatically rely upon the 
presupposition that the world is "there". It is this stand- 
point that 'Husserl proposes to alter. 
Insteaý now of remaining at this standpoint, we propose 
to alter it radically. Our aim must be to convince 
ourselves of the poss*bility of this alteration on the 
ground's of principle. 
, Iha this "alteration" involves must be stated care- 
fully; it is easy to misunderstand. remember that Husserl 
seeks an unquestionable foundation fo_" philosophy; this means 
that if e1':. rence for truth claims is i la any way partial or 
in_cor: _pl6t:., it must be put out of p12. . Perfection of 
1_ Berl, ý r1-rvnd ,, Gir . , W. R. -, oyce, 
?, onroi'?, ^E.. - . Allen an(" 'Tnwir_ L_t' ., 1c ', p. n4. 
2". '. i. --cirrce refers to tr, e and before that, 
OrC'I t Ii fE, a Ir. FP. --- , ý, "-lleý:, re 
'- ce to it. Trat th 
being of t. _e eiorlrl precede- everythin, - else is so obvious 
that no or, ý- thinks to articulate it j' a sentence. " Husserl, 
;., The Faris Lectures, p. 6. 
3 T--id. 
1 ý, I "ý 
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evidence yields apodicticity for Husserl, and this is what 
he is after. 
We are advised to reconsider our acceptance of the 
fact-world. Is it not true that we suffer from illusions 
about the existence of particular things? The red pencil 
may not be there; certainly, my failure to find it opens 
the door to doubt. If doubt is possible with regard to a 
particular sensible thing, the evidence for its existence 
cannot be apodictic. And if this is true of particulars 
it can also be true of existence in general. 
It sounds as if Husserl is employing the familiar 
tool of Descartes--methodic doubt. But once we amplify 
what he means by "altering" the natural attitude, the unique- 
ness of his method becomes apparent. The natural stand- 
point is "suspender"; we "disconnect" ourselves from it. 
Husserl means that judgments about the object-world are going 
to be withheld. '.. c say neither, "ycsi, there is my desk", 
nor "no, I doubt t' . '+. 
t it is tigere". This is different than 
: fescart. =, ' rct:... oc i_ doubt; escartes, -Ploy was to cxerci ý-, e 
scti C _. , 
ý. E 17. Ci . it . -t Coui 
, 'CCCO"". E 
, rour_c'e in certai i' rcvotly, ! ý; SC C'1 COitý! ': E; ý s 
1ýhe r; ford l, ýr to drain fro' N. i1Ci t 
involve a p. _Ie. urr. o . ion Li7r p} iJ_o op". Or 
LIn a, zoitio, to this ^rnll, arg I think aca(lemic 
tifference, ?. user: empha izes that Descartes' motivation to 
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is the truly disinterested one; only in that disinterest 
will objectivity become attainable. 
The natural attitude is "bracketed"; Husserl views 
our ready acceptance of the world as "an unacceptably naive 
belief. We can no longer accept the reality of the world 
as a fact to be taken for granted. It is a hypothesis that 
needs verification. "1 Bracketing serves to neutralize our 
acceptance. The phenomenological reduction is an epoche, 
an abstention. Once existence is placed in brackets, it 
may be considered cooly and "objectively"; at least this is 
Husserl's intention. This is the purpose of the phenomen- 
ological reduction. 
We can save our main critism until we have described 
the other reductions, but I think it is wise to bring up one 
thing here. Husserl's phenomenological reduction invloves 
somethin_: quite different than it did for rerleau-Ponty. 
It would appear the two agreed that suspension of judgment 
abort e- otence merely seckE to uproot the pr. esuppositiorIs 
we 1); _. v, e:: peria ce. '., lit r'oe: ', i. r'o so hE. re, as with 
doubt r_-.;.. tence is We 
ul, 
T iýl. ý 1'E 3_n t-C v 
are never' gwestione(... 
1_i taken. ':: It he also says that eý- 
nor:::,, s « rive,. fro: "' --ci c? ice and theology eýcýrtes' active (20,11--t becomes an 
an sub tance 
l: -usserl, E. , The Faris T_ectures, p. F. Elsewhere he says, "in spite of the continual experiencedness of the 
world, a non-being of the world is conceivable.,, Husserl, 
ý:. , Car. ` sinn r'editati. ons, p. 17. 
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ii. erleau-Ponty, in order to sharpen our knowledge about 
experience, or does it move in a different direction? 
A different direction is implicitly given with 
Husserl's notion of the world. as "hypothesis". That we 
could. regard existence as a hypothesis, carries with it 
an idea which will blossom in the next reduction, that is, 
Husserl's concentration upon pure consciousness. We shall 
explain this below, but it is evident even at this early 
stage, that the phenomenological reduction is not employed 
to put man back in touch with raw experience. It is not 
used to increase our knowledge of experience, or to reopen 
our wonder at the world. Rather, it is used to strip away 
a partially certain world, to gain a "scientifically cer- 
tain" one. 
'ghat we discover upon using the oheno; nenologieal 
reduction ia lesson of central importance to Pusserl. 
''dt, l the Sllt. iý(n io; ' of aot everything out there, 
it heco'"f s (--%7J. ient 1; ha-" I I've e; 'erc)_Sed ac! 
captly orr 1. Y12. 'ß '. r'. 1,1 G'"týE'. iýý o- '-%: er wor(I: , 
the sul--lect 
Eý:: FýC 
accep L0. LI. r " ý: 
ý. ,. Liý. i: Onl 
be G, 1l71f. 
?. G. O: ý! t "ý"_`C r_, ' ctt10_ a; =: V. 1 Oý. Cnc _ 'ß 
:1C 
device i---, Employ eC, the sub J ective Character o: the natural 
standpoint becomes clear. 
Two paths are now oven to the philosopher; he can 
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study the ways in which this thesis operates e. g. in per- 
ception or imagination, as did . 7erleau-Ponty and Sartre. 
Or he can, as Russen did, concentrate on finding principles 
innate to the subject which seem to explain how man comes 
to a. ffir_r_ a world. The search for the pencil illustrates 
these alternatives. The existentially oriented philosopher 
seeks to describe the subject's search in terms of its 
experiential modes; he concentrates on the ways we search 
for the pencil. His focus inevitably involves dealing with 
the subject's acceptance of the world; it describes and 
interprets the various ways that acceptance is carried out. 
This is not so with Husserl's alternative. We are advised 
to extract the meaning of searching from the phenomenon of 
searching. Finding what is essential in the phenomenon 
of searching does not involve dealing with the subject's 
"world-thesis. "l Teliefs, actions, and memories are phen- 
oMenal "ors!!, wh cl- rniýst loe hrac__e-'.; er. 1 he only thing 
essential. 'i; o ""9archif31º is that te 51_-jeet initiates it 
w2, we co. ',, it_'t¬, 
. is cor_cJ_l.::, io t? :e col -I 
co: 'cee', -`ra. te on the 
for: » .i will foci, our attention on 




This is the meaning Husserl assigns to the eidetic 
reduction. The structures of subjectivity become increas- 
ingly evident through the persistant use of eidetic reduction; 
the eidos is invariably, the "constituting" activity of the 
subject. The meaning of experience, rests upon this 
invar- 
iable structure; it is certain, that "I think I see a house" 
even though it is not certain that "I see a house" or that 
"a house is there". Experienced objects have been bracketed, 
even the certainty of perceptions has been suspended; what 
remains is the "I think". This is the specific conclusion 
of the eidetic reduction; it is the certainty, the apodicticity 
of the ego cogito. 
How Husserl interprets the eZo cogito, takes us to 
the final reduction; it represents his most radical break 
with Descartes. He did not rest his case with the Cartesian 
concept of the ego. Descartes believed that his discovery 
signaled the "end" of methodic doubt. For Husserl, it 
signaled the call to an even more radical discovery. 
In relation to this we must under no circumstances 
take for -granted that, with our apodictic and pure 
ego, we have salvaged a small corner of the world as 
the single indubitable fact about the world which can 
; 'Je disagree, but it is wise to be patient with 
Husserl on this. Vie are indebted to Frank Tillman for the 
illustration. Vide., Solomon, Robert, C., ec. Phenomenology 
and Existentialism, p. 33-37 
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be utilized by the philosophizing ego. It is not true 
that all remains to be done is to infer the rest of 
the world through correct deductive procedures according 
to the principles that are innate to the ego. 
1 
- 
Husserl holds that the Cartesian formula, cogito er7o 
sum, (fie -pense, donc 'exist) utilizes the notion of causality 
to reconstruct the existential domain. 
2 Descartes' ergo, 
Husserl would say, attempts to connect a transcendental 
cogito to an existential fact-world. If the reduction is 
faithfully employed, Descartes' connection must be denied. 
The suspension of existential claims rightly includes the 
"I"; as an exitential entity it cannot be inferred if the 
reduction is to be complete. Descartes' had come to the 
edge of a great discovery but he failed to press the reduction 
to its rightful conclusion. Husserl employs the reduction 
with a rigorous singlemindedness; every existential judgment 
is being bracketed. How Husserl conceives the ego can now 
be specified. "By phenomenological epoche I reduce my 
natural human Ego and ? my psychic life--the realm of my 
psychological self-experience--to my transcendental-phen- 
or"7enological self-experience. "3 
The ego, under the transcendental reduction, is not 
a concrete ego, a self; it is a "purified Ego", "a consciousness 
sý usserl, 'ý. , r-he Paris Lectures, p. c. 
2Ibid. 
; vide. , Husserl, . Cartesian : ', editationr, 
pp. 25-26. 
3itusserl, L., Cartesian -. edi-ta pions , p. 26. 
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fror: 1 which all transcendencies have been rerloved. We quote 
his rather surprising conclusion. 
This : ego, with his ago-life, who necessarily remains 
for rye, by virtue of such e-oochb, is not a piece of 
the world; mid if he says, 'I exist, SI, 7o conto' , that 
no longer signifies, - 'I, this man exist'. No longer 
am I the man who, in natural self-experience finds 
himself as a man and who, with the abstractive restriction 
to the pure contents of 'internal' or purely psychological 
self-experience, finds his own pure mens sive animus sive 
intellectus; nor am I the separately considered psyche 
itself. 
The consciousness that Husserl has in mind is a 
"pure" or "flowing" -Ego. 
His ego is not the experiencing, 
valuing, doing ego, that is a self in touch with the world; 
it is conceived of as an ego which remains after all these 
elements are extracted. What is left over, he calls the 
transcendental ego. 
It is not easy to find illustrative material for 
Husserl' s notion. Flow can we, in principle use any worldly 
example? The closest we can co-..,. e is by using an idea which 
Husserl himself rejected, the idea of substance so often 
found in the scholastics. 2 Substance is properly contrastec' 
with material existences; it is a "general thing", a concep- 
tual expression or -principle underlying the material world. 
Husserl's consciousness is a principle or ranifled "entity" 
which is supposed to explain a given ego's experience of the 
1Ibid., 
p. 2j. 
2Ibid., p. 24. 
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world. (I would not want to push the parallel further. ) 
By pressing the reductions to their ultimate con- 
elusion, E'usserl believes he has uncovered. the one self- 
evident truth. Only consciousness as a transcendental con- 
sciousness, a disembodied ego, can observe disinterestedly, 
the experienced world and the psychic or individual ego. 1 
The objective of phenomenology has been reached; the 
value of the attainment is as follows. The philosopher 
can now speak with certainty. Our world is subjectively 
constituted, both things and ourselves. Given this obser- 
vation the thinker can base all else on certainty. The 
method has yielded its intended function, apodictic truth. 
We are tempted to say that Husserl has chosen an odd 
way of justifying the claim that our experience of the world 
is subjective. But this does not go far enough. 
The transcendental spectator places himself above him- 
self, watches himself', an., -3 sees ... 
im^eJ f as the pr eviously 
work' imr, ersed ego. In othsr words he discovers that 
he, c^. _a being, e; "; i Sts v:, ' t in himself as a co %"- 
i through the cor: s-: ýo: --:, in co-r3_ta. , iones , 
r, c - iscovc_-s the tran. scenc1er_tel li. feýan-, reing which 
r. ', ake ,, p (t'_ie) to talit; r o' t'ze ý; orl '. 
Te e_°'"ect of thi- is. ' ,, ý': ?:. 7.10r)-5 ärnear to man 
o' ýc t-., as ý. -6,. 01-. S' .., -o `, _ c-.:, a t! -lought e!, -`er- 
1, 
O'; ý, 0"C?: 01_O. "? _. 
1_ G"i -. 
G':. ý', 1,11fili i 
enocb-b. e, co-irists in that T reach e u1__timate e erientia1 
L-nc cognitive persnec rive thinkable. In it I become the 
disinterested .1 ectator of my natb! ral end Avorldly ego 
and its life. " Husserl, ..:. , Faris. {Leectures, p. 15. 
?: _Lasscrl, ., The Faris 1 ectý-,. rcz , p. 16. 
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tained and possessed in the transcendental sphere. Ian's 
thought of himself must also be included; the ego is a 
thought possessed by a transcendental ego. Husserl's 
idealism is unrestrained. 
1 His method has taken him to 
the limits of radical reflection; it now deserves interpre- 
tive comment. 
Husserl's first proposal, to alter the natural atti- 
tude, is a necessity if one attempts description in a reflec- 
tive manner. Whether we speak of this as an "alteration of 
the natural attitude", or not, it is still necessary to 
recognize that the experienced world is being thrown into 
question with the advent of reflection. '? hen the ordinary 
language philosopher asks "what do you mean ... ?" he 
is challenging us to interpret experience, to stand apart 
fron it for a duration to become critical of it and our 
language about it. When the e: -istential-phenomenologist 
counsels the phenomenological reductio_ý, he is also asking 
i, s to withdraw fro: ) the raivete of 'r , erier_ce, to look 
, ix-or ;. t critic, -ill.;, T. Car -.. ---ar- ncthoý': i. c rolint i; l pcrha. p 
t' e Cl". ' sic e, -a. rnrlc3 0, Is r, cv ,. T that the 
ro oncl_; ý-ical ct . o:: 
i: J: ý`ý ,- -i ic objective of. 
-0 A. 
1"Carrie, ] out v! i. th this systematic concreteness, 
pheno: r, enolo y is co ipso 'transcend. Fnta1. idealirr'". 
riusscr1, ; _. , 
Cartesian . ý«er'it'ations, p. 86. 
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practitioners of philosophy; it is more a call to the crit- 
ical attitude, and is shared by all who undertake to do phil- 
osophy. Husserl cannot be thought of as an original thinker 
at the level of his first proposal, the phenomenological 
reduction. 
A small indication of Husserl's direction was given 
in that first move, however; it did infer that the world's 
existence must be a "hypothesis" for the phenomenologist. 
The outcome was further suggested in his second move, the 
eidetic reduction. Few existential phenomenologists would 
deny Husserl's contention that forms of consciousness become 
clear with the eidetic reduction. Merleau-Ponty would agree 
with Husserl on this. But Merleau-Ponty held fast to the 
position that the eidos which was discernible pertained to 
our experience of objects and others, and not to the singular 
idea that the human subject constitutes perceptions, actions 
and valuations. Husserl and "_erleau-Ponty part ways at this 
point. L: erleau-Ponty held that, although consciousness 
"belongs" to the subject, it is alý, wways a consciousness of 
other things and -people. Husserl failed to make this obser- 
vation; it is easy to see how subjective constitution became 
his preoccupation. It stood out as an independent truth. Its 
evidence was indubitable, whereas "consciousness of .. ." 
indicated truths which could not claim certainty as their norm. 
When we come to the final and radical reduction, the 
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transcendental reduction, 1usserl's choice to concentrate 
on human subjectivity becomes clear. It strikes me as a 
choice for two reasons. The first is Husserl's conception 
of phenomenology; he conceived of it as a transcendental 
discipline. He calls his method a "transcendental pheno: en- 
ology". The guiding principle behind this is the conviction 
that phenomenology must rest on indubitable truth; its 
findings must be apodictic. He believed because of this, 
that study of subjective consciousness was the only meaning- 
ful topic for phenomenology. 
The second reason is that Husserl had to contend with 
a major finding in his own work. With the eidetic reduction 
we could see clearly that man "intends" his experience of 
the world; it is his consciousness of ... things that 
characterizes all experience. That this is an activity of 
consciousness seems clear to both the existential and the 
transcer_c'ental rhenome_roJ. oýistt. . v. t ýserl held that this 
activity 0-7 cox cio A mess w. -. co: lýle'ýel; r "w; thin" conryc3. o is- 
nec ^; it 1a. ý' 'ro rE--er -nec to -', e' \. orlr- "o,, th r". A 
ýtcl 
C) 0 
CO; ý':: ]. QLI^ lE ;s . `l^ 
C (n. 0 
CC- t t' 
reality are, e-, c----r-'-s the nc e by 
which consciousness is interrogated. r11. lC Cartesian 
:.. ecitations draw all the consequences of such a dc- 
cision with an exemplary Philosophic courage. The 
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return to the ego leads to a monadism according to 
which the world is primordially the sense that my 
ego lays out. 
The turn toward the subject did involve a choice for 
ýHusc3erl. We think it was a wrong one, one which excludes 
all sense of interaction with a world, but it should be 
appreciated in light of his first decision. If phenomen- 
ology is to be apodictic, then the reduction must be taken 
as Husserl outlined. There is a certain logical strength 
in his persistence. By refraining from all existential 
judgments the phenomenologist is limited. to what is "left 
over". And it is quite clear that the human subject is 
and remains conscious, once the world is put in brackets. 
His consciousness is all that is left over. 
But should this excuse us fro-,, -, i seeing the mistake 
of his decision? Need phenorlenology employ self-evidence 
or apoclicticity as the only measure of truth? If it is 
not coy : -_. ttec' to his first choice th n the eidetic reduction 
r e' not si nr: 1e out trans cei-uientalism the one truth about 
J na ure of coin sciousr ess . 
In Ot?: f 1 WOY rl, slf we are 
].?. 'ý_ 2tc fron t' 
_ 
1nor' 0= _17ý)0. iCJ_': 'ý: j_ wý arc ttý'd 
1t: co: i , ,, r- ti o to ^ee hot' =i"c s of conscio; nsnes; 
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Consciousness is consciousness "in" the subject in 
a real sense. Our perception of objects or others 
is always 
ours; it can not Üe identified. with arother's consciousness 
or intentional activity. nut equally true and, perhaps, more 
important, consciousness always behoi is others and interacts 
with the world; if it is not the same as another's, it is 
nevertheless, always related to others and things. The 
truth of this claim is as evident as Husserl's. "Consciousness 
of .. ." 
is as primordial a 'truth about consciousness as 
"consciousness in". The difficult but necessary course for 
the phenomenologist is to show this by using Hussorl's own 
tool, the eidetic reduction. 
The dual truth about consciousness cannot be shown 
effectively by merely stating it; it can, however, be uncov- 
ered in every effort to "reduce". äerleau-Ponty attempted 
to express this when he said. the main. truth about phenomen- 
ological reduction is that it can't be completed. He could 
have stated his case another ww: ay; namely, the eidetic reduc- 
tion when faithfully employe(, does show that there are two 
"sides" to consciousness, i. e. "consciousness in" and "con- 
sciousness of". 
1 It is through the second reduction that 
fror etrample, the subject's claim to "be conscious" 
holds within it the very exercise of consciousness toward an 
"object"; i. e. it is a consciousness of the self. The claim 
to have a consciousness of anything (even if we make no judgment 
about its existence) is eo ipso, a claim c1enonstrating inten- 
tionality. In the same sense, consciou5neUs of the world can- 
not be bracketed even when judgment about its existence is. 
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one comes to understand the nature of consciousness. The 
counter argument to :? usserl's is best formulated by using 
his own method , partic, ý,. _larly the first two reductions. 
A . certain "price" 
is paid when phenomenological 
method is conducted this way. The notion of "self-evidence" 
may pertain to the phenoinenologict's demonstrations of two 
sides of consciousness, but with that, certainty ceases to 
be an inportant measure in phenomenological reflection. 
That is, once intentionality becomes justified as the staple 
for a concept of consciousness, we enter the sphere of 
describing phenomena. The element of contingency is intro- 
duced. We can be certain about being conscious of the world 
but we cannot be certain about the "objects" which conscious- 
ness intends. "erlea, i-Fonty made this abundantly clear in 
Phenorenology of Fercertior.; t', e conti. ngency of our "kno: a- 
ledge about" the world is a. necessary counter-cart to op. r 
certain in i.. 
coi, cept o`", _j"i^ , ýcE. 'ý ; uct re ]_ý. ce 'li er1' 5 notion 
of ße1: '- vir, --c ;. Y, r F: o. : 'oio_icaJ. %ý-; s, c: ril ; ion. A air. 
Li. 
d ý jr t 5(_: pro ')c 
v of "J-VC- 
i, 
c J. tc 
Y'ý. t. 1C mho certainty of 
'acc-ass J-o a live:. -:; or1c au, r-' of: 1 r: = it ýýor_', L..., not lp oviae 
certali1 Jý a-out J'". ^. J l'0: -l 'Io 
if i .- -Je-ýional ty is c; L. ly 
recognizes). 
'. 'ith regp. rr to T; usseri_, it is impossible for the 
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existentially oriented phenomenologist to follow him in 
the third reduction to transcendentalism. We are restrained 
because we take the conclusions of the eidetic reduction ser- 
iously. Merleau-Ponty did this, but quite often he neglected 
to explain his procedure. If eidetic forms are to be con- 
sidered c1edible the procedure should be explained; there is 
no merit in the philosopher hiding his method. 
And the conclusions are important when the eidetic 
reduction "ends" with consciousness of the lived-world. If 
consciousness of the lived-world cannot be put out of play, 
there is no such thing as a "pure ego", and there is no such 
thing as a purely transcendental sphere of reflection. 
Oddly, we agree with Husserl's comment that "transcendental 
subjectivity is an intersubjectivity" but we interpret it 
quite differently; the intersubjective nature of conscious- 
ness dictates that we put quotation marks over the term 
transcendental in his quotation. Merleau-Ponty's work 
does serve to make us aware of that requirement. 
Before we proceed to analyze Husserl's notion of 
intersubjectivity, two topics should be discussed briefly. 
It is important that we understand Husserl's peculiar use 
of the concept, intentionality. Once we catch the signi- 
ficance of that usage, his work on intersubjectivity becomes 
more understandable. Secondly, we need to comment further 
on Husserl's notion of the "split ego", his distinction 
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between the transcendental Ego and the concrete ego. 
Repeatedly, Husserl stresses the importance of 
intentionality for carrying out his method. This occurs 
in Ideas, is maintained in Cartesian Meditations, and is 
heavily emphasized in the "Crisis Lectures". Merleau-Ponty 
claimed that Husserl's concept of intentionality led him 
to tacitly give up transcendentalism in the last years of 
his writing. 1 We disagree with this view; we hold that 
intentionality, whether nominally observed or strongly 
emphasized, always functioned as "the clue" to a transcen- 
dental phenomenology. 2 Admittedly, the experienced world 
incites Husserl's reflections--it did so for his forerunner, 
Descartes. Intentionality, for him, is a phenomenon which 
must be explained and made philosophically credible. But 
when Husserl undertakes an explanation of intentionality, 
he is driven by his objective to obtain. a "first phil- 
osophy", and that is fulfilled only by clinging to the rule 
of apodicticity. Intentionality, because it cannot obtain 
the element of certainty, must be put aside; it can function 
1Vide., Merleau-Ponty, M., Primac of Perception, 
pp. 88=89,92-03. 
2Vide., Cartesian Meditations, pp. 47-53. He uses the term "the clue" there to justify his studies of inten- tionality; his position as we have noted is an extreme idealism. The following illustrations for this same con- 
cept come from the "crisis" period in order to show that he retained the goal of transcendentalism even when he turned to an extensive study of the lived-world. 
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as an opening to "transcendental reflection", but no more. 
That Husserl remained faithful to this position is 
evident even in the last period of his writing. It is not 
always clear, however, that the earlier call to certainty 
was heeded unequivocally; Husserl strugLled in the "Crisis 
Lectures" to bridge the gap between the problems posed by 
a concept of intentionality and his life-long quest for 
apodictic truth. 
The life-world is the world that is constantly pre- 
given, valid constantly and in advance as existing, 
but not valid because of some purpose of investiga- 
tion, according to some universal end. Every end 
presupposes/it; even the universal end of knowing it 
in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance; 
and in the course of (scientific) work it presupposes 
it ever anew, as a world existing in its own way (to 
be sure), but existing nevertheless. 1 
This emphasis upon the life-world, new certainly when 
viewed in light of his Cartesian Meditations, would seem to 
exclude the transcendental reduction and a concept of tran- 
scendental consciousness. The a priori is the lived-world 
and it cannot be put out of play. But Husserl also believed 
that a conflict occurs when the above emphasis is not balanced 
by an-understanding of the philosophical vocation. He did 
not give up transcendentalism for a philosophy of intention- 
ality and the Lebenswelt, because of his acute awareness 
for the following form of questioning. 
1Husserl, E., The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, Carr, D., trans., Evanston, 
Northwestern Univ. Press., 1970, p. 382. 
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But now the paradoxical-question: can one not (turn) 
to) the life-world, the world of which we are all 
conscious in life as the world of us all, ... can 
one not survey it universally in a changed attitude, 
and can one not seek to get to know it, as what it 
is, and how it is in its own motility and relativity, 
make it the subject matter of a universal science, 
but one which has by no means the goal of a universal 
theory in the sense in which this wap sought by his- 
torical philosophy and the sciences? 
The immediate question was not answered fully in 
this last period; the "Crisis Lectures" were never finished. 
But the alternative form of inquiry suggested above is 
that of transcendental subjectivity. The passage's "changed 
attitude" infers his acceptance of the transcendental reduc- 
tion. The fact that he eschews the metaphysics of historical 
philosophy, does not preclude the introduction of the science 
of pure consciousness. 2 Husserl emphasizes that his alterna- 
tive is different from previous philosophies, and is different 
also from other sciences. Transcendentalism is a necessity 
if one seeks to fulfill the philosophical vocation. That 
vocation is to explain how man comes to understand his own 
order of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's appraisal failed to 
emphasize Husserl's persistant objective. 
What is new in the crisis period and must be recog- 
nized in light of Merleau-Ponty's interpretation is that 
Husserl struggles to expose the necessity for transcendent- 
lIbid., p. 383. 
2Ibid. 
9 p. 389-395. 
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alism on a different plane than before. In his reacquaint- 
ence with intentionality Husserl realizes that "the phil- 
osopher, ... is in the position of not being able to pre- 
suppose any pregiven philosophy, his own or another, since 
the possiblility of a philosophy as such, as the sole phil- 
osophy, is to be his problem. "1 
Intentionality poses difficult problems when the 
objective is developing a doctrine of transcendental sub- 
jectivity; Husserl recognized them. Although we think the 
obstacles along the way are insuperable, and do preclude 
any-notion of a'pure consciousness, for Husserl they did 
not. "Later it will be understood, " he says, "that none 
of the expositions of this work are dispensable to it and 
its task of leading up to a transcendental phenomenology. "2 
As Husserl saw it, the immediate task of the phenomenologist 
is to expose the structures of intentionality; but the on- 
goirflg task is to establish intentionality as "the clue" to 
transcendental subjectivity. Everything about intentionality 
must be read with that in mind. This consideration alters 
Iiierleau-Ponty's appraisal and shows that the two thinkers 
are farther apart than iverleau-Ponty assumed. 
About the egology: Husserl devised the notions of 
1Ibid., p. 351 (underlinkng mine) 
2Ibid. 
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a pure ego and a concrete ego to satisfy the demands of 
transcendental logic. The "split" of the egos was the last 
essential step in formulating a purified transcendentalism. 1 
It also set the stage for dealing with the problem of others; 
that is, the transcendental ego and the empirical ego, 
being separate, pose the problem of a transcendental solipsism. 
His concept of the transcendental (purified) ego was reached 
only through a persistant exercise of the reduction which 
cut it off from every transcendence, even Descartes' "I". 
The transcendental ego is "alone"; Husserl's critical eye 
misses very little here. Solipsism is a real problem for 
the transcendental phenomenologist. 2 And the first step 
towards reconstructing the world phenomenologically, is to 
reconstruct the relation between the transcendental ego 
and its "I". 
The way Husserl reconstructs this relation must be 
understood, for the phenomenological reconstruction of the 
relation between self and others is managed in the same way. 
1"If the Ego as naturally immersed in the world, 
experientially and otherwise, is called 'interested' in the 
world, then the phenomenologically altered--and so altered, 
continually maintained--attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes 
himself as disinterested onlooker, above the naively interested Ego. " Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations p. 35. 
2"When I, the meditating It reduce myself to my 
absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological eýýoche do I not become Solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long 
as I carry on a consistant self-explication under the name 
phenomenology? " Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations p. 89. 
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Heretofore we have touched on only one side of this 
self-constitution, we have looked at only the flowing 
cogito. The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing 
life but also as I, who live this and that subjective 
process who liver through this and that cogito as the 
same I., 
' 
He is again making use of intentionality as the clue; 
but now it is the clue to a reconstruction of the "I". The 
effect of this move, made in the context of a "purified" 
ego, is that the thinker retains both the certainty of his 
transcendental ego and the "possibility" of being a self. 
2 
Why does he say that the concrete ego is a "possibility"? 
Because certainty pertains only to the completely reduced 
or transcendental ego. He has opened the door, he believes; 
the concrete "I" is a possibility because the association 
is made solely by the transcendental ego. The j'pure I" 
sees itself as being associated with a self; the foundation 
of certainty has thus far been retained. 
There are two ways, he says, of making this associations 
active genesis, and passive genesis. Active genesis is the 
purified ego's intentional activity; it is "productively 
constitutive"; in this form "belong all the works of practical 
1Ibid., p. 66. 
2lbid., p. 71. 
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reason. "1 Active genesis can never, of itself, yield cer- 
tainty. It is an inference. Intentionality belonged to 
the same genre; all it could account for was the possibility 
of there being an empirical ego. But the occurrence of 
active genesis must be explained and this cannot be done 
on its own terms. "It is owing to an essentially necessary 
genesis that I. the ego, can experience a physical thing 
and do so even at first glance. "2 
Husserl suggests that it is inescapable and certain 
that there are eidetic laws ! governing active genesis. Those 
laws are "passive genesis", or passive synthesis. The ego 
knows itself as a predicating ego; this is an immediate, 
self-evident truth, discovered passively--without infer- 
ence; 
3 Hence, passive genesis is the form of the ego's 
activity. This is an essential eidos; the world has been 
bracketed along with the self, but the Ego persists in 
knowi itself as a constituting or predicating Ego. In 
terms of the immediate topic, it is the law of passive 
genesis that explains the association between the pure Ego 
llbid., p. 77. His allusion to Kant is suggestive. 
Kant held that the sphere of practical reason was outside 
the sphere of knowledge or theoretical reason. Of course, 
Husserl will agree; he is interested in demonstrating the 
certainty of the association. 
21bid., p. 74. 
31bid., p. 80. 
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and the concrete "I", the self. 
The principle of passive genesis is supposed to be 
the certainty-bearing form of association between a disem- 
bodied ego and a self. 1 
Does this mental association produce the certainty 
of an empirical ego? Not so by his own definitions. Once 
the transcendental reduction has been made, the philosopher 
cannot revert to purely existential judgments. That is, 
the reconstructed self is contained as a thought in the pure 
consciousness; it is a self which makes sense only as a 
constituted self, a self given credibility by the transcen- 
dental Ego. "Precisely thereby every sort of existent itself, 
real or ideal, becomes understandable as a 'product' of trans- 
cendental subjectivity, .. . "2 
Husserl must be admired for following his adopted 
method so rigorously; he has not made the Cartesian leap 
from transcendental principle to existential judgment. The 
"I" is a thought product of the pure Ego. Husserl claims, 
of course, that this association amounts to an authentic 
remarriage, a philosophically important one. When passive 
1"The universal principle of passive genesis, for 




genesis is established as the element of certainty in assoc- 
Tation, it can provide the foundation for an understanding 
of others as well as self. The I conceived of as a self 
is the opening wedge to a "transcendental intersubjectivity". 
But it seems to me that the remarriage between pure 
and concrete ego is a peculiar one at best. The concrete 
ego is not "empirical" at all, if we take Husserl's method 
seriously. The self is given sense only as a thought-object. 
Apart from its being thought, it has no certainty and cannot 
be used as the springboard for understanding the life-world. 
Again, Husserl is aware of this problem, even though he 
settles upon a solution we deem inadequate. His method 
dictates that the outside world is always a "thought for 
us" and never an "in itself for us". We hold that Husserl 
will never succeed in developing the criterion of certainty 
in his reconstruction of the life-world. The notion of 
association, whether sustained as an eidetic law or not, 
is still a second-order law when compared to the self- 
evidence which establishes the transcendental ego. 
A great effort is made to counter our evaluation 
and we shall follow him closely. The law of association 
explained above is also used to obtain an understanding of 
others. Particularly when he deals with the question of 
how others also "constitute", the law of association is 
cast in its most radical form. Husserl is acutely aware 
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at that point that his phenomenology encounters an obstacles 
if everything is self-constituted, how can there be consti- 
tuting by others? For there to be any convincing doctrine 
of intersubjectivity, the reality of the other's conscious- 
nesses must be dealt with. But he does not attempt to 
explain the issue at this point. This to me, is a most 
serious shortcoming; he delays any solution. 
First, he addresses himself to another problem, the 
problem of constituting others as objects. Are other 
people to be construed as thought-objects? Consistent 
with the transcendental objective, the first requirement 
to be met is the reduction of the sphere of others, to 
"ownness". 1 This term again refers to the bracketing of 
all transcendence , leaving the residuum as a transcendental 
truth. Other subjects and all data, which emanate from 
others (e;.. g. sense data) are suspended. "We disregard all 
constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately 
or mediately to other subjectivities. "2 
The result of this reduction is similar to the 
remarriage of the two egos. All sense data are alien to 
1Vide., Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, pp. 92 ff. 
"Ovmness" is a new term in the text. It is synonomous with 
the transcendental reduction. 
2Ibid., p. 93. 
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ownness, as are all judgments pertaining to the existence 
of others. But it cannot be denied that the Ego-self 
retains in its_ consciousness, "a unitarily coherant stratum 
of the phenomenon world. "1 With all existential claims 
bracketed, he observes it is still true that consciousness 
sees itself as constituting a world of others. And this 
stratum of consciousness accounts for the possibility of 
an actual experienced world. He stresses that the objectiv- 
ity of this truth is not to be found in immediate claims 
for the existence of others and their consciousnesses. 
The claim is still circumscribed by "ownness"; or the trans- 
cendental reduction. 
Husserl is making two moves; the first is the brack- 
eting effort which propels us into the sphere of ownness. 
All "objectivities" become constituted objectivities--"I 
know I think the table is there". Every bracketed existen- 
tial becomes the possession of one's own consciousness. But 
with this comes the other side of that truth; what is in 
the possession of one's own consciousness is a consciousness 
of the other, or the world. On the one hand, consciousness 
of .... 
(intentionality) has been brought home, so to 
speak, to its proper sphere, transcendentalism. But trans- 





The logic is somewhat convincing. If the stratum 
of pure consciousness : includes a consciousness of others, 
we are not solus ipse. The transcendental sphere is not 
divorced from the sphere of the consciousness of others. 
It must be remembered, however, that the merging of these 
spheres is understood transcendentally; the knowledge of 
others is not yet a shared knowledge; it is self-constituted. 
But the latter move to "reconstruct" is nevertheless important. 
Husserl's attempt to prove that the two spheres are insepar- 
able has taken, us one step closer to his transcendentally 
disciplined existential claims. 
The first claim is found in the following passage. 
Where and so far as, the constituted unity is insep- 
arable from the original constitution itself, with 
the inseparableness that characterizes an immediate 
concrete oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete 
very-ownness. ... Within this 'original sphere' (the sphere of original self-explication) we find 
also a 'transcendent world'. 1 
The obstacle we referred to as the less serious 
obstacle, Husserl believes is overcome. Residing in con- 
sciousness is the consciousness of an external world. Trans- 
cendencies(existent things) have been re-introduced in the 
meditations. 
We need not emphasize that the world for Husserl, 
lIbid. p. 104-105. 
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is a constituted world, a world held in one's own conscious- 
ness. For us this priority makes the world's existence a 
mere thought-form and not an authentically external phen- 
omenon. But Husserl has struggled mightily to give conscious- 
ness of others a place in the transcendental sphere. 
The obstacle of there being other constituting con- 
sciousnesses now looms as the final problem of transcendental 
phenomenology. His program to solve this problem is patiently 
and meticulously worked out; he knows he must explain how 
the other is truly "another consciousness for me". Failing, 
he would be caught in a world devoid of intersubjective 
exchange. 
The argument which attempts to explain how we can 
be certain of another's consciousness is a critical one. 
The other is present as an "immanent transcendency". 1 
Nothing in the sphere of our perception of him can be cer- 
tain; at the same time we can know that our perception of 
him is based upon the certain principle of constitution; 
Husserl terms that principle appresentation or apperception. 
As before, the transcendentally reconstructed ego derives 
sense about perception from the principle of apperception; 
in order to perceive another, he must. have thought the other 
to be like himself. The principle of apperception is given 
', Ibid., p. 110. 
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the title, "analogizing transfer". 1 Its pattern is as 
follows: "I am a constituting consciousness and a concrete 
'I'; I perceive another as a constituting subject; as a 
matter of principle, that body could be a constituting 
subject or consciousness. " This is how one makes the analogy 
between self and others. 
Several elements in this argument are questionable 
and deserve comment. "Analogizing" involves a transfer. 
He admits this and it is a revealing fact. If analogizing 
is a transfer from thought about one's self to thought 
about another,, certainty about it is not attainable. He 
admits that knowing other consciousnesses involves a "cer- 
tain mediacy of intentionality"; appresentation is a "making 
'copresent". 2 The very principle he has chosen to point 
to the self-evidence of others lacks certainty. How then 
can he hold that knowing others is as self-evident as the 
truth of one's own constituting consciousness? 
He attempts to cover this problem by saying that 
apperception is not a thinking act, and that "analogizing" 
is not an inferential process. 
3 To say this borders on 
nonsense. The other is thought; analogizing is a mental 
1Ibid., 
p. 111. 
2Ibid., p. 109. 
3Vide., Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, p. 111. 
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transfer. If the term "analogizing" is to retain any of 
its ordinary meaning, we cannot accept Husserl's redefin- 
ition. But this objection must be coupled with his admission 
concerning the mediacy of intentionality. If the analogizing 
transfer is a mark of intentionality, it is difficult to 
see how it can, at the same time, be non-inferential. We 
shall return to this below. Most certainly, there is some 
confusion in his notion of appresentation. 
The second slip in his argument is more serious. 
It occurs when he says, "To the extent that there is a 
givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer. "Z He is 
giving away his case if this is taken seriously. 
"Givenness" is illustrated by the child's play with 
scissors; he "sees scissors at first glance as scissors. "2 
The analogizing process is immediate, he says; no infer- 
ence is involved; the subjects' relation to things is 
supposed to serve as an illustration of the immediacy or 
self-evidence of the apperceptive process. But the illus- 
tration speaks of something else. It witnesses to the 
immediacy of perception and this throws the apperceptive 
process, as a necessary principle into question. 




is "everyday experience"; he admits it is the necessary 
factor in providing opportunity for the analogizing transfer. 
If that is so, the lived-world has not been bracketed in 
any final sense. Merleau-Ponty would observe that this 
notion of "givenness" leads us first to affirrniand then to 
interrogate perception and not the constituting consciousness. 
If the world cannot be totally subsumed under a transcen- 
dentalism, the principle of apperception has failed as a 
phenomenological fondement. 
Though the scissors illustration seems inappropriate 
in Husserl's argument for recognition of other conscious- 
nesses, a better interpretation of it can be made. The 
process whereby we recognize others as being like ourselves, 
is not dependent solely upon ourselves. We recognize the 
other at first glance because he presents himself to us as 
"other". Perception is the givenness which makes analogies 
possible--if analogies are made at all. 
Husserl has seriously crippled his argument; the 
life-world has not been completely bracketed. The world is 
there; a true in-itself for us. Husserl has confused his 
case considerably by alluding to the priority of a "given- 
ness", and he has given the lived-world phenomenologist 
an opportunity to offer a better argument. 
It goes without saying that Husserl does not share 
our view of his conclusions. The process of appresentation, 
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made by the subject, is elaborated by the term "pairing". 
"Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which 
we designate as association. "1 The "universal" character 
of pairing is that two data are given simultaneously to 
consciousness, ourselves and the other; a unity in con- 
sciousness is founded because of this simultaneous appresen- 
tation. This is Husserl's description of "a pair", and what 
follows is his peculiar application of pairing to the way 
we know others as conscious subjects. 
Again, intentionality is his clue. 
As a suggestive clue to the requisite clarification, 
this proposition may suffice: the experienced animate 
organism of another continues to prove itself as actu- 
ally an animate organism, solely in its changing but 
incessantly harmonious 'behavior'. Such harmonious 
behavior (as having a physical side that indicates 
something psychic appresentatively) must present itself 
fulfillingly in original experience, and do so through- 
out the continuous change in behavior from phase to 
phase. 2 
Behavior is perceived and perception is a mark of 
intentionality; this much is familar to the method. 
It is peculiar that pairing is specifically defined 
as the presentation of "harmonious" behavior. Obviously 
he has in mind that human behavior is distinct from animal 
behavior, and whereas, animal behavior cannot be "harmon- 
ious" with human behavior, harmonious behavior is possible 
1lbid., p. 112. 
2lbid. 
0 p. 114. 
259 
between two humans. This seems to be Husserl's reason for 
the terminology, but he does not say so. We are left with 
the following possibility. 
A being over there must prove himself through his 
behavioral patterns to be "harmonious" with us. Then and 
only then are we able to apperceive that he has a conscious- 
ness. But Husserl's requirement for harmonious behavior 
could also stand in the way of the apperceptive association. 
A psychopath could easily mislead the lay observer, 
or even a psychiatrist; behavioral patterns are often diver- 
gent. A deaf-mute would certainly not be given credit for 
possessing a consciousness if our sole criterion for such a 
judgment were harmonious behavior. These circumstances are 
possible given Husserls terms; the "proof" of behavior 
could just as well lead us to conclude that the other 
over there, indeed, has no consciousness. l 
Husserl is willing to accept such a possibility: 
"the organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, 
precisely if there is something discordant about its behav- 
jor. "2 The god of rmrmality is in full sway here. It is 
1The requirement of harmonious behavior might not be 
so bizarre if it were balanced with other requirements. But 
it is an odd stipulation when, for instance, the physical 
appearance of the other is disregarded. Husserl's case, to 
be convincing, would have to utilize the perceptual realm 
much more effectively than he has. This again shows that 
his interest in intentionality was marginal. 
2Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, p. 114. 
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difficult to see how contemporary psychoanalysis could 
function if such a stipulation were followed seriously. 
Perhaps, this is not a serious critism philosophically, 
except to say that Husserl's transcendentalism remains 
uninformed by other disciplines. 
The more serious criticism is that Husserl has adopted 
a way of understanding the problem of others which satisfies 
neither his own demands for certainty nor the insights of 
existential phenomenology. 
Concerning his own demands, he has constructed a 
process which leads progressively to the realm of the 
uncertain. Harmonious behavior is the necessary beginning; 
in other words a "presentation" must occur prior to any 
apperception. This, as we commented earlier, is a give- 
away to existential phenomenology. Perception yields apper- 
ception and apperception is an associational pairing; when 
finally we "arrive" at the principle of pairing, we are a 
long way from the desired goal of apodicticity. Association 
is a second-order criterion for knowing others; it makes 
little sense to call "association" a self-evident, transcen- 
dental truth. He fails, therefore, to reach his own objective 
of certainty. Solipsism may well be the unhappy finale for 
transcendental phenomenology. 
The claims he makes naturally dissatisfy the phen- 
omenologist of the lived-world. When he says that inten- 
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tionality is a clue to transcendental subjectivity, we 
should take him at his word. His efforts to reconstruct 
a transcendentally purified intersubjectivity succeed only 
in convincing us that it is a transcendentalism, and not 
a serious theory of intersubjectivity. Husserl's transcen- 
dental subjectivity is not an intersubjectivity as he intended; 
his very persitance in employing the transcendental reduction 
denied him his goal. 
Nevertheless, one must give due respect to this 
methodologist. The rigour he exercises in pursuing his 
goal is staggering. One cannot reject his thinking by 
disagreeing selectively with either his presuppositions 
or with his "conclusions"; a critique of Husserl necessi- 
tates dissecting his entire method as patiently as he devised 
it. 
The lesson is obvious. It is that phenomenological 
method is critical for understanding the problems of inter- 
subjectivity. Husserl's failure was ironically, a failure- 
of method; the transcendental reduction is not a requirement 
imposed by the eidetic reduction. We emphasized that it 
should not be employed in light of the findings of the 
second reduction. 
The different course, one which rtierleau-Ponty so 
well exemplifies, is to pursue the experiential modes in 
which we come to understand our world. And the phenomenon 
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exemplar is that of relating to others i. e. the social and 
interpersonal realm. Phenomenological method confronts 
us with these very problems. It does not "solve" the 
problem of others as Husserl thought, but it does take us 
to a place where, through consistent use of phenomenological 
and eidetic reductions, we are confronted with the mysteries 
of inter-human encounter. Metleau-Ponty cannot be faulted 
for overlooking this interpretation of the philosophical 
vocation. He followed it faithfully. 
The only criticism we have of Merleau-Ponty in 
light of our study of Husserl, is that he did not stress 
the methodological steps which permitted him to retain an 
existential phenomenology. Two articles are devoted to 
establishing his case for an existential phenomenology. l 
The other analyses of the political and social conditions of 
his day were performences of his method= brilliant analyses 
they are, but they remain questionable for some as philosoph- 
ical pieces because the phenomenological method in them is 
covert. 
This is a characteristic of existential writing. 
1Vide., Merleau-Ponty, "n., The Phenomenology of 
Perception, preface; also, Yerleau-Ponty, IV., Signs, pp. 159- 1 1. T These are the main efforts to establish his peculiar 
method. Method is argued throughout his work but the refer- 
ences are spasmodic; concentration on the issue is lacking. 
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Sartre-; used drama and political journalism to exercise 
his phenomenological interpretation of the lived-world. 
Gabriel Parcel is another example of one who brought phen- 
omenological analysis to journal and theatre. This trait 
is a mixed blessing. On the one hand there is no good 
reason why phenomenological analysis should be confined to 
the dry academic, "philosophical piece". Phenomenology is 
supposed to reacquaint us with the lived-world and there 
are many ways to accomplish the task. But when method 
becomes covert, it is difficult to see the philosophical 
importance of the writing. There must be those who wed 
phenomenological method and existential analysis; they need 
not be separate endeavors. A conscious and constant expo- 
sure of method in the performance of phenomenological 
analysis, is a needed vocation; we shall pursue this task 
in our concluding chapters. 
CHAPTER TWO: PART THREE 
HEIDEGGER"S MITSEIN; 
ITS BEARING ON THE ISSUE OF TRANSCENDENCE 
We have seen how Husserl influenced Merleau-Ponty 
on the matter of method. A new form of analysis was born 
as the rejection of the transcendental reduction became a 
positive principle for Lebenswelt phenomenologists. The 
pioneer in this form of analysis is without doubt, Martin 
Heidegger. His book, Sein und Zeit is a kind of "first 
fruit" for existential phenomenology. He had his own 
view of the purpose of phenomenological interpretation, 
but his analysis of human and interhuman modalities is 
classic. If we were to cite the one philosopher who most 
influenced Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, it would be 
Heidegger. 
This does not imply that tv. erleau-Ponty borrowed 
Heidegger's system; the differences between the two are 
fundamental especially with regard to our topic. The most 
basic difference lies in their respective conceptions of 
the intersubjective sphere. With Heidegger, the contrasts 
occur not so much over method; Heidegger uses phenomenology 
similarly to Merleau-Ponty, to address experiential problems, 
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and to gain access to the ontological dimension of the lived- 
world. The more critical differences occur with Heidegger's 
phenomenological findings i. e. the essences he selects as 
being interpretative of the Lebenswelt. There could have 
been a much more frank statement of differences on both sides, 
but both thinkers were more concerned to develop their own 
doctrines than to engage in critical dialogue; it is left to 
the student interested in comparative studies to draw the 
lines of their "argument". That is my intention. 
This interpretive effort should clarify two aspects 
of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity. First, it should 
emphasize the critical function a doctrine of intersubject- 
ivity has for the whole of phenomenology. Heidegger's 
contribution is notable; intersubjectivity is the key 
which unlocks the full range of phenomenological discousrse. 1 
If the philosopher understands the modes of intersubjective 
existence he will see how the question of man's own being 
must be posed; who man is, is largely determined by his 
relationship to others. This is evident in Being, and Time; 
phenomenology begins with the social phenomenon. Whether 
we agree or not with his analysis of the social realm, its 
pivotal function must be recognized. 
iThis appraisal implies that Heidegger was quicker to see the importance of the intersubjective sphere than Merleau-Ponty. It does not imply that his doctrine of intersubjectivity is superior. Quite the opposite is true. 
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A second contribution Heidegger makes, concerns the 
relationship of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity to 
ontology. Heidegger believed, as did 1%Ierleau-Ponty, that 
phenomenology was the access to ontology. We should state 
the relation more strongly, however. For Heidegger, phen- 
omenology determines the question of Being. When we add 
that Heidegger's phenomenology is shaped by his character- 
ization of intersubjectivity, its critical function for 
ontology becomes clearer. Intersubjectivity is the key to 
his understanding of ontology. Not many interpreters of 
Heidegger take this position, but we believe that a patient 
examination of Mitsein will show that intersubjectivity* 
shapes the ontology he seeks to write. Heidegger eventually 
teaches that solitary thought opens Being to man, and man 
to Being. This notion, coming as late in Heidegger's 
career as it does, is nevertheless, presaged by his pecu- 
liar conception of the intersubjective sphere. The direction 
his ontology takes is the natural outgrowth of his early 
doctrine of intersubjectivity. 
One final introductory remark: Heidegger is noted 
for having created a new philosophical language. His word 
studies are fascinating and we intend to make use of some; 
but it is impossible in this relatively short space to do 
justice to his complicated terminology. We propose, there- 
fore, to use familiar ordinary language when it is at all 
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possible. 
A description of Heidegger's conception of phenomen- 
ological method beautifully illustrates his peculiar way 
of doing philosophy; description of it will also introduce 
us to his concept of Mitsein, the intersubjective sphere. 
The question which Heidegger intends to treat is 
the question of the "meaning of Being". "With the question 
of the meaning of Being, our investigation comes up against 
the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that 
must be dealt with phenomenologically. "1 
Heidegger claims to go beyond the traditional defin- 
ition of phenomenology as a "scinece of phenomena", i. e. 
a science which he believes employs special devices or 
techniques. 2 Heidegger's way of delineating phenomenological 
method is to rediscover the terms' original meaning. No 
"devices" need then be employed; the philosopher, when given 
an understanding of the word "phenomenology", will automat- 
ically know the appropriate method. Here, his word study 
is the one means of gaining his methodological perspective. 
The term phenomenology has two components, phenomenon 
and logos. The Greek noun 
oovo 
vo v is a form of the 
1Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, Tv: acquarrie, J., 
and Robinson, E., trans., London, S. C. M. Press, 1962, pp. 49-50. 
2Ibid. 
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verb 4rl-oJ t- G a%, which means "to show itself". 1 The 
stem of that verb, ýct , means "bright", and is synonomous 
with "visible" or "!: ianifest". When we reconstruct the 
noun with this in mind, phenomenon means "that which shows 
itself, the manifest". 2 Heidegger argues that this redefin- 
ition supplants the current dictionary definition; there, 
"phenomenon" is the appearance or mere appearance of 
entities. The dictionary definition is encrusted with 
wrong-headed philosophical traditions that Heidegger 
believes must be overcome. 
He argues that the "positive and primordial signi- 
fication" is philosophically more significant than the trad- 
itional notions of semblance and appearance. To say that 
a phenomenon is a "mere appearance" means that we think it 
is not a manifestation. To be a manifestation,, it must be 
more than a semblance of something; the notion of semblance 
divorces "the thing" from its self-manifestation. Heidegger's 
reconstruction of the term indicates that a phenomenon is 
a presentation; specifically, "the thing" is accessible to 
human beholding. If distortions or illusions occur, they 
are not to be attributed to the thing but to the beholder. 
The phenomenological dictum, "to the things themselves" 
1Ibid., p. 51. 
2Ibid. 
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(Husserl's zu Sachen Selbst) is possible now because phen- 
omena announce themselves. 
The term ý\dy o, 5 is dealt with similarly; its meaning 
has been distorted philosophically to connote reason or 
judgment, but its original signification is the more general 
idea of "discourse". Taken as, discourse, %öyoS is assoc- 
iated with Jýqsovv . Its meaning can then be specified: 
"to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's 
discourse. "1 In other words, discourse lets the objects 
being discussed become evident to the listener; discourse 
points out "the thing". Discourse is a vehicle which 
uncovers what is beheld by the thinker; one might 
say that %öyof is fundamentally a form of expression. 2 
The purpose of the redefinition is obvious: dis- 
course recovers the phenomenon. It is a vehicle for 
pointing it out, thereby making it communicable. Heidegger 
emphasizes that authentic discourse lets the phenomenon 
"be" what it is, and this is the essence of phenomenology. 
When we envisage what we have set forth in our inter- 
pretation of 'phenomenon' and 'logos', we are struck by an inner relationship between the things meant by these terms. The expression 'phenomenology' may be formulated in Greek as XLyEty -rq OaLvo/4 i vc6 where x er ckv means a+ýofý 0. vGa ý0. ý Thus phenomenology 
1Ibid., p. 56. 
2Theoretically this redefinition could pertain to 
expressive acts, e. g. Merleau-Ponty's handshake, as well 
as to verbal exp-session, but he does not say so. 
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means 4'Ro#a"v EG Day 'm 0awol+EVcý to let that which shows 
itself be seen from itself in the very way in which 
it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning 
of that branch of research which calls itself phenomen- 
ology. 1 
Once a formal redefinition of phenomenology is esta- 
blished, its real task can be elucidated. So far, he has 
told us how phenomenology must work; he proceeds to tell us 
of the specific problems encountered when the new definition 
is accepted. The main problem it seems, is that phenomena do 
not always show themselves. Particularly, when we ask what 
a phenomenon really "is", we are often puzzled; what it "is" 
or means, is not always evident. Given Heidegger's objective 
to interrogate the meaning of Being, this is a serious 
obstacle. The meaning or Being of entities remains hidden 
to the questioner, at least in the initial stage of interro- 
gation. He must first rediscover the Being of entities in 
order to pose the more general question about the meaning 
of Being. 
2 
lIbid., p. 58. Introduction of the verb, >ttv 
serves to get at the etymological rootage of X 6y as . As the translators. point out, the purpose of citing this rootage 
is twofold. Discourse is a vehicle; as such it addresses 
the phenomenon. Discourse is always about something. A 
second sense is also discerned; it is the phenomenon which 
incites expression, i. e. discourse arises because of, and is 
dependent upon the phenomenon. Other nuances are also cited 
but do not seem germane to Heidegger's purpose. 
2de cannot enter into a long discussion of the 
difference between his endeavor to interpret the Being of 
entities and the meaning of Being per se. Suffice it to 
say that Being and Time is devoted to the task of redis- 
covering the Being of entities, and this is the essential 
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The peculiar entity which brings home this problem 
for phenomenological-ontological discourse is man. One 
reason is, briefly, that man has been thought of as a dual- 
istic entity; the traditional Cartesian formula, the body- 
soul typology, leaves the real issue of man's being unan- 
swered. That man is a body with a soul, is an unsatisfying 
answer to the question "who is man". 1 
Heidegger suggests a different way of getting at 
the question of the being of man. It is introduced by a 
unique and imaginative redefinition of the term, "man". 
"Being-there", or "there-being' 19 (Dasein), is Heidegger' s 
label for man. The term does not seek to deny that man is 
an entity, but it reminds us that man is an entity in the 
world. Man, the object, is always "there", in the world. 
More important, the new term specifies that man's 
essential nature is found by coming to understand the ways 
he lives in the world; behavior and social-life will be the 
essential resources for an adequate answer to the "who ques- 
introduction to asking about the meaning of Being. "Re 
cause phenome-a, as 'understood phenomenologically, are 
never anything but what goes to make up Bein;, weile Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first 
bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim 
that Being should be laid bare; and we must do this in the 
right way. " Heidegger, M., Being and Time, p. 61. 
llbid., p. 72. This page reference contains a brief but effective criticism of Descartes. 
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tion". 1 Ironically, these are the same resources which 
non-philosophical man actually uses in estimating his own 
worth; he looks to his behavior and his social relationships 
to provide an answer to the'question of the meaning of his 
existence. And this is where his problems begin. By 
accepting the answers which society provides concerning 
behavior and social life, the thinker is misguided rather 
than enlightened. This is why Heidegger says the phenomena 
remain "hidden"; the existing interpretations of human inter- 
action withhold the truth from men. 
To uncover an authentic answer to the meaning of 
man's existence Heidegger must undertake a phenomenological 
reinterpretation of his being-there. If experiential modes 
of behavior and sociality are essential to an answer and 
can be uncovered for what they really are, then an answer 
can be given to the "who question". In sum, a phenomen- 
ological interpretation of man's actual existence is the only way 
to uncover the issue of"his being". 2 
1"If a being the kind of Dasein is said to be 'in' 
something, the relationship is not primarily 'spatial' but 
means 'to dwell' to 'sojourn' to 'stay' in the sense of 
the Latin Habitar_e, e. g. a match is in a box in the plain 
spatial sense, but if a man is in his home or in a seaside 
resort, obviously this relationship is not primarily spatial. " Heidegger, Existence and Being. Intro. by Werner Brock, p. 42. 
2The boldness of this position cannot be overlooked. Heidegger does not intend to make use of other disciplines 
in shaping his reinterpretation. In all of Being and Time 
there is no mention that sociology and psychology provide 
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Comment at this point is not premature, for Heidegger 
has set his program in motion with these redefinitions. 
Though his language is obtuse, it must be said that 
Heidegger has rendered an effective argument for constructing 
an existential phenomenology. The effectiveness is evident, 
not so much in the way he deals with the Cartesian heritage 
or Husserl's reductions, but in the reasonableness of his 
redefinition. 
For example, it is worth asking whether "phenomenology' 
is the science of "what appears" or what "presents itself"; 
the difference-is one of emphasis but it may be an important 
difference. A conclusive answer may not be obtainable but 
Heidegger has doen well to say that we could not study 
what appears unless there were an element of presentation. 
Heidegger is unique in his suggestion that behavioral 
patterns open up the question of meaning rather than explain 
it. Interpretation of behavior is necessary if phenomenology 
is to get beyond a superficial view of man. In this respect, 
Merleau-Ponty did not make his case for existential phen- 
omenology quite so clearly. He used Heidegger's notion of 
presentation boldly but he did not take time to explain it 
useful data concerning social existence. Such disregard 
could prove his undoing. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger is 
his o'bm sociologist and psychologist; it would be interesting 
to see how his reinterpretation is evaluated in those disciplines. 
Space prohibits such an endeavor here. 
274 
with reference to his phenomenological method. For Heidegger 
interpretation of behavioral patterns is an essential of 
method. 
But Heidegger's appeal for an existential hermeneutic 
presents as many problems as it solves. Once we are intro- 
duced to the necessity of interpreting personal and social 
modes of interaction, we are opened to an unbelievable 
variety of "data". We are especially aware of this from our 
reading of Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology, for him, risked 
openness to such experiential variety in the confidence that 
lines of interpretation were available that would do justice 
to the variety of lived-situations. His phenomenology could 
therefore be judged on the way it interpreted diverse and 
intricate material. That lesson should also apply to Heidegger. 
Philosophical themes are being sought in the intricacies of 
human, social interaction; we are asked to look at the "being- 
there" of man which is by definition, an inclusive sphere. 
We shall remain watchful to see if Heidegger's themes are 
attentive to the broad ranges of intersubjective experience; 
it is always possible that he will "select his material", 
i. e. fashion an interpretative theme which slights the 
full range of human existence. 
Especially, we intend to see how phenomenology's 
"hidden essences" shape ontology; it is certain that there 
will be some influence. If man's being-there gives access 
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to the question of his Being and to the issue of Being in 
general, phenomenology plays the central role in shaping 
ontology. More particularly, if the forms of social inter- 
action pose the issue of Being for man, a phenomenological 
interpretation of those forms is critical in shaping the 
ontological "answer". How he characterizes the forms of 
interaction is, therefore, not only an issue of phenomen- 
ological importance; it becomes in his own program outline, 
an issue for ontology. The conception of Being which he 
spent a lifetime interpreting, is prefigured in his inter- 
pretations of , Mitsein. 
We begin our analysis of Mitsein by recognizing its 
level of importance in the design. 
By directing our researches toward the phenomenon 
which is to provide us with an answer to the question 
of the 'who', we shall be led to certain structures 
of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the- 
world: Being-with and Dasein-with (Mitsein and Mit- 
dasein). In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of 
everyday Being-one's-Self. 1 
Mitsein is going to provide the clue to man's being, 
and we note, it is the only clue he will cite. 
Being with others is distinguished from man's 
encounter with things. Phenomenologically speaking, things 
1Heidegger, N., Being and Time, p. 149. The quoted 
passage does not fully clarify Heidegger's intention. Mit- 
sein is identified, for the most part, with inauthentic 
existence. 
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are encountered as object-entities; they are there "before us"-- 
Vorhanden. And they are encountered as utensils "ready to use"# 
Zuhanden. Heidegger emphasizes the latter characteristic. for 
man, objects are there primarily to be used in work or leisure. 
As utensils, objects indicate a social world; the tool indi- 
cates a maker and user, the pan a cook, and so on. Man easily 
distinguishes the tool and its use from the user, objects are 
objects whether just "there", or ready to be used. They are 
not the same as the people who use them. The main factor in 
man's ability to set apart objects so easily is the fact that 
objects evince no "concern"; other people do. That man is 
concerned is evident from the tools he makes; tools are made 
to facilitate human objectives. Man, is, -of all beings, con- 
cernful, and this is especially evident in direct social inter- 
action--where we come into contact with others. 1 
We find it hard to distinguish ourselves from others 
because, no matter what particular concerns we or they may have, 
we are like them in that we live in the world "concernfully". 
Heidegger pinpoints this element as the thread which 
binds the interhuman or social sphere. His word game is a 
bit bizarre: "with" and "there too" are not simply descrip- 
tive terms for location; e. g. we are not only with others in 
a given place. We are here, as others are "there", or 
1In general, this description of object perception was 
used by Merleau-Ponty. We cited it as his introduction to a 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Heidegger's thought was, 
evidently, an influence on Merleau-Ponty in this instance. 
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"yonder", because we are with others in concern. "Concern", 
therefore, is a most important theme phenomenologically, 
and gives proper perspective to the facts of location or 
particular tasks. 1 If the question is the autonomy of man's 
existence, it, too, is qualified by his being with others. 
Man can be described as being alone or by himself only 
because he is describable as one who lives primarily with 
others. 
2 In other words, man's being-with constitutes the 
primary form of his existence; "being-with" is the essential 
mode of being-there. Understanding the social in terms of 
concern is our, one clue to understanding man's everyday 
existence. 3 
Once "concernfulness" is established as the essence 
of Being-with in man's everyday existence, it is left for us 
to see the particular expressions of concern. Fürsorge or 
solicitude, is the umbrella term; the particular expressions 
of it form the typologies Heidegger wants to emphasize, so 
it is advisable to define Fürsorge. 
Fürsorge is associated with the care of a social agency 
1Ibid., pp. 154-155. 
2lbid., pp. 155-157. 
3The term concern will have other significant appli- 
cations. What we have said here Is but an introduction to 
its importance as an existential form; it will be used later to uncover the form of "care" which is essential in his phenomenology. 
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for its constituents; the soup kitchen or the hospital illus- 
trate his idea. The notion conveys the existence of a social 
arrangement in which personal intimacy or committment are 
misplaced sentiments. Man's everyday existence is charact- 
erized as Being-with others in a convenient arrangement to 
get things done or to solve problems. Everyday solicitude 
is a form of social indifference. 
Heidegger then speaks of "positive" modes of solici- 
tude; why he terms them "positive", I'm not sure. The first 
form is einspringen, or leap-in; this mode of solicitude is 
where one takes care of the other's concerns. One attends to 
the matter so that the other person will not have to bother 
with it. Heidegger says that this can lead to domination or 
dependence; we either take control of the other or accept 
his control over us. This should remind us of the way we 
deal with utensils; the other is an object which we use. 
This mode, again, "is to a large extent determinative for 
Being with one another .. . 111 Treating others as objects 
is normative in everyday existence. Indifference and 
manipulation as we shall see, account for the major themes of 
everyday existence. 
The second "positive" mode of solicitude is the "leap- 
1lbid., p. 158. Heidegger's notion of einspringen 
comes very close to Buber's I-It typology, but Heidegger 
does not pursue this mode even as much as Buber did his. 
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ahead" (vorauss-oringen). Heidegger says that it pertains 
to "authentic care"; it is intended as a category which indi- 
cates an answer to the who question. The mode is obviously 
of central importance. The surprising thing is that his 
discussion of it covers little more than a short paragraph. 
He gives one brief explanation: a common cause or project 
is possible only because one has been "taken hold of". l He 
does not say what that state of being amounts to, but in 
light of what follows, he is evidently thinking of a theme 
he calls "resolve". Later, we shall detail that concept, 
but the passage is misleading if Heidegger's concept of 
resolve goes unmentioned. "Anxious resolve" is Heidegger's 
title for authentic being-in-the-world; if one has secured 
that mode as his own, then it is possible to engage in this 
positive form of solicitude. Resolve is the prerequisite 
for authentic Being-with. 
Vorausspringen is Heidegger's single category for 
authentic personal and social relations. Its importance 
becomes more evident when Heidegger cites its practical 
effects, i. e. what the mode means for the one's who live 
by it. "It helps the Other to become transparent to himself 
in his care and to become free for it. n2 
1Heidegger, M., Being and Time., p. 158. 
2Ibid. The resemblance between this concept and 
Sartre's concept of freedom is striking. 
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The authentically "resolved" person shows the other 
his potential'. The Other beholding this exemplar of authen- 
ticity can then see his own way towards self-fulfillment or 
resolve. "They thus become authentically bound together. "1 
Resolve provides for the conditions of authentic interper- 
sonal and social relationships, and the main effect is the 
individual's own freedom. This is the clue to Heidegger's 
view of authentic Mitsein; individual freedom is its pre- 
requisite and its fulfillment. 
Other, more directly intersubjective themes such as 
trust, compassion, or love are not mentioned. We shall see 
why this is so in the following discussion but it bears 
mentioning now, in that this is the one place he discusses 
"authentic" intersubjective relationships. 
For the thoughtful reader of Heidegger a question 
emerges; why, when he has specified that Mitsein is the key 
which unlocks the issue of man's being, is his discussion 
so brief? 2 Heidegger gives us no reason in the present 
passage and yet we believe there is a reason. The remainder 
of the phenomenology provides the explanation. 
1 Ibid. 
20ne of Heidegger's most thoughtful interpreter's, 
remarks that Heidegger's description of authentic Mitsein 
is "truncated". Vide., Richardson, Wm. J., Heideggeýr: 
Through Phenomenolo to Thought, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1963, The Introduction. 
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The study thus far, has characterized the ways man 
may interact with others; the negative and positive, or in- 
authentic and authentic modes, each have a place. The next 
task of phenomenological investigation is to see which 
forms predominate in actual everyday existence. Heidegger 
believes it is essential to focus upon actual, social forms 
of behavior in order to make phenomenological discourse 
credible. We are about to hear a portrayal of everyday 
Mitsein; it is supposed to open up the issue first posed-- 
the question of who man truly is. The relevant phenomenon 
is what men actually do in human interaction, for, "they are 
what they do, (sie sind das, was sie betrieben). "1 
Ordinary man sees either that he lags behind others 
in their social concerns, or that he has power to influence 
others. No matter which form this self-appraisal assumes, 
a certain distance comes between self and others. 
The state of distentiality expresses the fact that 
others are remote from us in our own quest for meaning. The 
effect Heidegger says, is that others are not known and are 
viewed as a neuter, "they". The distance, however, is over- 
come in one sense; a certain kind of communication takes 
1Heidegger, DI., ; ging and Time, p. 158. Again we em- 
phasize that Heidegger will not employ sociological psych- 
ological insights or data. Heidegger is singularly unwilling to relate his interpretation to other disciplines. His 
interpretation of human behavior is very much his own. 
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place. 
Social values dominate man; everyday man, for Heidegger, 
is entirely other-directed. Characteristic of the crowd, is 
"averageness". Its influence upon individuals is to level 
personal values. The "they" tells man what he should do and 
how; "every kind of priority gets noiselessly surpressed". 1 
The label for society's averageness and manipulation is 
"publicness"; everyday man is a product of public values. 
Not only is the conduct of individuals affected by 
the crowd; man's self-image is also stamped with the norms 
and values of the herd's morality. Because man is captive 
to the crowd, Heidegger says that he is a not-self; a "they- 
self". 2 He is both estranged from others, and is not his own 
man; he is the pawn of social pressures. In the context of 
the ontological issue "who is man", a preliminary answer is 
possible. Everyday Dasein is a "nobody". 3 
As a critique of social morality and conformity, 
Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic is, indeed, effective. 
The pathos of Nietzsche's commentary is not present, but 
Heidegger's observations are cooly and concisely enumerated; 
a sense of the demonic nature of herd morality and its effects 
1Ibid., p. 165. 
21bid. 
, p. 167., 
"The Self of every dasein is the 
They-self". Ibid. 
31bid., p. 166. 
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upon individual life is progressively heightened. 
We can 
see clearly the alienated man who is sick himself 
because 
of his mindless conformity. Heidegger's picture of 
"social- 
ibility" is stark. 
But Heidegger does not merely intend to criticize 
social mores and personal conformity; his critique 
is sup- 
posed to give access to the ontological issue. 
When he says 
that everyday man is a nobody, he makes an all-inclusive 
statement; man's life in the everyday form specifies who he 
is. His state of being is to be a nobody, and everyday Mit- 
sein is the specific factor which makes him a nobody. 
With this Interpretation of Being-with and Being- 
one's Self in the 'they', the question of the 'who' 
of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another is 
answered. These considerations have at the same time 
brought us a concrete understanding of the basic 
constitution of Dasein: Being-in-the-world, in its 
everydayness and its averageness, has become visible. 
l 
Heidegger's conclusion is familiar: everydayness 
in society has kept man from the real issue of his own 
Being. Mitsein is a prime example of man's condition and 
his problem. Phenomenological interrogation has but uncov- 
ered it; in this sense, Heidegger's commentary is a contri- 
bution to existential analysis. 
But it is seldom recognized that Heidegger's inter- 
pretation of Mitsein specifies the ontological issue. 
As such, one should ask if Heideggers phenomenology 
1lbid., p. 168. 
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is as representative or interpretative of the full range of 
experience as it claims to be. If we were to restrict the 
idea of Mitsein to social influence on the part of the 
"crowd", and to borrowed values on the part of the individual, 
a much more convincing case could be made for its pervasive- 
ness. But Heidegger is not talking about borrowed values 
only, or propoganda; he is talking about all forms of human 
interaction. All forms of social contact rob man of his 
identity. 
If human experience is interpreted as being completely 
other directed, has not Heidegger introduced a bias that 
distorts rather than uncovers man's true state of being? 
Has he not unwisely telescoped the focus of phenomenolog- 
ical discipline? Is this form of everydayness the only 
aspect of Mitsein to be taken seriously? 
Heidegger's program, I suggest, is a systematic 
narrowing of the interhuman sphere, fashioned to meet his 
individualistic conception of man's true being. He has 
structured his phenomenology to introduce a peculiar onto- 
logy. Though this is contrary to his stated definition of 
the discipline, i. e. phenomenology "lets be what shows it- 
self"; there is no argument, if his phenomenology is truly 
representative. This is where we take exception. Mitsein 
is not given interpretative latitude; it is one-sided. If 
a phenomenology claims to be existential in character it 
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cannot afford to neglect whole segments of human exchange 
without explaining w they must be thought of as inauth- 
entic. "Common causes" were not distinguished from the 
everyday mode; personal relationships such as parent-child, 
husband-wife, and lover to lover were totally disregarded. 
These-sorts of relationships may have a social as well as 
a personal-private domain, and it seems a bit farfetched 
to assume they are completely other-directed forms. In 
any case, Heidegger's error is that he failed to deal with 
them in his discussion of everyday man. His rush to expli- 
cate the concepts of care and resolve has led him to bypass 
experiential modes which may have modified his phenomenology. 
His fault is that of narrow singlemindedness, and his phen- 
omenology loses credibility because of it. 
The case we are making becomes stronger as we follow 
Heidegger in his phenomenological explication of "Being- 
in". This theme is Heidegger's way of resolving the issue 
of man's being, i. e. of describing how man comes to confront 
his everyday state of being, and reshape it into an authentic 
of being-in-the-world. 1 -- 
Heidegger uses three sub-themes which serve to introduce 
1The term "reshape" is chosen with Heidegger's con- 
cept in mind. "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest 
upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an exis- tential modification of the 'they'--of the 'they' as an 
essential existentiale. " Heidegger, M., Being and Time, p. 168. 
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the issue. The first theme, man's state of mind, is dis- 
covered through the phenomenon of fear. Fear is the 
specific form that reveals a general condition or state of 
mind. So the phenomenon does have ontological significance; 
the mood of fear illustrates how man is "there" and this 
in turn opens us to the issue, of his "being". 
' 
State of mind is made more specific by observing 
that man is aware of his "thereness"; he cannot say why 
he is "there", or where he is going. He is in the world; 
that much is a certain fact. This "fact" has as its 
theme, "thrownness"; man resides in the world as an entity, 
but more important, he is thrown into relationships with 
others. "Thrownness" connotes man's immersion in society 
and his loss of self-identity. Fear illustrates this 
condition of mind in that our thrownness cannot be 
explained-away. Hence, being-there is threatening to us. 
The second theme builds upon the first; the condi- 
tion of thrownness also indicates that one understands 
himself in terms of his potential. In the negative sense, 
thrownness incites the understanding that one has passed 
up his potential by surrendering himself to social manipu- 
lation. Man sees that he has not confronted the issue of 
1Ibid. 
, p. 173, and pp. 179-181. The analyses of fear are fascinating; we do not detail them because their 
main purpose is to show the connection between a phenomenal 
mood and the ontological issue. 
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an authentic, inner-directed life. 
Heidegger's third theme is "Interpretation"; it 
serves to drive home, specifically, how man is exposed 
to this new self-understanding. It is the extension of 
his work on everyday Mitsein, and is Heidegger's way of 
"demonstrating" the above themes. Social discourse is 
the primary vehicle which incites an individual's self- 
interpretation, and discourse in the everyday sense is idle- 
talk. The state of mind of the "they" is publicness; 
idle talk and gossip predominate. Both are "groundless"; 
that is, they are superficial, and the effect is that the 
"thereness" of individuals is bypassed. There is a kind 
of restlessness in social discourse, so that an individual 
comes to see himself as "floating" and "uprooted". 1 Idle 
talk breeds this sense of floating; personal values are 
disregarded so that the individual does not receive the 
satisfaction of being taken seriously., 
Heidegger begins explaining the emergence of self- 
awareness by saying that man's curiosity about things 
continues in face of social discourse; he cannot remain 
casually indifferent; he watches others and sees that the 
apparent "being-for-one-another" so often advertised in 
discourse really masks man's "being-against-cane-another". 2 
1lbid", p. 213. 
2Ibid., p. 219. 
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Because the individual is immersed in this mode, he sees 
himself as "falling". This has no negative connotation 
for Heidegger; it is the birth of self-understanding. 
He sees himself floundering in the midst of groundless 
idle talk; being passed by, he is now a nobody in his own 
eyes. 
The progress of the program should be made explicit 
at this point. Everyday Mitsein is not only the general 
form of social living; it is a personal form in that it 
affects every individual. Phenomenological hermeneutic 
has uncovered the destructive interaction in its specific 
effects upon the person who seeks enlightenment. 
Much like Nietzsche, Heidegger can now play the role 
of missionary. The philosopher has exposed a new access 
for gaining of self-identity, and the reader or listener 
is expected to heed the call to authenticity by following 
the next steps the philosopher prescribes. Phenomenological 
description, for Heidegger, has a mission; we are advised 
to accept his interpretation as the one way which can 
prepare man for authentic Being-there. 
I use this form of critique advisedly, but it is 
difficult to avoid the missionary fervor in his writing. 
The facade of cool objective analysis is there, but the 
call to Heidegger's special notion of self-understanding 
is unmistakable. Two things become clear when his phen- 
omenology is viewed this way: phenomenological description 
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is a call to a new way of life, based upon a particular 
appraisal of intersubjective encounters. Everyday Mitsein 
has not been "left-behind"; rather, its demonic features 
have given birth to the individual's self-understanding. 
What remains to be done is to change this condition so 
that a positive form of life can emerge. There can be 
no hesitations; man remains a nobody if he does not respond 
as Heidegger outlines. 1 
We emphasize that everyday Mitsein, when intern- 
alized as one's self-understanding remains a negative form. 
There is no positive intersubjective exchange of which 
one can claim to be a part. The negative influence of 
intersubjective encounters is pervasive even as regards 
one's thought of himself. Though this may be manifestly 
true of much human interchange, Heidegger's error lies in 
making it the sole norm for self-appraisal. Mitsein is 
determinative of man's total existence. We can therefore, 
expect that some "divorce" will occur between the indi- 
vidual and intersubjective exchange in Heidegger's reso- 
lution of the "being issue"; it is obvious that intersub- 
jectivity will play no positive part in one's recovery of 
there-being. 
The acceptance of fallenness becomes pointed when 
1This activism in Heidegger is responsible in part, for a particular view of "existentialism", a view we find 
objectionable. We note it here and will discuss it in our 
conclusions. 
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it is seen that man really cares about his existence. That 
he cares is attested to by the phenomenon of anxiety (Angst). 1 
Whereas falling is understood as one's reaction to social 
influence, anxiety shows that man cares about the issue of 
his own being. Though man is still very much immersed in 
social modalities, he now sees that "the world can offer 
nothing more and neither can the Dasein-with others. i2 The 
individual begins to understand that his own potentiality 
for authentic Being must take place apart from the social 
sphere. He gains the uncanny feeling of "not being at home". 3 
Whether 'he still attempts escape from these realiza- 
tions or succeeds in living with them, a unique form of 
existence has been brought into the open. "Care" (Sorge) 
is the ontological structure of man's new awareness; no 
matter how he actually lives, it is now evident that he 
cares about living. 
The obstacle to man's care is, of course, his state 
of immersion as it conflicts with his quest for meaning. 
He is tranquilized by the they and he is individualized 
by his new self-awareness. The either/or character of the 
1V'ide., Heidegger, N., Being and Time, p. 227. 
2lbid. 
1, p. 232. 
31bid. 
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"being issue" is firnly established. 1 Man may either acknow- 
ledge his care, or he may continue in the attempt to escape. 
The analysis of care is concluded by citing the one 
"phenomenon which provides the ontological support for the 
unity of care. "2 That phenomenon is death, and it serves 
to hold Heidegger's whole program together. Death is both 
a fact, and it is an "existentiale"; that is, man is a 
being who exists in face of death. His care is focused 
upon caring about death. To detail Heidegger's analysis 
would take far too much space, but we are obliged to outline 
this most important part of the phenomenology. Its relation 
to Mitsein is especially important. 
In the condition of "fallenness" man avoids 'the 
issue of death; he is distracted by the "they". Death, 
however, has factual certainty, even though that certainty 
is hidden by gossip and idle talk. The curiosity of man is 
both heightened and surpressed by the crowd. Heidegger 
observes that man's anticipation of death, which is an 
authentic mode of living, is just as possible as is indiff- 
erence to the issue. 
lEither/or as a term is an appropriate term in this 
context, if not associated with Kierkegaard. If we restrict 
our usage to the way man faces existential alternatives-- 
i. e. "modes of life", the term is helpful. 
2Heidegger, M., Being and Time, p. 241. 
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Anticipation of death (Being-towards-death) is the 
authentic form of care. Anticipation, however, is not a 
morbid death-wish or a pathological fear; it is, for Hei- 
degger, the acceptance of death as being certain. One 
knows that he came into the world as one "thrown", and that 
he will die alone. The. idea of accepting death goes hand 
in hand with a resolve to live apart from the illusions 
promulgated by society, i. e. "explanations", myths, or 
beliefs. The effect is to become free for death's advent, 
to be anxiously resolved to meet it whenever it may occur. 
Again, the mode of anxious resolve is a life-affirming 
modality; life is now accepted as a finite existence. 
It is not necessary to detail Heidegger's descriptions 
of finitude and temporality. In terms of the phenomenology, 
finitude is synonomous with temporality; man is a finite 
being. The meaning of his existence is temporal and, the 
issue of his Being is resolved by accepting temporality. 
He lives in anxious resolve before death as a temporal 
Being. This is the authentic answer to the "who" of Dasein, 
the capstone of the program in Being and Time. 
Man's new relation to others is mentioned briefly 
in the following: 
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the 
they-self and brings it face to face with the possibil- 
ity of being itself, primarily unsupporrtted concernful 
solicitude, but of being itself, rather in- an impassioned 
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freedom toward death--a freedom which has been released 
from the illusions o the 'they' and which is factical, 
certain of death and anxious. 
No intersubjective exchange bears upon the indi- 
vidual's anticipation, even tangentially. Death antici- 
pation is a possibility only for one's self, and is carried 
out one's self. William Richardson aptly terms anxious 
resolve, "finite transcendence". 
2 In the solitary acceptance 
of death-anticipation, man transcends the social sphere 
and its myths; his resolve is centered on the unique fact 
that he is a finite, temporal creature. We are reminded 
of Merleau-Ponty's thought during the late forties; "hori- 
zontal transcendence" is an appropriate term for Heidegger's 
concept of resolve. 
Individualism is the backbone of Heidegger's onto- 
logical dictum. We must acknowledge that his theme of 
death-anticipation does "fit" the individual context, at 
least to a certain extent. Death is a unique phenomenon 
which pertains to solitary man; it is "private" and an 
understanding of it may rest upon the individual's solitary 
grasp. Heidegger has struck an impressive note by focusing 
upon death as an individual's personal affair. 
The strange philosophical language he employs does not 
entirely mask, however, a very serious misconception of the human 
1Ibid., p. 311. (underlining mine). 
2Richardson, Wm. J., off. cit., pt I. 
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situation. That misconception was brought to our attention 
by reading Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological-ontology. 
Namely, the anticipation of death may be one's own personal 
issue but it is not necessarily worked out, understood, or 
anticipated in a sphere apart from the social, as Heidegger 
suggests. The mystery of death as well as of life can be 
opened to us through human interaction. 
We do not intend. to write an alternative phenomenology 
to counter Heidegger, but we suggest that his phenomenology, 
and his ontological formulation is severely handicapped by 
insisting that everyday Mitsein must be transcended in order 
to authentically anticipate death. This is why he never 
returns to a concept of "authentic Mitsein* at the conclu- 
sion of Being and Time. The fact is, his phenomenology is 
complete with the portrayal of an individual's resolve. 
Interhuman exchange cannot affect resolve; intersubjectivity 
is finally put aside because it is replaced by a militant 
individualism. 
Were he to have returned to explicate the notion of 
authentic Mitsein what would he have said? We are forced 
to put some words into his mouth, but what we say is not 
speculation; it is an extension of what is inherant in 
the program. His earlier reference about being "bound 
together" can now be made specific. One reference aids our 
explication. 
295 
Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first 
makes it possible to let others 'be' in their own 
most potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this 
potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and 
liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 
conscience of Others. Only by authentically Being- 
their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically 
be with one another--not by ambiguous and jealous 
stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 'they' 
and in what 'they' want to undertake. 
Heidegger is the advocate of a militant individual- 
ism in that resolute man is a conscience for others. Man 
is his own measure and the teacher of others. Put more 
boldly, he is both conscience and judge. Being "bound 
together" is reminiscent of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. 
But Hegel's intriguing dialogue between labor and lordship 
is not necessary for Heidegger. The resolute man is the 
master, pure and simple; he alone provides freedom for 
another, as he has provided it for himself. 
The above allusion to authentic Mitsein seems aca- 
demic, and unnecessary. Heidegger's brief reference shows 
that it is an afterthought in his program. The only essential 
is hard-won, individual resolve. We are left with a program 
which was given life by a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 
and which essentially does away with its importance in the 
end. The reason: intersubjective encounter is an obstacle 
to self-knowledge; his ontology is based solely upon the 
necessity of overcoming the bad effects of intersubjective 
1Heidegger, M., Being and Time, p. 344. 
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encounter. 
What about the relation between Mitsein and "finite 
transcendence"? Phenomenologically speaking, there is none. 
Individual man is the source and executor of finite trans- 
cendence; in the view of Being and Time, man is finite- 
transcendence. Heidegger's early claim that Mitsein is 
the one access to authentic Being-there is somewhat mis- 
leading. As an "access" it is at best labyrinthine; it 
offers no real direction of its own. One must see Mitsein 
as counter productive, negative, and enslaving. The order 
is, separate your self from others. That movement becomes 
the opportunity for the transcending act. Individual 
finitude has no reference to positive modalities of life 
with others. 
This structure indicates a radical difference with 
the ontology of Merleau-Ponty. 
We have made it clear that intersubjectivity is an 
access to ontological thought in Merleau-Ponty's thought. 
One of the reasons is that "the other" is fundamental in 
confronting the ontological issue; people in encountering 
each other can experience the "wave of Being". The differ- 
ence with Heidegger is striking. Mitsein is not, in its 
inauthentic form, a presentation of otherness. The notion 
of "immersion" or of man as a they-self, makes that plain; 
meaningful intersubjective exchange never opens one to 
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transcendence. 
Concerning "authentic" Mitsein, the same is true. 
Transcendence is confined to the individual's resolve; an- 
other person can only witness a resolute person, imitate his 
transcending act, and finally initiate his own self-trans- 
cendence. To say that intersubjective exchange plays a part in 
this response would be to distort Heidegger's position. The 
exchange may influence the transcending act but only because 
it is understood as an obstacle. Man is left to himself; 
intersubjectivity never functions as an "opening". in the 
creative sense. 
The contrast between the two thinkers indicates the 
vastly different roles a phenomenology of intersubjectivity 
plays in shaping concept of transcendence. In our con- 
cluding observations we shall evaluate them. 
Our interpretation of Heidegger does bring up the 
question of Heidegger's later work, and especially the changes 
in his perspectives on the problem of transcendence. An 
adequate survey of the material would involve an inordinate 
amount of space, so what is said here should not be taken 
as a full scale analysis of his position, but as a suggestion 
for the study of the "later Heidegger". 
It is quite evident that Heidegger altered his view 
that man is the embodiment of transcendence. The change is 
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first noted in the 1929 essay, "Was ist Metaphysik? "1 where 
he observes that "nothingness" is responsible for the human 
act of negation. In confrontation with "the nothing", man 
is influenced to make the transcending act of resolve. Much 
in this essay is an extension of the views in Being and Time, 
but there is a new element. "The nothing" is revealed to 
man; it is not produced by him but is the occasion for his 
response. Later, in 1943, Heidegger amplifies the concept 
of nothingness. 
2 The peculiar experience of what-is-not, is 
the occasion for an encounter between man and Being. Noth- 
ingness is portrayed as the "veil of Being". That affirm- 
ation certainly contains a new notion of transcendence. 
Man responds to a disclosure. William Richardson's study 
of Heidegger titles the new conception, "dehiscience of 
Being". In ordinary terms, it means that Being presents 
itself to man; that revelatory aspect is the key to under- 
standing Heidegger's later views on Being. 
Heidegger also developed a somewhat different view 
of the activity of man as he sought to interrogate the 
meaning of Being. Reference to death anticipation was, 
for the most part, dropped in the later essays. In "Essays 
in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference", he observes 
1Heidegger, Martin, 'IWhat' is Metaphysics? " Existence 
and Being, Intro. by Werner Brock, Chicago, H. Regnery Co, 
199. 
'Heidegger, Martin, The Question of in g, Trans. William Kluback and J. T. ', Ili e. London, Vision Press Ltd. , 1958. 
290 
that the disclosure of Being brings with it the experience 
of "enthrallment". 1 In the "pervading luminosity" which is 
Being's mode of presentation, Being is experienced as 
enshrouded; man cannot directly experience Being itself but 
he can think it. The concept carrying the weight of his 
explication is. Logos; it becomes Heidegger's most mature 
expression of the meaning of Being for man. Being, though 
concealed, is nevertheless, effectively thought about. 
Moreover, Logos teaches that man's thought is his corre- 
spondence with Being. He learns in meditation that he 
belongs to Being. The notion of belonging is carried home 
by what Heidegger calls a reciprocal "challer; ge". Being 
challenges man in its presentation as a pervading lumin- 
osity; man challenges Being also by the leap of reason. 
The conclusion is, he says, that man and Being are alienated; 
at the same time--they belong together. 
This new pattern of the relation between man and 
Being we take to be Heidegger's answer to the question he 
asked in the beginning of Being and Time, i. e. what is the 
meaning of Being? It would seem that an entirely new 
ontology has been written which could change our conclusions. 
But is this so? 
'Heidegger, Martin, Essays in Metaphysics, Identity 
and Difference, Trans. Kurt Leidecker, New York, Philosoph- 
ical Library-Inc., 1960. 
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Heidegger's new emphasis upon meditative thought 
as the access to confrontation with Being does not change 
our position for these reasons: the "leap" of reason is 
characterized as an experience of "keeping aloof" from 
the traditional modes of thought, particularly represen- 
tational thinking. More important, it is a solitary act 
made for the purpose of experiencing "in our own person" 
the relation we have with Being. Being is domiciled in 
the private meditative man. The term which illustrates 
man's leap is the same one used in Being and Time, concern. 
It may not now refer to the anxious resolve cited earlier 
but it is never related to the notion of life with others. 
Mitsein is never brought into the picture of man's way of 
confronting the movement of Being. 
Heidegger's essay, "Holderlin and the Essence of 
Poetry" makes our point quite clearly. 1 Man's correspon- 
dence with Being is demonstrated or actualized in langu--. ge. 
He takes Holderlin's line, "since we have been a conversa- 
tion", to mean that each man, that is, the individual, is 
a conversation with the mystery of Being. The poet and 
the thinker have this in common; they stand before the 
gods as privileged recipients and spokesmen. Because the 
1Vide. 
, .. Heidegger, T. lartin, Existence and Being 




thinker does confront Being, he, along with the poet, can 
pass the word of Being to others. Of course, he does not 
say that this sets the philosopher or the poet above 
ordinary mortals; but the parallel with the man of Being 
and Time is striking. The philosopher need never refer 
to conversation with others in this experience; rather he 
stands alone between Being and the crowd as the supplier 
of wisdom and truth. It is this picture of reason, func- 
tioning to inform the masses, which makes Heidegger's 
new position consistant with that of Being and Time. He 
has not reconsidered the intersubjective sphere as affecting 
the voaation of the philosopher. 
Why? We suggest that the early phenomenology was 
never altered in the midst of all the alterations concerning 
transcendence and meditative thought. It remained the 
same; intersubjectivity played no creative part in shaping 
his conception of finite transcendence and it played no 
part in his later conception. The man, whether one of 
anxious resolve or of meditative thought, is still solitary. 
Could it be that Heidegger's own life influenced 
such an intellectual position? We must not view him as 
a pawn of the age, for his brilliance is unquestionably 
rare, but this man who writes in his forest retreat is 
truly a man of solitude, if not of isolation. 
We can now compare Merleau-Ponty'o thought with 
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Heidegger's. It would seem that the two concur in their 
characterization of Being: Merleau-Ponty uses the terms 
"silence", "absence", and "mystery"; Heidegger, the term 
"luminosity". For both, Being cannot be described or 
effectively known about; Being is confronted. Man challenges 
to know its secrets;. but no answers are forthcoming. In 
this much the two are alike. 'Both say that man "belongs" 
to Being; that man encounters the mystery and is, somehow, 
part of its mystery. Both argue that interpretation of living 
modes is the primary instrument for developing this claim; 
both seek a phenomenologically grounded ontology. 
But the similarities end here. Intersubjectivity 
plays a major and positive role for Merleau-Ponty. Encounter 
is a social thing and is -a conduite to a disclosure of .. 
Being. Man's interaction also leads Merleau-Ponty to say 
he, man, bears the weight of transcendence. For Heidegger, 
interaction simply gets in the way of Being's disclosure. 
We suggest that man's encounter with Being is a 
very different phenomenon for the two thinkers. For 
Heidegger, the place of meeting is solitariness; for Mer- 
leau-Ponty it is the rare experience of intersubjective 
encounter. Will not that difference play an important role 
in man's claim to confront Being? If phenomenologists are 
to risk an affirmation of transcendence, it must follow that 
the phenomenology they articulate will affect the ontology 
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in a direct way. 
One lesson from this study seems especially important. 
It is incumbent upon the thinker to examine the phenomenal 
forms which can be relied upon to effectively open the issue 
of Being. It simply cannot be true that all forms of living 
bear the same significance. A phenomenology which claims 
to be an opening to the issue of Being must delineate which 
forms emerge as conduites. This means comparing the various 
forms so that we may estimate their function, 
In a modest way, we accept that task, and will 
attempt to delineate those forms in our concluding chapter. 
PART FOUR 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
THE FUNCTION OF METHOD IN DEVELOPING A 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Our objectives in these final two chapters can be 
outlined briefly. The present chapter will concentrate on 
describing how a credible phenomenlogy of intersubjectivity 
is developed. We shall argue that by remaining attentive 
to the discipline of method, a phenomenology of intersub- 
jectivity which focuses upon encounter is both possible and 
credible. In arguing this approach we shall confine our- 
selves to the function of method in guiding a phenomenology 
through the complex materials necessary for a coherent 
portrayal of intersubjective experience. Chapter two will 
build upon this foundation; the relation between experience 
and. method will show that intersubjective exchange not only 
opens the issue of transcendence, it leads the thinker to 
consider again the appropriateness of theological affirmation. 
emphasis there will be upon the phenomenological forms them- 
selves, that is, the specific themes of love and trust which 
can be utilized in posing the issue of transcendence. We 
will argue that Buber's insights need not be disregarded. 
Our main contention, however, will be that of the I-Thou 
form must be formulated differently to be Dhilosonhically 
credible. 
The 
We shall proceed as patiently as possible in this 
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chapter to apply phenomenological discipline to encounter 
experience. 
First, we should review our criticism of Buber as a 
philosopher. Buber's conviction that intersubjective encouthter 
provides the foundation for truth about man's world was 
quite plain. His unwillingness to submit that phenomenon 
to phenomenological critique was also quite evident. It 
left the truth of it questionable for us; specifically, he 
was reticent to utilize any methodological form of reduction 
or eroche to demonstrate the credibility of the I-Thou form. 
Perhaps, he should not be criticized for failing to employ 
a phenomenological reduction as it was conceived by Husserl; 
if he was acquainted with it, he surely knew that it led to 
transcendentalism, and that would have prevented its use. 
Buber was committed to characterize concrete experience. 
But this does not excuse the shortcoming; intersubjective 
encounter, apart from a methodologically informed attack, 
remains a fascinating but vague phenomenon. 
We observed in our study of Buber a more personal 
reason for the reaction against method; the fact that 
transcendence provided, a priori, the foundation for the 
I-Thou form of encounter, helped explain why encounter exper- 
ience was never interrogated. We found that the affirmation 
of a graceful God did indeed complicate hi. 6, desire to be viewed 
as a philosopher. He assumed that a methodologically gov- 
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erned interrogation would-somehow distort the contribution 
he sought to make. He chose the path of apologetics and of 
poetry, and we believe that choice affected Iris credibility 
as an otherwise brilliant phenomenologist. 
If we were to state our criticism in one sentence 
it would be that Buber's forms failed to gain credibility 
because he employed no method to preserve the critical 
function so essential to all philosophical inquiry. If one 
is to pursue the description of phenomenal forms as a phil- 
osopher, method and discipline are essential. 
Heidegge, r teaches important lessons in this regard. 
Heidegger embraced method. As a methodologically oriented 
thinker Heidegger's early prominence cannot be argued. He 
proposed to use the phenomenological reduction in a (then) 
new and important way; Being and Time began with the argu- 
ment that phenomenological method could, of itself, uncover 
the truth of man's condition. The phenomenological reduc- 
tion was supposed to be a way of getting at the question of 
man's true being. Our study, however, uncovered an unusual 
and questionable management of method. 
Once his chosen themes were introduced the function 
of phenomenological reduction was for the most part, for- 
gotten. Our criticism is that he was not sufficiently 
rigorous in his use of the er oche. We demonstrated this by 
our frequent question, "why this theme and not another? " 
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Heidegger had no answer. He never questioned his selection 
of phenomenological themes; bracketing was all too soon 
discarded in the progress of his system. Specifically, 
once alienation and other-directedness are introduced by 
Heidegger, he settles upon them as the only relevant themes 
for phenomenology and ontology. Building his system solely 
upon these themes, his ontology became captive to individ- 
ualism. We did not contest Heidegger's insights about 
alienation or otherdirectedness. We did say, however, that 
his phenomenology progressively lost sight of the use of 
phenomenological reduction; method gave way to proclamation. 
Heidegger's program, when evaluated from this angle, 
is curiously enough, akin to Buber's. They saw different 
things in the existential sphere, but they both failed to 
submit their themes to reduction. Heidegger's systematic 
narrowing of the intersubjective to otherdirectedness, and 
the authentically human to that radical of individuality, is 
strangely like to Buber's apologetics when the issue is 
that of employing a methodological tool. Both Buber and 
Heidegger failed to compare their chosen themes with others. 
Interrogation which would show the significance of the chosen 
themes as compared to others, was never undertaken. This is 
a shortcoming which teaches and important lesson about phen- 
omenological method--specifically the use of the reduction. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, with respect to our criticism 
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of Fauber and Heidegger, is a relevant corrective. 
Not only did Merleau-Ponty embrace the principle of 
phenomenological reduction, he employed it constantly in 
his descriptions of the phenomenal sphere. His antipathy 
towards the scientific method did not stand in the way of 
his emphasizing the proximate character of all eidetic 
themes. There was never an attempt on his part to finalize 
or formalize the forms of interhuman relationships in the 
development of a phenomenology. On the contrary, his effort 
was usually directed towards opening the interpretive 
options rather than investigating one theme. For example, 
when the question is the type of humanism he espouses, he 
remains critical of both the Nietzschian warrior and the 
Hegelian man of destiny. He submits a different observation; 
the humanist is he who knows of interhuman support and is 
willing to die alone. No one form dominates. Though his 
method is discreetly hidden, it does bear upon his unwilling- 
ness to decide between philosophical extremes. ""ethod dic- 
tates that where evidence of phenomenal forms exists, they 
must be dealt with rather than excluded from phenomenological 
critique. His "hero" is a fine example of the blending of 
themes and the proximate nature of forms. When il': erleau- 
Ponty studies the relation between an individual's perceptual 
characteristics and his environment, he finds both operative. 
There is no need to decide between them. Again, he is not 
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the human sphere are thoughtfully analysed and compared. 
Secondly, use of the reduction requires comparisons and 
contrasts of differing modalities in its effort to specify 
dominant themes. The thinker asks, "why this theme and not 
another? " because he seeks to differentiate levels of 
importance. In so doing the significance of one theme can 
be demonstrated. 
We emphasize the comparative function in the use of 
phenomenological reduction not so much as a guideline for 
method, but as its essential characteristic. Reduction 
requires comparison. Without comparative critique of the 
various modes of human interaction, it makes little sense 
to say we know which themes are phenomenologically signi- 
ficant. If the phenomenologist proposes to demonstrate a 
particular view about experience he must compare it to 
other views to make his case credible. 
This comparative function is especially meaningful 
when applied to the development of intersubjective themes. 
A phenomenology of intersubjectivity must heed this norm if 
it is to gain credibility. Had Ruber's typology been worked 
out in relation to socio-cultural factors or perceptual 
patterns, to name only two, its potential for credibility 
would have been greatly enhanced. 
The work of Merleau-Ponty again stands as an illus- 
tration of the principle. Not only was openness to various 
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constrained to pin-point one form and exclude another. The 
essence of phenomenological reduction is its characteristic 
openness to evidence. As we proceed we shall see why. 
The exercise of blending themes is not indicative of 
indecisive thinking or an effort to please both existential- 
ist and scientific analyst; it is an expression how the 
phenomenological reduction disciplines and affects descrip- 
tions of the phenomenal world. The one sure discipline is 
that phenomenological reduction necessitates the question "why 
this form and not something else". The reason is that forms 
are proximate; because they arise from our experience, they 
are never final. The effect should be a critical philosophy, 
instead of apologetics. The alternative Merleau-Ponty opens 
is an important one if phenomenology is to remain within 
the historic guidelines of philosophy. 
Use of phenomenological reduction in existential analysis 
provides a specific perspective especially useful in the study 
of intersubjectivity: intersubjective themes, once introduced 
through use of the epoche, are the result of comparative analysis. 
We should review why this comes to be. Lebens- 
welt phenomenology is clear in its affirmation of the 
"presence of the world"; because of this it must remain 
attentive to the diversities of human experience. The 
affirmation that experience is the proper subject for inter- 
rogation in philosophy is hollow unless the diversities of 
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the human sphere are thoughtfully analysed and compared. 
Secondly, use of the reduction requires comparisons and 
contrasts of differing modalities in its effort to specify 
dominant themes. The thinker asks, "why this theme and not 
another? " because he seeks to differentiate levels of 
importance. In so doing the significance of one theme can 
be demonstrated. 
We emphasize the comparative function in the use of 
phenomenological reduction not so much as a guideline for 
method, but as its essential characteristic. Reduction 
requires comparison. Without comparative critique of the 
various modes of human interaction, it makes little sense 
to say we know which themes are phenomenologically signi- 
ficant. If the phenomenologist proposes to demonstrate a 
particular view about experience he must compare it to 
other views to make his case credible. 
This comparative function is especially meaningful 
when applied to the development of intersubjective themes. 
A phenomenology of intersubjectivity must heed this norm if 
it is to gain credibility. Had Ruber's typoloFy been worked 
out in relation to socio-cultural factors or perceptual 
patterns, to name only two, its potential for credibility 
would have been greatly enhanced. 
The work of Merleau-Ponty again stands as an illus- 
tration of the principle. Not only was openness to various 
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forms counselled, he actually undertook comparative analysis 
to arrive at the dominant themes in his phenomenology. 
What emerged from his study was the point Buber had sought 
to establish; encounter is the ground upon which interpre- 
tations of human exchange are constructed. Philosophical 
truth claims do not arise by confining analysis to what we 
know hbout another. Quite the contrary, he says, what we 
know about an other is developed from forms of encounter. 
This important conclusion could not have been reached had 
different forms of man's relation to the world been disre- 
garded. The problem of focusing upon the significance of 
encounter modalities depended upon the phenomenologist's 
ablility to deal with them in relation to the traditional 
assumption that "knowledge about" was the prime source for 
estimating worth and importance. Through comparative 
description Merleau-Ponty argued effectively for the primacy 
of encounter modes. The inadequacies of the opposition, I 
suggest, could never have been made apparent if he had failed 
to compare and contrast the encounter forms with the ration- 
alist and behaviorist alternatives. The method of reduc- 
tion functioned mightily in this endeavor. 
The epoche also functions to produce another result. 
::: erleau-Ponty made a valuable suggestion when he 
said that phenomenological reduction is a "loosening of 
the threads" which bind us to our world. Proper conduct of 
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the epoch? is one way of developing an alternative concept 
of objectivity; phenomenological reduction is the key. The 
reduction constrains the thinker from simply affirming 
a particular view of encounter or the lived-world. For 
instance, if Buber's forms are, indeed, relevant for a 
phenomenology, they will be so because evidence is developed 
in their favor. The proximate nature of the forms need 
not be a deficit; on the contrary, the evidence which is 
gathered and compared gives the thinker access to viable 
judgments about them. Judgments are possible because there 
is no effort to, obtain a completely detached version of 
experience. The phenomenologist seeks judgments which 
admit to the factor of subjective involvement; they are 
proximate and they rely on the force of evidence. "loos- 
ening" is the by-word, not a complete separation of the 
reflective process from lived-experiences. 
The drive for a pure objectivity is put away in 
Lebenswelt phenomenology. The contingency of experiential 
forms is implied in the very notion of diversity already 
cited; it is also indicated because the thinker acbiowledaos 
his own ties with the world. The reduction attempts to 
bring this involvement under scrutiny but does not pretend 
to obliterate it. The sensitive use of the reduction does 
away with the notion of absolute truth(s). This balance 
between the critical approach and proximate knowledge is 
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especially important for our study. By respecting this bal- 
ance the thinker may gain a more accurate description of the 
subject-world relation. It is vital he recognizes that he 
is part of that relation. 
In sum, phenomenological reduction is a microcosm 
of phenomenological method. It is the critique-oriented 
side of the discipline, and it shows the stance of the 
discipline towards its own theorizing activity. 
We have not exhausted the question of the conduct 
of phenomenological reduction; it will come up again as 
we discuss the second phase of phenomenological method, 
eidetic intuition, or eidetic reduction. 
We saw in our survey of Husserl that it is necessary 
to follow his reductions only where they acknowledged a 
primal relation between subject and world. Use of phen- 
omenological method does not lead to transcendentalism; 
it leads elsewhere. Faithful use of the eidetic reduction 
redirects the thinker's efforts to question the subject- 
world relation. As part of this, we also saw that the 
eidetic reduction leads the phenomenologist to develop a 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity. 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrated the former point, though 
he did not make plain its mechanics. We attempted to do 
that in our analysis of Husserl. The mechanics are simply 
that one cannot separate the I from self-consciousness or 
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from his world of experience; to attempt 
to reintroduce evidence which comes from 
nexus. Phenomenological discipline when 
sibly is eo ipso "existential phenomenol, 
ably bound to the subject-world relation 
survival. 
that maneuver is 
the lived-world 
practiced respon- 
Dgy". It is incur- 
for its continued 
A more specific focus was found in the application 
of method; the predominant form emerging from a study of 
the Lebenswelt was the intersubjective theme. We followed 
Merleau-Ponty's patient effort to show how social and 
interpersonal forms continually emerge in the most intell- 
ectual of maneuvers. Merleau-Ponty's position was argued 
effectively in "The Child's Relation to Others" . That 
argument not only precludes a transcendentalism; it suggests 
the predominance of the intersubjective form in the subject- 
world relation. Mothod was instrumental in bringing such a 
focus. That focus came because the forms of interpersonal 
living were continually found in modes of intellection and 
perception. They emerged as being operative in the most 
abstract forms of perception. The interpersonal ai: nply 
could not be disregarded in a phenomenology of perception. 
Significant for the philosopher, concentration upon the 
intersubjective sphere was not chosen through personal 
preference; it was highlighted because the method presented 
such forms. Eidetic reduction brings the intersubjective 
314 
to light. 
If we ask, as we have sought throughout, how phen- 
omenology poses the issue of transcendence, a third impor- 
tant function of eidetic method is found. 
Merleau-Ponty's procedure in developing eidetic 
forms, contrary to Buber, precludes the right to use a 
particular concept of transcendence as a presupposition. 
This is germane to our issue: ideational structures are 
abstractions of experience, they are ggthered and built 
in response to experience and this means that the phenomen- 
ologist can never presume a factor which a priori, serves 
to explain that experience. 
This restriction applies only, however, when a par- 
ticular concept of transcendence is used as a presupposition. 
There is a sense in which Lebenswelt phenomenology employs a 
general concept of transcendence in its investigations. 
The concept of the lived-world contains a notion of tran- 
scendence; it is that man confronts a world which is "al- 
ready there". The lived-world concept pertains to the con- 
frontation of man with transcendence , with things and 
other people. But this notion cannot be understood as 
falling under the afore-mentioned restriction. Lebenswelt 
is not a particular concept of transcendence concerning 
God or Being; it is not a presupposition which explains 
experience. 
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Whereas specific presuppositions about the nature of 
transcendence are not permitted, the objective of eidetic 
research is to develop concepts which clarify the exper- 
ience of confrontation. This is how our question can be 
answered; eidetic research does not exclude themes of 
transcendence if such are developed within the context 
of phenomenological reduction. That is, the discipline 
presses to develop ideational forms concerning the subject- 
world relation and does not exclude concepts of transcendence 
unless they are presuppositional. To exclude concepts of 
transcendence which emerge in research would be as one- 
sided as would employing them as presuppositions. Develop- 
ment of concepts which bear upon the issue of transcendence 
is a specialty in eidetic research. 
Merleau-Ponty understood that intersubjective ex- 
change was a primary resource in this constructive endeavor. 
He understood that a phenomenology which was shaped in 
large degree by the intersubjective sphere, would have 
ontological levels of tonte-tualization. Eidetic formula- 
tion does not evRde the issue of transcendence; its drive 
to bring the world to light necessitates coming to grips 
with the questions of universal meaning. The Lebenswelt 
phenomenologist, though wary of "high altitude thinking", 
is nevertheless brought face to face with the question of 
Being. For Merleau-Ponty interhuman networks of experience 
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open the question of. Being. 
+ + + 
If these observations on phenomenological reduction 
and the eidetic function are pressed further and brought 
into conversation with other methods, the question of the 
conduct of reason, arises. The method we have outlined, is 
not itself, beyond criticism. What are its strengths, and 
weaknesses? How does this method contribute to philosoph- 
ical debates about perception and experience? 
Mary Warnock's book Existentialism makes a strong 
case for being skeptical about Lebenswelt phenomenology 
and its conception of reason. 1 Hers, as Hepburns, is a 
thoughtful interpretation of the contributions of Kierke- 
gaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and especially 
Sartre; in the following quotation we can see her apprecia- 
tion for them and the seed of her criticism. 
There is an inescapable fact about the world, which is that Beings-for-themselves are separate from the rest 
of the world; and part of what they understand, in 
understanding the gap between themselves and the things around them is that the world is not wholly 
manageable, and might in the end turn and submerge them. 
This is the truth which Sartre seeks to expose by the Concrete Imagination. No account of Existentialism 
IVide., Warnock, Mary, Existentialism, London, Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1970. 
31? 
which failed to emphasize this imaginative and descrip- 
tive aspect 'could possibly be complete. ... 
This may have been the strength of the Existentialist 
movement, which has sometimes seemed a desirable refuge 
from the aridities of other philosophy. But it has, I 
believe, also been its dovmfall. There is no real 
possibilility of argument with the deliverances of the 
concrete imagination. 
Though her criticism points to Sartre, her case 
against "concrete imagination" is also directed to the 
phenomenologists we have surveyed. Their concentration on 
intuition and existential insight forces their work into 
the category of oracularism; no real debate can take place, 
she believes, because the tools for investigation find 
their home in subjective imagination, and not reason. The 
drive to develop concepts which portray the "ultimate 
meaning of existence" is not an appropriate task for 
philosophers. 2 
She does not elaborate in this short essay what the 
appropriate task of philosophy is, but her criticism does 
not necessarily depend on having an alternative. It con- 
cerns the method of phenomenology; is she correct in speci- 
fying imagination as its singular characteristic? If not, 
is the method we have described truly capable of aiding 
philosophical debate. 
1Ibid., p. 139. 
2lbid., p. 140. 
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As to the first issues it is not simply insight 
or intuitional sensitivity that led Merleau-Ponty to the 
eidetic formulations outlined in our research. Intention- 
ality, for example, was not regarded as a self-evident 
truth of experience; it was regarded as a thesis which 
called for the gathering of evidence. In other words, it 
had to be argued and demonstrated. 
Phenomenological reduction was also employed in his 
investigations to guard against criticism such as Warnock'sa 
Without compromising the Lebenswelt thesis, Merleau-Ponty 
sought to demonstrate it through the use of the 
_epoche. 
His case may be weak as Warnock argues quite well, but he 
is not a candidate for her major ctiticism. There are no 
"oracular" affirmations which remain immune from the disci- 
pline of reduction. 
Another factor, already mentioned, is that Merleau- 
Ponty contests the various philosophical theories of per- 
ception and not necessarily the data they utilize. Ad- 
mittedly, he is convinced that evidence is gained from the 
pre-reflective, but he argues particularly with those who 
theorize about experience and this marks his thoery, it 
seems to me, as being within the traditional arena of phil- 
osophical debate. He claims no unique access to the truth 
of experience; he seeks rather, to demonstrate that his 
interpretation is more adequate than others. The idea 
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that experience dictates a theory of contingent "knowledge 
about" illustrates this well. His is no first philosophy 
as Husserl's sought to be; r'Ierleau-Ponty is at least one 
"existentialist" whose method constrains promulgation of 
concepts about the ultimate meaning of existence. 
These two points are preliminary, however, to 
answering the question of the method's adequacy in forwarding 
philosophical debate. I have no final answers bu. t mould 
offer observations. 
If one's philosophical concern is to develop themes 
about intersubjectivity, phenomenological method has certain 
advantages. Where method leads to a concentration upon 
intersubjectivity, it can be looked upon as a discipline 
which gives direction to study and debate. This was seen 
by every phenomenologist studied, even by Husserl who 
realized the intersubjective question was a key one. Method 
does, indeed, lead to concern for concepts about intersub- 
jective experience. Method, in this instance, specified 
a key issue for investigation; it was more than a general 
discipline for thinking. 
If the inclination of the philosopher ion broadly 
speaking "existential", phenomenological method is an indis- 
pensable tool for acquiring critical perspective. It con- 
strains the thinker from simply affirming truths about 
experience. Existential "truths" are not to be taken for- 
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granted; phenomenological method forces the distinction 
between encounter experience and theoretical knowledge. 
Its objective is to draw an adequate relation between the 
world we know by encounter and the theories we have about 
it. This is a traditional venture in philosophy, and should 
be obvious in light of Merleau-Ponty's studies of perception. 
What makes phenomenological method particularly 
helpful in debate is that it argues against the separation 
of the physical and rational in human activity. Warnock 
cites the rejection of the Cartesian typology as a major 
contribution of existential thought. We would go further. 
The constructive or eidetic aspect of phenomenology is not 
there by chance. Ifý'man should not be dealt with as 
a dualistic entity, a constructive role becomes necessary. 
Particularly, it is incumbent upon those who recognize the 
failures of Cartesian theory to weave concepts which do 
justice to a holistic conception of man. I11erleau-Ponty's 
concept of intentionality is a serious alternative in the 
attempt to overcome the deficiencies of Descartes' theory. 
Phenomenological method, I suggest, is right in 
risking itself with constructive theories about the subject- 
world relation. To remain inactive, convinced that 
theory is broken, is to fail in genuine philosophical 
debate. If Descartes' typology falls short, is it not 
reasonable to think that alternatives are called for? 
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Merleau-Ponty attempts to meet the challenge; for that he 
cannot be judged as insensitive to philosophical debate. 
In one sense, Warnock's criticism about phenomenology's 
anti-scientific bias should be appreciated. 1 We argued it 
was a shortcoming when Merleau-Ponty insisted his method was 
anti-scientific. His claim to be anti-scientific is a bit 
hollow; he strived to develop concepts while utilizing and 
integrating clinical-experimental data. To say he is anti- 
scientific given such a condition, is to court popular 
opinion. 
His real argument with science is directed towards 
absolutistic doctrines and not to what is generally called 
scientific method. He seldom argues with the data emplyed in 
idealism or behaviorism; his critique concerns their assump- 
tions and conclusions. This is where he is right, it seems 
to me, to espouse an "anti-scientific" bias. Idealism's 
failure is the assumption that man generates ideas without 
benefit of experience. Behaviorism sees man as totally 
governed by physical stimulii. Neither view provides room 
for each other. If these views are given the aura of being 
scientific, then an anti-scientific bias is commendable. 
But that is a poor description of the issue. Phen- 
omenological method is a valuable contribution because it 
looks to both sides of the debate to' gain its own per- 
spectives. It sees the rational and the environmental 
11bid., Chapter 7., pp. 131 ff. 
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aspects of the subject-world relation as being important 
aspects in a holistic conception. 
It is also a valuable contribution because 
method dictates continual attentiveness to the diversities 
of experience and to the drive for conceptual coherence. In 
terms of our problem area this seems entirely appropriate. 
Human relationships provide a 'staggering range of diversity 
for philosophical investigation. If one sees the inter- 
human as a source of philosophical problems, then attentive- 
ness to diversity is essential. 
This need not cancel the drive for unitary structures. 
Phenomenological method is a press in this direction; it 
seeks to integrate diverse fields of experience. If themes 
are seen as proximate and diversity is attended to, there is 
no reason why unitary themes should be excluded. The drive 
for conceptual coherence, when properly disciplined is the 
philosopher's specialty. In phenomenological method the 
constructive function is given ample room for expression; 
ontological reflections are permitted to compliment a cred- 
ible phenomenology. 
This is one reason we chose to look at Buber from a 
phenomenological perspective. What he tried to do was 
frustrated by absence of method; we have suggested that presence 
of method makes his objectives more possible. 
323 
lation. 
Stated methodologically, the value of phenomenolog- 
ical research is found in the tension between the e poche 
and eidetic formulation. This has been implicit in the above 
observations. The suspension of judgment about theories 
of experience in order to see encounters more clearly always 
stands in tension with the drive to develop new conceptual 
structures. Bracketing balances the constructive effort, 
and the constructive effort deepens the critical function. 
If phenomenological method is seen this way, then phenomen- 
ology carries on its own internal debate. It is a debate 
between the critical and constructive sides of philosophy; 
it gives expression to two necessary functions. in philosophy. 
As an internal debate it nurtures methodological refinement 
and maturity, and as a specific method it aids the debate 
in other fields of philosophy. 
We have taken time to state some specific advantages 
of the phenomenological method in developing concepts of 
intersubjective experience; though no final specification 
of what those themes are has yet been dealt with, a found- 
ation has been laid. Phenomenological method, attentively 
applied, cancels -the assumn-tion that apologetics will yield 
a credible phenomenoloSy. It also teaches that transcenden- 
talism is neither necessary nor warranted in the development 
of themes. Lastly, it suggests that the constructive func- 
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tion in philosophy be taken in hand as a disciplined and 
appropriate task. 
If we are ever to get beyond the "aridities of other 
philosophy" without falling prey to the temptations of 
oracularism, it will be because a method has disciplined. 
and guided us. Phenomenological method used as a critical 
taskmaster and initiator of unitary themes can help us 
pursue the intricasies of lived-world encounter and remain 
credible as conceptualizers. 
In our last chapter we shall attempt to demonstrate 
this with reference to our specific topic. 
CHAPTER II 
A PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE INTERHUMANs 
ITS BEARING ON THE ISSUE OF TRANSCENDENCE 
If method is not only advisable but necessary for 
phenomenology, its most important function is its appli- 
cation to the constructive effort in research. Our study 
asks if and how a phenomenology of intersubjectivity opens 
the issue of transcendence. We are now ready to utilize 
the preceeding research in attacking the question directly. 
In so doing, we undertake a constructive effort. 
We readily admit that our research question was not dealt 
with systematically by PMerleau-Ponty. But the research did 
demonstrate that his efforts in phenomenology and ontology 
do affect the issue. That in itself is an important contri- 
bution worthy of consideration for constructive attempts. 
Suggestive and viable alternatives have been submitted in 
P.,: erleau-Ponty's work on the question we raised. 
To some extent we shall have to tailor what Merleau- 
Fonty said, to our stated issue. As we said before, this will 
add to his observations, but will not stray from his inten- 
tions or conceptualizations. We intend to use his method 
and formulations in discussing our specific issue. To 
sharpen the issue, it is wise to review again the work of 
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Martin Buber. 
His major contribution was to conceptualize an area 
of experience between persons that had been left in the 
background of philosophical inquiry. He asserted that the 
description of interpersonal meetings could not be confined 
to psychological explanations or behavioral actions. Phil- 
osophical inquiry had, in his mind, consistantly attempted 
to reduce interpersonal exchange to subjective dimensions or 
objectivistic (behavioral) interpretations. In this crit- 
icism we agreed. 
We accepted his intention to construct a concept- 
ualization of exchange which encouraged phenomenological 
interpretation, one which preserved its unique character- 
istics and forced subsequent inquiry to recognize its central 
importance. This would call for a new form of discourse 
and a redirection for theological observations. Again, we 
appreciated his objectives. 
In the execution of his task, questions arose. Gen- 
erally speaking, he was reluctant to relate the notion of. 
encounter to any theory of knowledge about others. Spec- 
ifically, he was unwilling to interpret encounters as per- 
ceptual experiences; he left himself swide open to the indict- 
ment of mysticism, or prophetism, because he would not explain 
the connection between knowledge about and knowing as 
encounter. Buber, like others, recognized the difference 
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between pre-reflective experience and the reflective process, 
between direct awareness and ratiocination, but he gave us 
no way of explaining the difference. So we were left in a 
quandry with Buber. How could his insights about intersub- 
jective meeting be retained while at the same time relating 
them to a theory of perception? If his-objective is to be 
respected, we must attempt a description of the interhuman 
that affectively relates to forms of perception. 
More serious, however, was Buber's failure to expli- 
cate the relation between intersubjective encounters and 
the acknowledgment of transcendence. Double-think was not 
intended, but became evident despite his efforts. We con- 
cluded that the acknowledgement of transcendence was a prior 
requirement for understanding the I-Thou form, as well as 
being an affirmation which emerged from one's understanding 
of I-Thou meeting. Though Buber saw no conflict in this 
twofold structure, I did. One cannot claim to be a phil- 
osopher and utilize a theological presupposition unless he 
is willing to justify that theological claim on philosophical 
grounds. Because Buber did not attempt a phenomenological 
argument for his typology, and because he utilized a theo- 
logical presupposition, we became progressively suspicious 
that his theology was the determing factor in shaping the 
character of the I-Thou phenomenology. This relation between 
theology and phenomenology must be revised if we seek a 
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philosophically credible account of the interhuman. 
Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenological research bears 
on the first problem we had with Buber. 
The first point is that Nerleau-Ponty chose to interro- 
gate perceptual forms. In doing this, he made it abundantly 
clear that perception would not be dealt with in tradtional 
terms. He set out to describe it without yielding to the 
Cartesian postion on a priori thought forms; he also asserted 
that behavioristic interpretations failed to do justice to 
the perceptual event. The purpose in objecting to classical 
theories was to retain an interpretative option which accounted 
for the fullness of perceptual interaction. Most important 
and germane to our issue, the "fullness" of the perceptual 
event has at its center, an encounter mode. 1 Merleau-Ponty 
termed it pre-reflective experience. How does this position 
bear on the issue of developing a phenomenology which 
respects Buber's insights and yet relates the interpersonal 
as a perceptual experience. First, we shall state the gen- 
eral importance of Merleau-Ponty's alternative; next, we 
shall use his concepts of project or intentionality, vortex, 
and intercorporeality, to construct a more credible theory 
about the I-Thou event. 
The fundamental importance of perception as pre-re- 
l We are not now indentifying Buber' s conception of 
encounter with Merleau-Ponty's term "pre-reflective". But 
ther is a useful connection and we shall elaborate it below. 
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flective encounter lies in the new relation Merleau-Ponty 
shaped between "knowing" and "knowledge about". The con- 
cept of "knowing" captures the point he sought to make 
against the classical theories. Hearing, touching, and 
especially seeing, are not just data-producing 
functions 
which tell us something about the objects of our perception. 
They are much more than vehicles for perception; they are 
our modes of encountering and dealing with the world. The 
term lived-world or Lebenswelt keynotes this. The subject- 
world relation is a network of encounters; the world is not 
just "out there"; we are intimately involved in and related 
to it. Objects and persons are perceived in terms of our 
position or condition. That "position" is inevitably social. 
We perceive according to our personal and interpersonal 
fields of experience. Merleau-Ponty strives to demonstrate 
that we cannot construct "clean" concepts of subject and 
object' the point is that perceptual activity is best 
interpreted as a network of exchange. The communal and 
"knowing" aspects of experience are the foundations for 
his work. 
In addition to this, as its compliment, Merleau- 
Ponty develops a concept of perception which gives a new 
interpretation to "knowledge about". If knowing is the 
primary mode of perception, knowledge about must be class- 
ified as its derivative. In terms of the two traditional 
330 
positions, this is a radical alternative, and it affects 
our issue. His point is certainly arguable; we will argue 
henceforth that the rational dimension, i. e. a concept- 
ualization of encounter, must grow out of a recognition of 
its "birth place", exchange. ' 
As we have said consistantly, the derivative nature 
of knowledge about implies that it is also proximate, 
never independent or complete. In phenomenological terms 
the implication is clear; eidetic forms are never seen as 
unchangeable; concepts are always open to the phenomenolog- 
ical reduction and to additional inquiry. This means that 
our application of Merleau-Ponty's work is admittedly open 
to other interpretations. We accept this as a discipline 
and will attempt to remain sensitive to other options. We 
turn to its specific importance. 
Merleau-Ponty's alternative offers a new approach 
to Buber's typology and Hepburn's criticisms. These 
following concepts are Merleau-Ponty's "argument" for his 
position; they are particularly appropriate in specifying 
the meaning of interpersonal exchange. 
The "project" character of perception was cast as 
an individual's total involvement in the object of his con- 
'We 
shall not attempt discussion of the function of knowledge about for other areas of inquiry, even though Merleau-Ponty's position could mean much for ethics and aesthetics. We shall restrict ourselves to intersubjective 
exchange as is only prudent. 
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cern. It seems to me that this concept has special rele- 
vance with regard to intersubjective exchange. 
There is no reason to restrict the notion of project 
to an individual mode of perception. Merleau-Ponty would 
agree with the observation that individual projects which 
involve other people become "projects of relationship". 
That is, exchanges between persons form a set of rela- 
tional projects. An individual retains his or her personal 
modes of dealing with the world, but he also participates 
in relationships which have interpersonal objectives 
or modes of dealing with the world. 1 There is, thus, 
a sense in which the concept of project is an intersub- 
jective concept. That aspect is of special interest. 
The notion of project calls for a holistic inter- 
pretation of relationships; we shall elaborate. 
First, the project character of a relationship 
indicates that interaction shapes whatever concepts (or 
decisions) one party makes about the other. One is 
involved with the other prior to estimating the worth 
of the other, or the relationship. This is not to be 
construed as a time priority but as a priority of import- 
ance. If we take this priority seriously, it means that 
'We 
refer here to a "we" form of interacting with 
our world. We shall elaborate that concept below. 
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we describe a relationship in terms of its personal, 
behavioral, and environmental peculiarities and growth. 
We cannot view it as being confined to mental decisions 
made by the participants. The way a relationship grows and 
is nourished is of special concern whether that requires 
concentration upon physical expressions, or recognition 
of social influences. The notion of project requires 
that an interpreter look first at all kinds of interaction 
which constitute it as a "unique" relationship. 
Once this is corrected, however, the behaviorist 
option is no more credible. An interpersonal environ- 
ment includes personal decision-making. Project description 
is well advised to focus upon the inclinations, intentions 
and decisions of the participants, though it is certainly 
not confined to these things. Project modes are conscious 
modes, although not always self-conscious. This position 
on conscious interaction means that relationships should 
be described in terms of their mental dimensions if we 
do not attempt to make these aspects all-inclusive. 
The reational- emotional aspects of an interchange are 
important indicators aiding philosophical analysis or 
description. 
Two themes emerge. If they 
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are seen operating together as they should be, we gain a 
different approach to philosophical evaluation. A rela- 
tionship has its own unique forms; one relationship is not 
the same as another. We can never make complete general- 
izations by collecting data, e. g. about father-son inter- 
actions mother-daughter relations, etc. A relation has 
its own specific environment. In this sense every rela- 
tionship is unique; that much is evident if we properly 
utilize the concept of project. 
But if a relation is to be seen as unique, it is also 
to be seen as being open to many forces which make up an 
environment. The intentions of persons in exchange are 
never explainable in individualistic or even interpersonal 
terms. They are related to social, physical, and intellect- 
ual environments. In other words, the project nature of 
interaction indicates that relationships cannot be isolated 
from that which goes on about them; they are social and thoy 
relate to a broader sociality, a cultural milieu. 
If these aspects seem unimportant philosonhica11y, 
we have missed the point of the phenomenological approach. 
In evaluating relationships, or undertaking eidetic forms as 
the phenomenologist would say, recognition of the project 
aspect is a good beginning. The phenomenologist will remain 
aware of the uniqueness of relationships; he will submit 
concepts which describe kinds of interaction. In so doing 
334 
he will not be embarrassed about the proximateness of 
ideational forms. He will also take due account of factors 
which influence relationships because they are part of the 
participant's project. In sum, he will strive for themes 
which do justice to the broad theme of project. 
How do these themes affect our appraisal of the 
I-Thou typology? Buber held up the I-Thou form as the 
only true encounter mode. To meet was to encounter a Thou, 
to be related in a specific way. The implication was that 
no other mode was a true encounter. The I-It form lay 
outside his notion of encounter. Our application of 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of project indicates that the I- 
Thou form's exclusive role is not viable; all projects 
fall into an encounter mode. It is obvious the two thinkers 
define "encounter" quite differently. 
Encounter for Buber, is restricted to "being", 
"personal making present" and "unfolding". Encounter 
for Merleau-Ponty is all-inclusive; project is synonymous 
with an encounter mode. If we are to retain the priority 
of the project theme, we cannot at the same time claim 
that one kind of project is exclusively an encounter mode. 
I suggest that we begin to see I-Thou encounters as one 
type of encounter. 
This revision of our view of I-Thou encounter 
deserves some attention before we proceed. One of the short- 
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comings of Buber's I-Thou typology is that it had no rootage 
in perceptual modes; he strained the form by implying that 
encounter was somehow different than perceptual interaction. 
Merleau-Ponty's concept makes that separation unnecessary 
and undesireable. All modes in the subject-world relation 
are perceptual, and in the encounter mode. If we think in 
I-It, I-Thou terms, both are encounter modes and are forms 
of perception. 
Secondly, the project concept makes it possible for 
us to formulate the uniqueness of the I-Thou form: namely, 
description of, the I-Thou form is important because it refers 
to a kind of interaction that has a distinct raison d'etre 
and form of interaction. Within the context of project we 
can begin to sort out differing forms of relationships 
while not insisting that perceptual modes are missing or 
that encounter modes are absent in other typologies. With 
instruction from Ifierleau-Ponty we begin to see that involve- 
ment with another can be the kind Buber asserted. Perceptual, 
behavioral characteristics play a part, as Hepburn suggested, 
but the center of the relationship can still bear the forme 
of "personal making present" and "being; " as Buber sugponted. 
Once these suggestions are dealt with in the con- 
struction of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the I-Thou 
form can be appreciated as a distinct option. There is no 
reason to think that what Buber sought to establish for phon- 
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omenological inquiry should be disregarded. The I-Thou form 
may play an important, even central, role in the interpre- 
tation of encounter situations. We shall speak of its 
actual relevance below, but it should be said here that 
the I-Thou form, "disciplined" as it can be by the concept 
of project, may still be an integral part of a phenomenology. 
The task remains to show why the elements of the 
I-Thou form should be considered of central importance to 
the intersubjective exchange. 
One of Merleau-Ponty's forms can serve as a tran- 
sition to this, issue. I speak of his use of the term "vor- 
tex". Merleau-Ponty used this concept to show that the 
individual's experience of objects encouraged the thinker 
to put social or intersubjective experience at the center 
of phenomenology. Vortex denoted, for example, that 
people's encounter with objects is an expanding experience) 
we begin to see tools as carpenter's tools; objects indi- 
cate social purpose or social usage. 
The concept of vortex Still applies once the inter- 
subjective sphere is introduced; let us see how. f'ncounter 
with another at an acquaintance level may lead to deep 
personal interaction and social consciousnonso. The issues 
of ethics, of social responsibility, for example, may arise 
in what seems to be an isolated interpersonal problem or 
situation. The casual meeting may be followed by exchange 
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about family relationships; understanding an individual means 
encountering that person's environment. To carry it further, 
an understanding of the person's environment means that we 
encounter his circle of friends, organizations, economic and 
political forms of living. The personal is never separate 
from the social. These options are opened even though the 
relationship remains unique to us. Interaction, Merleau- 
Ponty suggests, throws us into a broader field of exper- 
ience; the vortex theme attempts to conceptualize a centri- 
fugal force in personal encounters. The same ideational 
thrust was spoken of often by Heidegger in his character- 
ization of Mitsein. 
The uses of the vortex concept are many; we cannot 
begin to consider them all. But one stands out. The meaning 
of vortex indicates that interpersonal exchange not only 
opens areas of broader communication; it opens those involved 
to the meaning of intersubjective exchange per ne. That is, 
our experience of others shapes our view of what is both 
possible in interpersonal modalities, and our view of the 
character of the lived-world. Specific relationships 
shape our description of human experience. 
If one form of encounter, no matter what ito character, 
does have implications for the whole of intersubjectivo 
experience and for a world view, then specific forms of 
encounter must be examined to estimate their roles in opening 
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a view of the whole. This does not mean that the phenomen- 
ologist plays a game of elimination, i. e. that he find some 
forms important and others unimportant. He cannot afford 
to disregard forms which affect a description of the lived- 
world. It means rather, that he interrogates forms or types 
to see how they affect the total picture of man's interaction. 
His specialization is to understand given forms in order to 
gain unitary concepts about the whole of experience. 
Vortex heightens the importance of inquiry into 
typologies such as Buber's and Heidegger's. We not only 
ask about the relevance of specific forms in shaping a phen- 
omenology of the lived-world; we ask what the function of 
a form is in disclosing the sphere of intersubjective 
exchange, --. and our social world. 
A most suggestive form for such an inquiry is M? er- 
leau-Ponty's "intercorporeality". Through the unique char- 
acter of the vortex concept we have gained access, as it 
were, to the issue of man's total experience; it is left 
for us to characterize that experience with conceptually appro- 
priate themes. ; Terleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality 
serves an important function. As a form, it has the distinct 
characteristic of "opening" and it also provides direction 
on how one evaluates other typologies. Buber'a I-Thou form 
and Heidegger's Mitsein will serve as comparative examples. 
Through such a comparison, we are better able to see how 
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specific forms of intersubjective exchange shape the whole 
of our interpretation of experience. 
First, we shall review Merleau-Ponty's concept. Inter- 
corporeality is a form of experience between persons which 
opens them to what it means to be with another. M erleau- 
Ponty saw in the handshake and glance, a deep interpene- 
tration of two personal existences. Subjects in this 
mode see things through the other's eyes; one's own world 
invades, and is invaded by another's. The impact is one 
of total involvement; euphoria occurs. The perspectives, 
joys or hatreds of one party become those of the other; 
lived-worlds are shared. Merleau-Ponty never lived to 
articulate the question of what kinds of experience were 
shared; he only said that whatever one encountered with 
the other became vitally important in one's experieneo of 
the other and of the whole existence. Individuals see them- 
selves as sharing and belonging to a common world. This 
in itself is a vital experience. In simplest terms it 
means that one's privacy is broadened to include an under- 
standing of experience from another's viewpoint or "project"; 
an encounter with whole of existence is, likewise, given an 
interpersonal meaning. 
When this intensive, if rare, form of encounter in 
compared to the forms taught by Buber and Heidegger, the 
significance of intercoporeality can be eotimatod. 
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I could see Buber affirming 1,4erleau-Ponty's concept; 
he would be very friendly to it. He would also employ it in 
the theological venture. Its philosophical importance, 
Buber would say, lies in the opening of private worlds to 
divine grace. Obviously the phenomenologist cannot readily 
adopt this position. Intercorporeality is rooted in per- 
ceptual contact; one might say that intercorporeal exchange 
is a perceptual exchange. The "leap" from the interpersonal 
to theological affirmation is neither called for nor implied 
in the form itself. At least Merleau-Ponty would not employ 
that usage; the meaning of this form, for him, is the open- 
ing of private worlds. While the two agree upon the networks 
opening those involved, they do not agree upon the necessity 
of theological affirmation. 
If the concept's primary emphasis is upon the sharing 
of personal existences, we can afford a brief comment on 
Heidegger's Mitsein. As we described that form, Mitnein 
was the absorbtion of the subject in a social sickness. 
Identity for the subject was lost and he became possessed 
by otherdirectedness. There was never a mention of shy 
worlds. Because the Heideggerian theme is lostness and 
absorbtion for the individual, we conclude that hic form 
is really foreign to intercorporeality. 
To summarize the comparison: ßuber'a form, while 
friendly to the notion of perceptual interpenetration, 
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sought to appropriate its occurrence for other purposes. 
Heidegger's Pilitsein plainly denied any real importance for 
such a form. Intercorporeality's primary significance 
amounts to the affirmation that human exchange can open 
one's life to others and can open one to a new understanding 
of the world. It is a challenging assertion this concept 
makes about our. experience. It affirms that we experience 
with another, the truth of belonging to the world of others 
and to the mystery of the world as a whole. Without theo- 
logical affirmation, yet with a bold ontological statement, 
bierleau-Ponty describes the intercorporeal as encounter with 
Being. To examine the truth of this claim we shall look 
into modes which will aid us in deciding upon the positive 
meaning of exchange. 
]ierleau-Ponty has directed us thus far, to consider 
how interpersonal modes actually bear upon our appraisal 
of the subject-world relation. We have reached the point 
where we should be able to specify how certain mode. of 
exchange do open one to the whole of personal existence. 
The problem can be nut this way also: we should be ablcc to 
show which forms of intersubjective exchange are consonant 
with intercorporeality. 
We assume here that intersubjectve exchanges carry 
positive value personally and philosophically as they affect 
the individual, his view of self with the other, and a world- 
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view. Our problem: if intersubjective exchange does not 
alter our views or projects in relation to others, if it 
does not offer the option of "being opened" to the world 
in new ways, we are wasting our time talking about its 
phenomenological significance and its relevance to the 
issue of transcendence. 
We shall deal with the characteristics of "opening" 
first, on a phenomenological level. Then we shall attempt 
to say how "opening" obtains an ontological significance. 
That is, we shall ascertain how intercorporeality becomes 
a disclosure to Being. 
I suggest that we are at the stage in our inquiry 
where the themes of trust and love can be beneficially 
compared to those of alienation. Our description of these 
forms may serve to illustrate the above issue, for trust 
and love have always been used to highlight the opened 
person and alienation the isolated individual. The following 
phenomenological appraisal is, admittedly, an addition to 
rerleau-Ponty's conceptualizations but it 5. o also consi^tnnt 
with the concepts he embraced. 
Trust and love as forms of interpersonal exchange 
do not occur in the sense that a person adopts a mental 
viewpoint "about" them by concluding the other is loving or 
hateful, faithful or unreliable. One does not decide upon 
love or trust as a viewpoint at all. Rather the two terms 
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attempt to describe an intimate form of interaction, a deep 
penetration of one's own world by, and with, another. This 
theme is suggested by one of Mierleau-ponty's remarks in the 
article "A Child's Relation with Others". 
To consent to love or be loved is to consent also to 
influence somebody else, to decide to a certain extent 
on behalf of the other. To love is inevitably to 
enter into an undivided situation with another. l 
The point about interpenetration of private worlds 
is widely accepted as a matter of common sense. Merleau- 
Ponty showed throughout his work that this same interpenetra- 
tion bore phenomenological importance. The above remark says 
it well; the person who loves and is loved enters "into an. 
undivided situation with another". 
The specific import of this is that love and trust 
illustrate the breaking of barriers between people; this 
can be expressed in two ways. The person who loves, is 
aware that his own world is reshaped in terms of the rela- 
tionship. The emphasis is here, upon the new way a once 
private world is shaped. Self-awareness in a love relation 
takes on the element of seeing one's self as one is seen by 
another. This can mean that a person merely compliments 
himself as being lovable; or more seriously, it may mean 
that the person sees himself as being truly accepted by 
p. 154. 
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another. In any degree the latter option constitutes a 
form of self-acceptance. To be loved is to see one's self 
through the eyes of the other party, and that is phenomen- 
ologically speaking, a new mode of self awareness. 
Not only does the experience of trust and love sig- 
nify the breaking of personal barriers; there is in trust- 
ful relations a distinct mode of dealing with the world at 
large. It can be put this way: the "I" form, meaning the 
subject's individual approach to others, becomes a "we" form 
in his dealings with the world. Many things can be articu- 
lated about the dynamics of trust but this theme stands out. 
A sense of interpersonal cooperation at the less intense 
levels of trust exists. Also, at more intense levels, per- 
sons deal with their worlds in the "we" form. They permit 
their partner to represent them; they are trusted to repre- 
sent their mate. Nothing about the "we" form is static; it 
is dynamic and changing but trust and love cannot be described 
fully apart from the "we". 
In short, not only is the person opened to another= 
the rerson's relation to the world iq reshaped. In trnn^t, 
a relationship forms a vital center for self-awareness, 
and a. unique mode of being in the world. 
Alienation is also a form of interaction. To be 
alienated is to be separated from someone; contact or inter- 
change is assumed in that one cannot be alienated unless 
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there has been something experienced which suggests or en- 
courages separation. The term connotes however, that one 
is separated from another's world in the sense that sharing 
is absent. As in the mode of trust there is a form of 
self-awarenss that becomes 'evident in participants. Whether 
it be a sense of rejection or unworthiness, a person's 
self-appraisal is shaped by alienating relationships. We 
remember the "resolved" man of Heidegger's system: he 
says, in effect that when separateness is accepted by man, 
he can resolve the issue of death and solitary living. 
Alienation directs self-awareness towards the solitary "I". 
We take Heidegger's description's seriously. 
Alienated man's approach to his world can be put in 
direct contrast to the trustful form of living. The "we" 
form is distinctly different than alienation= we might say 
that the logical outcome of alienation is the rejection of 
a "we" form. The "we" form is not possible if we take alien- 
ation at all seriously; one cannot be alienated "with some- 
one". To say that is to strain our language. For whatever 
reasons, this form of relation pushes the individual into a 
tighter more private lived-world. Sociality, if rejected, 
means that one not only cannot accent the mind of the crowd. 
It also means that "opening" to the world is frustrated. 
To be solitary in the final sense means being cut off from 
the lived-world. Not only is autonomy an individualist 
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form; taken as an all inclusive form, it logically frustrates 
being open to the world as a whole. 
It should not be assumed that the forms or types of 
relations we have outlined are always "separate", meaning 
that a given individual cannot experience both of them as 
well as other forms not discussed. Our point is that the 
experiential forms we have described are distinct. The phen- 
omenological themes can be delineated. Our conclusions 
are based upon their distinct characteristics. 
Love and trust connote the expanding of the private 
sphere; they are synonymous with "opening" as rierleau- 
Ponty indicated in his concepts of "project" and "vortex". 
Alienation connotes what we anticipated: it is a form of 
interaction which hardens the lines between self and others, 
and illustrates the absence of openness to the world as a 
whole. 
When the phenomenological reduction is applied "why 
this form and not another", a fairly clear answer can be 
given. Our comparison of alU. enation with love and trust 
forms indicates that alienation cimnl. y cannot serve an an 
"opening" of the subject's lived-world. Love and trust can. 
Our conclusion is that the forms of love and trust are thc, 
peculiar forms which demonstrate what I'. Lerleau-Ponty said 
in other terminology. Man, in these forms is opened to 
self and others as a participant,, Find tq the world in the 
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"we" form. Love and trust are the specific forms which most 
clearly illustrate the meaning of vortex, and intercorpor- 
eality. 
Our explication of love and trust is surely incom- 
plete but our purpose has been served. If these forms are 
of special importance in opening the subject to himself, 
others, and the world at large, if they have special rele- 
vance for a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, they can 
justifiably be considered as having a special role in open- 
ing the issue of transcendence. 
One issue remains to be discussed: it is the ques- 
tion, how will the specific forms of trust and love bear 
upon the issue of transcendence? In any attempt to make 
these forms credible philosophically, books could be written. 
We will not begin to exhaust the possibilities in our arpu- 
ment, but we introduced one issue in our analysic of ror- 
leau-Panty's ontology which is critical in establishing 
credibility. It is the question we asked at the close o: f 
that chanter: if we utilize ?. erleau-Ponty's form of onto- 
logical observation are we abandoning, as he may have, all 
connection with a phenomenology of perception's i)id ý'erl 
Pon-cy stray, in his descriptions of reversibility and inter- 
corporeality, from the path of phenomenological discipline? 
That issue calls for resolution. 
Intercorporeality was used above to conceptualize 
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the experience of a broadening self-awareness and a new 
approach to the lived-world in the "we" form. We held 
ourselves to the phenomenological context in those discuss- 
ions because we believe it was essential before any onto- 
logical observations could be made. Intercorporeality, 
however, was employed in Merleau-Ponty's ontological re- 
flections. Our task is to see if the types we have intro- 
duced make concrete the claim that intercorporeality is 
man's opening to Being or transcendence. 
Two concepts suggested by r"erleau-Ponty will aid 
our inquiry. They are, reversibility and mediation; they 
should help us to see the appropriateness of the love and 
trust types in fulfilling the requirements Merleau-Ponty 
set for the eidos, intercorporeality. 
Intercorporeality, we said was the moot suggestive 
of Merleau-Ponty's ontological categories. He submitted 
it "by title", however; reversibility was described much 
more fully. It connoted the many aspects of awareness in 
an intersubjective encounter; a person's lived--wor. ]d is 
seen both as an individual donair, and as responsivc+ to the 
experience of ^nothe. r; the per; on: i-: r: p; criher1 a^ seeing 
his oým world through the eyes of another; he irains sccers 
to the other's lived-world and participates in it; he is 
aware that lived worlds are shared and that the whole sphere 
of his experience is shaped by this exchange. 
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Other things could be said about the networks of 
reversibility, but one theme is all important. The impact 
of reversibility is that the participants belong to each 
other and to a common world. The encounter brings home, 
through its many "reverses" of awareness, that the partici- 
pants belong, in an almost literal way, to each other and 
to a common world. 
It seems to me that trustful relations as we have 
described them are peculiar candidates for making this form 
of interchange understandable and concrete. 
Trust and love connote the participant's willingness 
to submit their own private worlds to each other. We have 
described this previously in terms of "opening"; it still 
app? ies. Love is a particular way of sharing another's 
world. We mean by it that another's life has become a vital 
influence for our own project. More significant, we have 
been given something in a love relation that we could not 
possibly have provided ourselves; we become recipients of 
the other's outlook, his or her intere^ts rind committmenty, 
in short his or her peculiar appr. ouch to the world. Tt 
is not so much that we behold another' ;. ]i veil-world; it 
is more that we p^rticip_qte in a common world with the 
beloved. We have opened ourselves and been opened. 
That we experience this "reverse" is one part of 
the relation; we also assume that the other, the beloved, 
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is opened. This does not imply that we have been instru- 
mental in the opening act, but we have offered ourselves 
in trust and the other has accepted. We claim an opening 
movement for the other primarily because we have been party 
to the action as one who is received. 
These rudimentary observations on the networks of 
a loving, trustful, relationship certainly indicate that it 
corresponds to what Prerleau-Ponty noted about reversibility. 
In being opened, we "belong" to another. 
The experience of a love relation uniquely fulfills 
the theme, i' err suis. It does so especially in the sense 
that man belongs to the world in which he lives and to its 
mystery. 
In this way, the particular relationship of love 
between two persons is one which shapes man's grasp of 
existence and its meaning. We have said : )ow the other 
"opens" the individual and how the subject submits his 
private world to another; this very interaction is it^elf 
an opening towards the world at large and to the ie3^ue of 
its meaning. The world is no lon, er P. rri v, ate sphere Jf 
we take this form seriously. 
i. `oreover, once love iý, exneriencecý, that form. brcorýeý3 
a potential pattern for one's relation to the whole of 
existence. Let us be sure this is understood. I am not 
saying that a particular' trusting relation is imitated in 
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other associations, or that one trusts everyone once he 
has known trust. I am suggesting that particular trustful 
relationships become the foundation for our way of coping 
in society, our view of others and our conception of the 
world at large. Once the risk of sharing another's world 
is operative, it can grow into a pattern and become the 
focus of our total project. No matter how momentary the 
experience, it is a network which demonstrates concretely 
that we belong to others and belong to the world. It is 
the unique forms of love and trust which connote "belonging" 
as Merleau-Ponty described it. 
The term that comes to mind in elaborating thin 
pattern, is "infusion". In trust one undergoes infusion: 
one's life is invaded by another and he lots his perceptions 
and values be shared and even cared for by another. If 
we step back from this experience, it seems evident that 
life-world's are shaped by this unique experience. Love 
for another infuses us with the awareness of belonging. 
We all experience alienation, but I am suggesting that the 
experience of love and trust forever affects our openness 
to the world at large. In it we have received and given= 
that pattern can become the norm for all others. Once 
belongingness becomes apparent, other forms of relation 
become subordinate. 
Reversibility and ''en suis are given npecificity 
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and concreteness by the form of love and trust. 
The concept of mediation is also clarified by the 
love and trust forms. Especially when we attack the issue 
of how the interhuman confronts man with 'transcendence, 
are the connections important. Two elements in the love 
form bring us to a better understanding of mediation. 
When the question arises, "what is comnunicated or 
mediated in , loving relations, 
the most sensible answer 
is, "the person, his or her lived-world". What love and 
trust indicate in the context of mediation is that the 
sharing of worlds is truly accomplished; it is not simply 
a matter of personal awareness. The concept of reversibility 
left that issue unanswered because it dealt with the inter- 
human as a matter of awareness. Mediation says not only 
"I belong"; it says life-worlds are given and received, 
truly shared. When this is particularized in the event of 
love and trust its meaning becomes clear. 
The experience of facing the other and the world at 
large as one who is accented, is considerably different 
than living as a solitary self. The "tire" form is not a 
form for autonomous beings, but for persons who sham and 
are different becaune of it. Once we have felt the impact. 
of the other tigre do not hold ourselves aloof; we have become 
vunerable, perhaps, more accepting. The point is we are 
different; in the node of love we communicate differently, 
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behave differently and think differently than if we had 
not confronted the beloved. What we mediate to others in 
this form is an altered, opened self. Mediation becomes 
more understandable in the context of an I-Thou relation. 
The second aspect is the nub of the issue in this 
study. Mediation is a two-way thoroughfare. The other who 
offers his world to us and is opened in the sharing of love, 
communicates a new sense of the whole. It is best here to 
speak of "being confronted", or of "reception" for that 
element in love is unmistakable. What lerleau-Ponty describ- 
ed as "floating on the wave of Being" is suggestive of the 
point. In love we experience the world as being disclosed. 
The other has opened himself, we share and belong 
to that world. When the question of the meaning of existence 
is pressed, the response is, we have behold and been involved 
in an experience of unveiling. We have been confirmed, 
accepted. For those who take this experience seriously, 
it is not a leap of the imagination that calls for the claim 
of truth about this event. I1, 'edi? tion means dicelonure of 
truth, of Being; it is made concrete in the I-Thou form. 
The two elements ayes we mediate a changed self to 
the other in love, a vunerable "I"; we Ploo receive in the' 
trust of another a sense of disclosure. 
It should be clearly noted here that we have not 
attempted to pursue the specific meaning of dicclosuro. 
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That it seems to me, would take us into "high altitude 
thinking". We have not attempted to assign universal values 
or principles to the event of love and trust; we have not 
said that it is analogous to grace or that it reveals the 
love of God. Merleau-Ponty's reticence is well placed and 
so is ours. To proceed in that manner would be to present 
an explanation of the event and its conceptual themes. 
We are especially mindful at this point that we are describ- 
ing an interpersonal phenomenon; we see in that event cer- 
tain forms and emerging themes but we do not attempt explan- 
ation. 
We have not strayed far from the original insights 
of Merleau-Ponty; yet we have I suggest, made clearer the 
ontological implcations of intercubjective exchange. In 
sum, we have said that the human subject is uniquely opened 
to the meaning of his being through love and trust; we have 
argued that the question of the meaning of existence per se 
is shaped uniquely by loving and trustful relationships, 
and we have observed that disclosure is a reciprocal affair. 
The world is not sir-)ly an entity such as Sartre's massivr' 
Peing, but a "disclo: &ng" world, a worin which we find 
opening through intercubjective encounter. Pa. rti. cu1ry. r1y is 
this latter Plement i. riportant in our rýtuddy. Tt is the onto- 
logical sphere we have affirmed when we say that, in love 
and trust man begins to have a true relation with the world 
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at large. 
The ontological significance of love and trust means 
this: we affirm that the truth of man's existence is commun- 
icated uniquely through this form of relation. The truth of 
our being and the truth of existence is encountered uniquely 
in the love form of relation. The disclosure of Being may 
still be characterized as an encounter with mystery for we 
have not attempted to explain what is disclosed; we have 
not assigned to the mystery the name of love or any other 
name. That man confronts the meaning of his existence, 
that he belongs to the unveiling experience and to others 
in common wonder, this is enough. Interpersonal exchanges 
of love and trust become our access to the truth about the 
entire subject-world relation. 
Our phenomenological description of intersubjectivity 
does not necessitate belief in God. That, it seems to me, 
is beyond the legitimate bounds of our discussion. 
but we have gone much further than presenting a 
nhilosorhical question which theolofy will have to answer. 
The constructive effort for a. phenomenolo7, y of intersubjectiv- 
ity is much more than the creation of a favorable atmosphere 
for theological affirmations. We have made the claim that 
the truth of the subject-world relation is disclosed in the 
experience of love. We have claimed that a disclosure of 
the truth of our being can be identified here as in no other 
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way. Without resorting to theological perspectives we have 
argued that there is something essential to be known about 
ourselves and our world in the context of the love-trust 
forms. The "new" knowledge about ourselves can be put 
clearly; as love and trust become the forms which yield 
truth, so we are taught to seek continued contact with self 
and others in that very manner. Through an experience of 
trust comes a continued awareness that we are meant to 
express what we have found as our truth. 
From the phenomenological standpoint, the experience 
of love is the key to a concept of man as the mediator of 
transcendence. The unitary theme we presented is that 
man is a communicant and communicator; he both participates 
in relationships which present him with a new understanding 
of the world and he also offers others that which they them- 
selves cannot provide. He presents himself as "the other" 
for the beloved. Man is a bearer of transcendence as he 
is its recipient. 
Phenomenological discipline requires we emphasize 
that concepts discussed here are di 
reflective. They cannot be deemed 
which we can use without reference 
But if the experiences of love are 
ological discourse we do gain what 
This much "knowledge about" man is 
ependent upon the nre- 
absolute categories 
to particular events. 
perrnissable in phenomen- 
I have suggested above. 
attainable within the 
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conceptual scheme. 
Ontology, as we have attempted to develop it, is 
not divorced from a phenomenology of encounter. It is 
credible only if the phenomenology is so; encounter with 
Being is rooted in the interpersonal modes we have found 
to be central. 
Our study is but one way of introducing a discussion 
of the issue of transcendence, but I believe it is an import- 
ant approach. A phenomenologically oriented discussion 
can conform to Buber's objectives; discussion of trans- 
cendence as he suggested, will concentrate on the question 
of human relationships and will specifically take its cue 
from the love-trust forms. It will argue that concepts of 
transcendence should be rooted in that experiential sphere. 
But as Hepburn rightly saw, it will not attempt 
either to "leap" to a concept of grace from its study of 
the intersubjective, and it will not permit a presupposition 
to direct its investigations. 
The procedures outlined are not a simple compromise 
between theological affirmations and empirical philosophy. 
Phenomenological discipline and its resultant themes call 
for a radical reappraisal of both theological and philosoph- 
ical viewpoints. 
A phenomenology of intersubjectivity is, I believe, 
of central concern for other phenomenological studies. 
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Without overstating the case, it can be said that the recog- 
nitions argued heretofore should force any study of essences 
to regard the interpersonal sphere with utmost seriousness. 
We did not set out to explain every aspect of sociality and 
we shall not pursue that issue here, but mention of the task 
must be made. 
Most importantly for this study, the effects on 
theological discipline should be reviewed. The following 
is a brief statement of position as dictated by this study. 
Theological disciplines have continually sought to 
work out a right relation to philosophy. That concern lay 
in the back of my mind throughout this investigation. 
Controversy has characterized every effort to solve that 
problem. No solution has satisfied this writer. P+Ierleau- 
Ponty is significant because he persisted in a critical 
but constructive phenomenology. I do not think his onto- 
logical reflections betrayed his phenomenology of social 
exchange and I do not believe my portrayal of the I-Thou 
type as a form of human love and trust fades into oracul- 
arism. It certainly makes no theological affirmation 
necessary and it receives its vitality in the study of 
perception. 
A phenomenology of the interhuman, however, can prod 
the thinker to ponder the appropriateness of faith in God. 
To face the other and be opened to the world is to face the 
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question of Being. How is that experience to be named? 
The Neiztschean man may persist to say "Nothingness", the 
Christian, "Father". There are, perhaps, many other names. 
But one thing haunts every utterance; we have opened our- 
selves and been opened. Our lives have been changed by 
loving and trusting. The experience, if fleeting, is 
unique and we are moved to utter words and concepts which 
approximate the impact of love in our lives. 
The theologian who responds to this perspective is 
at once restricted and set free to make us of phenomen- 
ological studies. We have repeatedly asserted the restric- 
tion: there can be no assumption that divine grace is 
specified as the presupposition which directs phenomenolog- 
ical study to a given finding. And there can be no pretense, 
as Hepburn saw, to structure a phenomenology so as to reveal 
an ostensive definition of God either through analogy or 
the "gesture" of encounter. We have patiently sought to 
expose that objective as philosophically unjustified. But 
once it is recognized as an unwise attemrt at natural 
theology, the theological vocation can he er. ercised. 
We have argued that a Phenomenology of i. ntersub j ect- 
ivity does involve a recognition of transcendence. We have 
described. that recognition as an experience of Otherness 
or Being, intimately bound up with the experience of another 
person in love and trust. Otherness or Mystery, in phen- 
360 
omenological discipline cannot be named, that much is certain 
if we listen to Merleau-Ponty. But need that be a difficulty 
for the theologian? No. The relation is made clearer be- 
tween phenomenology and theology because there is no com- 
plete connection between the disciplines, their methods or 
affirmations. The theologian becomes the "warring brother" 
in this senses he names the experience of Otherness; he 
particularizes the experience of transcendence. There is 
no neat justification for his position. He sets himself 
free to affirm something the philosopher cannot be expected 
to affirm. Theology becomes a discipline which consciously 
risks affirmation. 
In light of our study it is appropriate to commend 
to theological study, the concept of "transcendence in 
immanence". We shall not attempt to describe fully what 
that concept entails, but it is not beyond our bounds to 
say why the concept is appropriate. 
If the interhuman is to be a vital artery in shaping 
a concez)t of transcendence, man's role as a mediator should 
be retained. Transcendence as a mystery intimately bound 
to the expressions of love does involve man's activity. 
That man possesses the power or divine spark need not be 
posited; the lesson of our study is that man, in exchange, 
communicates the truth of Otherness and is its recipient. 
Transcendence in immanence retains this focus. 
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A second aspect of the concept's appropriateness is 
that it makes room for the affirmation that Otherness is 
not a creation of man. Otherness is experienced with an- 
other; it is experienced but not contained in the interhuman 
event. Phenomenological discipline makes no claim which 
would confine the experience to a radical humanism. Again, 
transcendence in immanence conveys this. 
These two elements are given prominence in our 
research. They shape theological affirmation if the rindings 
about the interhuman are deemed credible. 
The major influence, however, is a more general one. 
Phenomenological descriptions serve to remind the religious 
thinker that conceptualization is rooted in the pre--reflective 
interaction of worldly people. Faith is rooted in behavior 
if we take seriously the holistic concept of behavior. 
Perhaps, that is the main result of our study; it is the 
lesson that theological research nee('s to be constantly in 
touch with the lived-world. That 11-jer'. -world, in the forms 
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